The Russian Academy of Sciences recently announced the opening of the Xi Jinping Thought Research Laboratory, the first program outside of China dedicated to studying the thought of Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平). The founding of this laboratory reflects Russia’s increased reliance on China due to Western economic sanctions.
Data from the Chinese General Administration of Customs show a 75.6 percent increase in Chinese exports to Russia compared with last year. In March, Xi visited the Kremlin to show support for the Russian regime and discuss further partnerships. Despite this close friendship between the two autocracies, China, unlike Iran, has yet to provide weapons to Russia. Furthermore, in April, Xi held a telephone call with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy and pledged to stay neutral in this war. This careful balancing act shows that China’s strategic thinking is a lot more nuanced and complex than some Taiwanese and Western pundits have described.
Chinese attempts to retain the moral high ground at the expense of Russia’s war efforts most likely frustrate Moscow. China often sends mixed signals to the Russian political elite, which in turn finds it necessary to study Xi Jinping Thought and understand its implementation.
However, their efforts are unlikely to be fruitful. Xi is not as ideologically dogmatic as Mao Zedong (毛澤東) was.
Xi focuses on consolidating his power over the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) while attempting to elevate China’s global influence. Achieving such goals is often justified through realpolitik, rather than on ideological grounds. Hence, Xi’s decisions cannot be extrapolated from the study of Xi Jinping Thought alone. Due to the limited public information and lack of transparency on the inner workings of the CCP’s politburo, the factional dynamics are unlikely to be fully understood by outsiders, including Russian academics.
Nonetheless, the central problem for modern autocracies is how they claim legitimacy. This is often done on shaky grounds, by building uneasy alliances with the elites, keeping overly ambitious subordinates in check, and maintaining some semblance of control over the armed forces.
Behind every ostentatious display of power is an insecure leader reasserting his dominance over the state apparatus. Providing the appearance of stability, strongman rule often involves a brutal crackdown on political dissidents and opponents. This “might is right” attitude encourages fierce power struggles once the strongman leader is perceived as showing signs of weakness, especially in times of national crisis. For instance, Wagner Group leader and founder Yevgeny Prigozhin, citing the ineptitude of Russian Minister of Defense Sergei Shoigu, practically declared war on the Russian Ministry of Defense. Wagner mercenaries shot down several Russian military helicopters and seized military facilities during their advance to Moscow. In response, Russian attack helicopters bombed a fuel depot in Voronezh to harm Wagner’s fuel supply. Prigozhin eventually backed down and ordered his troops to withdraw. Whether Prigozhin would share the same fate as former Chinese vice premier Lin Biao (林彪), who died in a plane crash after allegedly organizing a coup, remains to be seen. Nonetheless, this chaotic confrontation is still a sign of instability of the strongman rule during a national crisis.
For Russia, many of the problems China is facing today hit too close to home, meaning that Russian academics might find it difficult to critically analyze Xi without offending Russian President Vladimir Putin. A critical study of Xi Jinping Thought must be approached by understanding the inherent and unavoidable dilemma of strongman rule.
Linus Chiou graduated from the University of Virginia.
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