I heard from a teacher that famous US and Hong Kong martial artist Bruce Lee (李小龍) once said: “In kung fu, one hand lies while the other throws bitter truths on the face.” I think this strategy of deception is more cunning and consequential in politics.
Chinese strategist Sun Tzu (孫子) had a name for it: making a noise in the east and striking in the west.
It is difficult to say whether or how any party has applied this strategy in the war in Ukraine, but it was on display in the Chinese city of Xian.
However, the word display undermines the deceptive nature of the strategy; it is more appropriate to say it was camouflaged in Xian with cultural performances and diplomatic platitudes.
I am referring to the inaugural China-Central Asia Summit (CCAS) recently held in China.
The CCAS seemed to have attracted media attention more for its timing — it took place on the same date (May 19) as the G7 summit in Japan — rather than its nature. The timing is a careful and indeed brilliant tactical calculation rather than simple coincidence.
By scheduling the CCAS on the same date as the G7 summit, Beijing sought to achieve several goals.
First, it gave the impression that China is taking on the US-led G7 industrialized democracies at a time when the Sino-US relationship is going through a tough time.
The summit was helpful in projecting China’s power abroad, as well as burnishing the regime’s image at home, where nationalism is a vital injection for political legitimacy.
Second, the summit’s timing not only prevented all of the spotlights from focusing on the latter, where key issues discussed included how to bite Russia with more sanctions and deal with an aggressive China. It also showed China’s potential to lead other authoritarian countries under its umbrella in terms of security, regime stability and development strategy as an alternative to the existing world order.
The most important and probably the most consequential outcome of the CCAS is the third point. By seemingly competing with the G7 summit, Beijing began formalizing its sphere of influence in Central Asia, while Moscow is bogged down in a war.
Unlike the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, which includes big powers such as India and Russia, the CCAS is exclusively a China-led, China-dominated group. By making it an exclusive club for China and Central Asia, Beijing has made it clear there is no room for Russia.
It might not be a case of China backstabbing Russia, but it could possibly be a case of Beijing ensuring that it has Central Asian republics from Russia’s former Soviet sphere in its back pocket.
Moscow is likely to feel more pain as Beijing expands its playground to include critical spaces once considered as Russia’s backyard. Russia knows it, but it cannot afford to confront China, for the time being, at least.
The CCAS is the latest sign of how terrible the war in Ukraine is for the Kremlin.
Russia has never seemed so weak as it is today. It is internationally isolated and dependent on China for politics and trade — the consequences of which are beginning to weigh on Moscow.
China sees Russia’s predicament as a strategic opportunity to increase its footprint deep into Central Asia where Moscow’s influence loomed larger than other powers, including Beijing.
Putin’s unilateral war in Ukraine means it is easy for the Central Asian dictators of former Soviet republics to have bad dreams about their authoritarian future.
Last year, Russia sent troops to crack down on popular protests in Kazakhstan, but how much could Moscow do if similar protests were to happen today?
Central Asian dictators are preparing for unfavorable consequences of the Ukraine war, which could lead to a change of guard in the Kremlin that might incline more toward democracy. If they cooperate with China on issues such as trade and security, including regime stability, it could increase Beijing’s interests in the security and stability of an authoritarian Central Asia.
Interestingly though, China tried to spin the first CCAS as promotion of multilateralism.
China’s foreign minister said all the parties in the CCAS agreed to “firmly defend multilateralism and resist unilateralism, hegemonism and power politics.”
This is an old Chinese jibe at the US.
However, despite China’s fondness for singing the language of multilateralism, it is at best a selective one rather than sanctity.
This cannot be more conspicuous than the ways in which China deals with its neighbors in Southeast Asia with whom it has maritime disputes. The nature of the disputes, with overlapping claims from multiple countries, demands a multilateral approach to the problem, but Beijing is always reluctant to solve the issue using a multilateral framework. It is, being the dominant power in the region, more advantageous to engage bilaterally.
Moreover, when it serves its purpose, China is more than willing to engage in unilateral actions such as building artificial islands and military installations in the disputed seas and territories to shift the “status quo” in its favor. This unilateral salami slicing strategy is seen at work for South China Sea to the Himalayas as Beijing pushes its expansionism.
For China, multilateralism is a means not the end — more of strategy than a principle. In this context, the CCAS is part of a strategy to bring the region under its umbrella of influence. It is multilateral in appearance, but calibrated for a China-led unipolar Asia.
In Chinese eyes, Russia is a competitor in Central Asia, just like India is in South Asia. Diluting and displacing regional competitors is a necessary stepping stone to building a unipolar Asia under China.
China, like a hungry wolf, can smell where the meat is available. Strategically, the time is right for China to push its influence on Central Asia, while Russian legs are stuck in a deep Ukrainian mud.
Palden Sonam is a political analyst.
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