A week away from the world’s most important election this year, the contest between Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his main opposition candidate, Kemal Kilicdaroglu, is tight.
The polls suggest that all outcomes are possible: Erdogan could extend his rule into a third decade or lose the presidency, his People’s Alliance could retain or lose its parliamentary majority.
However, an air of desperation has crept into the campaign speeches of the president and senior figures of his Justice and Development Party.
To distract voters from their disastrous mismanagement of the economy, they are trotting out tired tropes to connect with voters.
Erdogan, back to the hustings after a three-day break because of a stomach bug, is railing against the LGBT community, and saying that the opposition is backed by terrorists.
There is the oldest chestnut of them all: Justice and Development Party leaders are accusing the West of planning to influence the vote.
After all, they say, US President Joe Biden is on record saying that the US should “embolden” the opposition to defeat Erdogan in elections.
Turkish Minister of the Interior Suleyman Soylu has warned of a Western “political coup attempt” on election day. Erdogan also has alluded to a “plot” against him.
Referring to himself in the third person, he told CNN-Turk television: “The West is saying that it is against Erdogan. Their hostile stance toward Erdogan is a hostile stance toward my nation — my nation will foil this plot on May 14.”
Such hysterical pronouncements about Western conspiracies smack of excuse-making in preparation for defeat.
Still, Erdogan is not entirely wrong to assume that Biden and many European leaders would be glad to see the back of him — in large part for his open hostility toward them and his disregard for their strategic concerns.
Kilicdaroglu’s congenitally conciliatory tone of voice, a sharp contrast to Erdogan’s hectoring timbre, would be a welcome change in and of itself.
Western leaders hope that a change of leadership in Ankara would lead to Turkey’s quick return to the NATO fold after years of drift eastward.
At a time when NATO faces its greatest challenge from Russian President Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine, the alliance would be glad to have Turkey as part of the consensus rather than as a spoiler.
However, even if the election produces the worst outcome for Erdogan, Western leaders should guard against freighting Kilicdaroglu with too much expectation.
He would likely save the political capital accruing from victory for domestic priorities — such as freeing political prisoners, unshackling the press, taming high inflation, rescuing a weak currency and fixing the damage from February’s twin earthquakes — rather than fritter it away on foreign policy about-turns.
Furthermore, he shares Erdogan’s worldview in a number of areas where it diverges from the Western perspective.
If the West wants Kilicdaroglu to be flexible on foreign policy, it would need to help him clean the mess Erdogan has made of the Turkish economy.
Failing that, it would need to be patient while he tackles that herculean task.
One contentious issue where NATO can expect quick resolution under a Kilicdaroglu presidency is Sweden’s accession: The opposition has already said it would remove Erdogan’s veto. Conceivably, the alliance could have 32 members by July, when they gather for a summit in Vilnius.
However, Kilicdaroglu is unlikely to quickly remove the other thorn afflicting Turkey’s relations with its Western allies: Erdogan’s purchase of Russia’s S-400 missile defense system, which potentially compromises NATO’s defenses.
Kilicdaroglu has previously endorsed the purchase. He has said he wants to maintain good relations with Russia, which has become one of Turkey’s most important trading partners, as well as a key supplier of energy. Moscow would not look kindly on Ankara backing away from the S-400 deal.
For the same reason, the West should not expect a Kilicdaroglu government to join the sanctions regime against Russia, or participate in any kind of economic blockade.
Like Erdogan, he would argue that Turkey can play a more useful role as a potential peacemaker in Ukraine — and a conduit through which Ukrainian grain can reach the wider world.
Another area where Kilicdaroglu would disappoint Westerners expecting major change is Syria, specifically in his dealings with the Kurdish groups that have helped the West in the fight against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria.
There is little sunlight between Erdogan and the opposition in the view that the Kurdish groups, some of which are aligned with terrorist organizations, represent an existential threat to Turkey.
Even if he were inclined to be flexible, the presence of the nationalist Iyi Party in Kilicdaroglu’s alliance would stay his hand on Kurdish issues.
Likewise, Kilicdaroglu wants to deport millions of Syrian refugees back to their war-torn homeland, a move that would not endear him to rights groups.
Kilicdaroglu has pledged to reset relations with the West, and there is no reason to doubt his sincerity.
However, even if there is a change in government in Ankara after May 14, its priorities would be very different to those of Washington or Brussels.
The West would be wise to manage its expectations.
Bobby Ghosh is a Bloomberg Opinion columnist covering foreign affairs. Previously, he was editor-in-chief at Hindustan Times, managing editor at Quartz and international editor at Time. This column does not necessarily reflect the opinion of the editorial board or Bloomberg LP and its owners.
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