It seems that Taiwan is not the only country whose international status is contested by the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Or at least, this is the conclusion that can be drawn from a statement by Chinese Ambassador to France Lu Shaye (盧沙野), who in an interview with the LCI news channel on Friday last week asserted that the countries that emerged from the dissolution of the former Soviet Union have “no effective status” under international law.
The Baltic states of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia were prompt to issue a coordinated response demanding clarification and an explanation by the PRC.
Lu’s statement was particularly ill-timed, as the EU is about to restart an official discussion on reopening negotiations on the Comprehensive Agreement on Investments with Beijing.
These developments are taking place in the context of Russia’s ongoing invasion of Ukraine. Russia’s aggression has not only reshaped Europe’s strategic outlook, but has forced European countries to reassess their own political and economic relations through the prism of the war. And the PRC’s apparent leaning on Moscow’s side — most clearly demonstrated by Chinese President Xi Jinping’s (習近平) recent trip to Russia — has not played in Beijing’s favor. The unwillingness of Chinese officials to even talk to Ukrainian representatives has led many in Europe to doubt the sincerity of Beijing’s so-called “peace plan” for Ukraine.
Lu’s interview has only reinforced this perception, not least because of his reiteration of Russia’s talking points on the fabricated nature of Ukrainian statehood. At the same time, Lu’s pronouncement appears to undermine China’s recent rhetorical “charm offensive” in Europe that Beijing has moved away from its “wolf warrior” tactics.
While taking place far from Taiwanese shores, these developments have implications for Taiwan: They call attention to the old proverb that having many acquaintances, means having no real friends (廣交友,無深交). It seems that after a decade of its Belt and Road Initiative, Beijing has begun to realize the validity of this proverb, as the only support it can get is by either bullying or buying countries.
With a combined territory of just over 175,000km2 and a combined population of a little more than 6 million, the three Baltic states are considered small, and not just by European standards. Yet, they have been consistently punching above their weight — especially, when it comes to calling out authoritarian regimes in Russia and China.
Over the past two years, first Lithuania and then Estonia and Latvia left China’s cooperation with the countries of central and eastern Europe. Ever since Russia invaded Ukraine, the three Baltic states have been the top three aid providers to Kyiv when measured as a percentage of GDP.
This Baltic assertiveness suggests a qualitatively new condition in international life — smallness on the world stage is no longer only about size (if it ever were), but about the kind of relationships a country has. In this respect, it is not merely about the “power” that a country possesses, but the kind of power it can exercise through its relationships. Thus, while a relationship might be asymmetrical in military terms, it can be less so diplomatically, economically or politically, thanks to the ties a country has.
For instance, the example of the tiny Baltic states ending their participation in China-European cooperation and defying Russia by providing aid to Ukraine was made possible because of their central position in a dense network of European and Euro-Atlantic relations, as well as close political, economic and cultural bilateral ties with countries across Europe and North America. These developments would suggest that small states — even when their international status is contested — might have a few trump cards up their sleeves depending on who their international partners are.
In this respect, the quality and resolve of a nation’s international friends could make the difference in whether it stands a chance against a great-power bully.
The obvious lesson for Taiwan is to enmesh itself in a network of strategic partners on whose commitment it can count. In this setting, the adage “less is more” seems to be especially pertinent — countries such as Taiwan need to be selective.
This might be difficult for Taipei to stomach as it needs as many countries as possible to secure its inclusion in major international forums. Yet, as demonstrated by the Baltic states and Ukraine’s resistance to Russia’s invasion, when push comes to shove, the quality of partnerships tends to trump their quantity.
Moreover, the search for committed and meaningful partners has been complicated by the growing fragmentation of world affairs. As demonstrated by the Russian invasion, “geopolitical distance” seems to trump geographic considerations. “Like-minded” countries whose “value based” foreign policies align have banded together to support Ukraine.
Such “friend shoring” has already started to dominate financial and trade flows. And while the job of Taiwanese diplomats is becoming ever more challenging, it seems that statements such as Lu’s offer an unexpected helping hand in identifying Taipei’s true friends.
Emilian Kavalski is the NAWA chair professor of complex systems with the Centre for International Studies and Development at the Jagiellonian University in Krakow, Poland.
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