Germany and France have always been the twin engines driving the EU, but it appears that they are pursuing divergent policies toward China.
While Germany is upholding the principle of values-based diplomacy and reducing its reliance on China, France has become the standard-bearer for rebelling against the US and pleasing China.
Germany and France are headed for a tug-of-war between pro-US and China-friendly attitudes, and their respective approaches would influence the EU’s formation of a united approach to China.
Germany’s recent tightening of its policies regarding 5G technology, the visits to Taiwan by a high-ranking German Bundestag delegation and German Minister of Education and Research Bettina Stark-Watzinger, as well as the likelihood that the country would re-examine Chinese investment in a shipping terminal in Hamburg, are signs that foretold the tough stance taken by German Minister for Foreign Affairs Annalena Baerbock during her visit to China last week.
Berlin also deployed its navy frigate Bayern to the Indo-Pacific region from 2021 to last year, and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz visited Japan twice within less than a year.
The revelation of draft China policy guidelines that focus on reducing Germany’s reliance on China is a further indication that Berlin’s East Asian deployment is in full swing.
Germany’s departure from former chancellor Angela Merkel’s 16-year path of “putting business first and being friendly to China” puts Taiwan in an important strategic position.
Meanwhile, French President Emmanuel Macron has chosen a path of moving away from the US and engaging with Asia, centered on China, which is different from other Western countries’ containment policies.
Macron’s idea of “strategic autonomy” and moving toward a third way involves economic reliance on China. His “strategic autonomy” means hovering between the US and China, which contrasts with the Nordic countries’ fear of Russia and urgent desire to join NATO, and from central and east European countries’ Russia-phobic and pro-US attitudes, as well as their rejection of China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Possibly only Hungary, which is friendly to Russia and China, but less friendly to the US, might be in tune with Macron’s approach.
Surprisingly, before Italy endorsed Beijing’s initiative in March 2019, it was Macron who warned that Europe should not be too naive about China and exercise due caution. It was thanks to him that the EU in 2019 put forward 10 countermeasures to China, defining it as a “systemic rival” and aiming to reach a united position toward Beijing.
Macron could have used France’s membership in the UN Security Council and its possession of nuclear weapons, which give it a higher status than Germany in terms of defense, to lead the EU in upholding values-based diplomacy, but instead he handed this role to Germany.
With Germany and France taking such widely different approaches to China, the US and China are likely to react by defending whichever country most closely represents their respective interests.
Germany shut down its nuclear power plants, and Berlin is reducing its reliance on China in key areas and re-evaluating Chinese investment in Germany. Germany’s demand for China’s market to be fair and open, its closeness to Taiwan, its protection of peace in the Taiwan Strait, and its bold criticisms of the human rights situation in Xinjiang and Tibet would help Europe consolidate its three principles of a market economy, democracy and the rule of law, which are conditions of EU membership.
If the EU wants to become a “third superpower” independent of the US and China, it must stand on the moral high ground and say what needs to be said instead of submitting to economic threats. That would allow it to provide a third option.
Germany’s current policies of reducing its reliance on China in key areas and upholding values-based diplomacy are the right way to go about it.
Chang Meng-jen is an associate professor and chair of Fu Jen Catholic University’s Department of Italian Language and Culture.
Translated by Julian Clegg
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