The Reserve Officers’ Training Corps (ROTC), introduced by the Ministry of National Defense, recently received much criticism on the letters pages of local newspapers.
Some readers wrote that the ROTC should be abolished, saying that the overall training environment and hours of ROTC officers are inferior to those of regular officers from public military academies, making it difficult for the training corps graduates to adapt to being in the military or to be promoted.
Other readers wrote that by following the example of the Nanya Institute of Technology — which in 2018 founded the country’s only ROTC military academy in Taoyuan — a private military academy should also be established by a college in northern, central, southern and eastern Taiwan.
I am glad that the public is concerned about national defense and that many are willing to discuss the pros and cons of the ROTC. I have also met or worked with many ROTC officers in the military, so I would like to share some thoughts.
First, ROTC officers can contribute to reform and innovation in the military’s organizational culture. Given that such officers study, live and receive military training at a private college, their approaches and perspectives are often different from those of students who live 24 hours a day under centralized management at regular military academies. This certainly affects military leadership and organizational practice.
ROTC officers can help make adjustments to the conservative and stereotypical practices that are projected by the military’s regulations and orders. ROTC cadres and troops are willing to change gradually while breaking rigid command styles and stern management.
The inclusion of ROTC graduates has the potential to reform the military organizational culture and enhance its efficiency. It cannot be done overnight, but is a work in progress.
Next, high-ranking officials must stop perceiving officers from regular military academies as having more legitimacy than ROTC graduates. There is no difference between them in quality or so-called legitimacy. The key lies in their personal characteristics as well as willingness to give their best to the military.
Those who are willing to contribute can “learn by doing, do by learning,” and ability becomes strong as experience is accumulated in command coordination, leadership, management and administrative integration.
This is certainly not something that can only be achieved by officers from regular military academies. Officers from past special programs and the junior college of the ROTC Military Academy, professional officers, specialty officers, reserve officers and even ROTC officers can also do the job and do it well. The military must first reach such a consensus.
It can be seen from the background of students at the National Defense University’s (NDU) War College or Army, Naval and Air Force Command and Staff Colleges, which are responsible for military officers’ advanced education, that all students who meet the requirements for admission are above standard and with great experience.
When I was teaching at NDU, my students included middle and high-ranking cadres from several officer training systems. Even some of Taiwan’s general officers have risen from alternative officer training systems.
Irrespective of a person’s position or origin, as long as they are committed wholeheartedly to the nation, have an aptitude for the military, and are always willing to learn, they are sure to rise to prominence in the military.
Chang Ling-ling is a retired colonel in the armed forces reserves.
Translated by Eddy Chang
Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) caucus whip Fu Kun-chi (傅?萁) has caused havoc with his attempts to overturn the democratic and constitutional order in the legislature. If we look at this devolution from the context of a transition to democracy from authoritarianism in a culturally Chinese sense — that of zhonghua (中華) — then we are playing witness to a servile spirit from a millennia-old form of totalitarianism that is intent on damaging the nation’s hard-won democracy. This servile spirit is ingrained in Chinese culture. About a century ago, Chinese satirist and author Lu Xun (魯迅) saw through the servile nature of
In their New York Times bestseller How Democracies Die, Harvard political scientists Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt said that democracies today “may die at the hands not of generals but of elected leaders. Many government efforts to subvert democracy are ‘legal,’ in the sense that they are approved by the legislature or accepted by the courts. They may even be portrayed as efforts to improve democracy — making the judiciary more efficient, combating corruption, or cleaning up the electoral process.” Moreover, the two authors observe that those who denounce such legal threats to democracy are often “dismissed as exaggerating or
Monday was the 37th anniversary of former president Chiang Ching-kuo’s (蔣經國) death. Chiang — a son of former president Chiang Kai-shek (蔣介石), who had implemented party-state rule and martial law in Taiwan — has a complicated legacy. Whether one looks at his time in power in a positive or negative light depends very much on who they are, and what their relationship with the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) is. Although toward the end of his life Chiang Ching-kuo lifted martial law and steered Taiwan onto the path of democratization, these changes were forced upon him by internal and external pressures,
The Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) caucus in the Legislative Yuan has made an internal decision to freeze NT$1.8 billion (US$54.7 million) of the indigenous submarine project’s NT$2 billion budget. This means that up to 90 percent of the budget cannot be utilized. It would only be accessible if the legislature agrees to lift the freeze sometime in the future. However, for Taiwan to construct its own submarines, it must rely on foreign support for several key pieces of equipment and technology. These foreign supporters would also be forced to endure significant pressure, infiltration and influence from Beijing. In other words,