Taiwanese got a nasty surprise on Sunday as French President Emmanuel Macron, in the air on his way home from Guangzhou, China, sparked controversy by saying in an interview that Europe must avoid getting caught up in crises that are not its own. This was in clear reference to Taiwan.
After a run of good developments recently, this capped a bad week for Taipei, coming on top of the EU deciding not to move forward with a bilateral investment agreement.
Yet what do Macron’s comments actually mean for Taiwan?
It is important to ground one’s understanding here: What Macron said does not represent a change in policy for France, which no-one expects to help defend Taiwan against Chinese aggression. Nor is it obvious that he is suggesting France would not join European sanctions against China, especially given his comments on European unity (more on this later).
France has been, and still is, a good friend to Taiwan. Even as Macron was speaking, French-built frigates and jets patrolled the Strait, helping to keep Taiwan safe. France is also a Pacific country with more than half a million citizens living in New Caledonia and French Polynesia — it has direct security interests in the region.
However, it is also true that these comments are some of the most negative and damaging to come from a European leader in recent years, which have been characterized by friendliness toward Taiwan and a guarded attitude toward China. Beijing is certain to publicly interpret them as recognition of its sovereignty claims.
No one knows what Macron said in private to Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平), but it seems likely that at best he will be seen as showing a lack of resolve and at worse a lack of interest in Taiwan’s security.
Given that Europe has been steadfast in its allyship of Ukraine, Beijing has shown a renewed interest in driving a wedge between Brussels and Washington, explaining Chinese support for European “strategic autonomy.” The goal here is not only to weaken the US’ standing in the world, but also to reduce the scope and scale of European sanctions on China in the worst-case scenario.
Taiwanese have the right to be angry over these comments, especially given the high level of support they have shown for Ukraine, helping Europe in a crisis “that is not their own.”
Nevertheless, Taiwan should not overreact. Looking insecure does not help with security. There are some simple steps that can be taken. Taipei will have already spoken to the French representative, seeking clarification.
Taiwan’s engagement and support for Europe should be reiterated privately and publicly. Taipei might also look for a way to “boost the signal” regarding its support for Ukraine, but this should be done carefully and genuinely. Ukrainians and their freedom are not a pawn — Taiwanese understand this better than most.
Overreactions and pressure from other corners are inevitable and welcome in this case.
Europe needs to continue to engage with China productively — serious analysis should not dispute this.
However, if the EU wants to be a superpower, especially a standard-setting one, it needs to remember that the most powerful standards of all are liberte, egalite and fraternite, and should consider the cost of not exemplifying them when it matters.
As for Macron, true European strategic autonomy, in defense of European interests, is welcome.
However, he should consider whether France can truly sustain a “friendship” with China over the next three decades. History is seldom kind to the authors of failed resets.
Joshua Wilkes is a graduate student at the National Sun Yat-sen University College of Social Sciences.
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