Wed, Dec 21, 2022 page8

• Learning from US’ Ukraine policy

  • By Joseph Bosco
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  If Washington’s support for Ukraine against Russia’s aggression is a model for the US’ role after a Chinese attack on Taiwan, Taiwanese are in for a rough ride.

  In 2008, at the urging of then-US president George W. Bush, NATO issued a communique from its 26 members, stating: “We agreed that [Georgia and Ukraine] will become members of NATO.”

  Russian President Vladimir Putin objected strongly to NATO’s position, calling it a threat to Russia’s security, despite the specific 1997 security guarantee to Ukraine from the US, the UK and Russia, in exchange for Kyiv’s surrender of the nuclear weapons stationed on its territory when it was part of the Soviet Union.

  Notwithstanding those security commitments,Washington and other NATO capitals took no action when Russia invaded Georgia later in 2008. Encouraged by US and NATO acquiescence, Putin planned his next move toward “national reunification” and “territorial integrity.”

  That move consisted of the 2014 invasion of eastern Ukraine and Crimea. Former US president Barack Obama’s administration followed Bush’s example with Georgia and did nothing to stop it.

  Without US leadership, NATO also accepted Putin’s second act of aggression, which inevitably led to him planning a decisive third act. That came in February, with plenty of advance notice as Russia mobilized an invasion force along Ukraine’s border, ignoring warnings of “severe” economic sanctions from US President Joe Biden’s administration.

  After Russian forces crossed into Ukraine and advanced toward the capital, Kyiv, officials in Washington and its NATO allies expected the imminent collapse of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy’s government. The West’s role, then, would be minimal and relatively risk-free, facilitating negotiations for Ukraine’s surrender and reconstruction under Putin’s rule.

  Biden said challenging Russia directly with US forces on the ground — which Ukraine did not request — or by imposing a no-fly zone — which it did request — “would be World War III.”

  Taiwan does not have the same level of Western security guarantees that ultimately failed to protect Ukraine against Russian invasion. Instead, it has the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), which states that “any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including by boycotts or embargoes is considered a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States.”

  To respond to any such hostile action, the TRA provides that the US “shall provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character; and shall maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion.”

  Every US administration since has complied with the first part of the TRA mandate by providing Taiwan with defensive weapons. The administrations of former US president Donald Trump and Biden significantly increased the volume and quality of Taiwan arms sales, in response to China’s escalating rhetoric and increasingly hostile actions.

  However, Beijing is unlikely to be deterred from taking kinetic action against Taiwan because of the island’s military capabilities given Washington’s rigid emphasis on the “defensive” nature of the weapons it is willing to provide Taiwan. Here, too, the Ukraine experience is not an encouraging one for Taiwan.

  US and Western fear of Russian escalation — including the possible use of nuclear weapons, which Putin has threatened several times — has succeeded in inhibiting the transfer of Western arms that could strike Russian territory from Ukraine’s present defensive positions.

  Similarly, US administrations have consistently refused to sell Taiwan advanced fighter aircraft, diesel submarines and other weapons systems that could threaten Chinese assets and potentially deter Beijing from initiating a conflict.

  In recent years, US defense officials have elevated the withholding of lethal arms to the realm of strategic doctrine. They advance the so-called “porcupine strategy,” by which “many small things” — e.g. mines, beach obstacles and anti-amphibious weapons — would make Taiwan an “indigestible” target for attacking Chinese forces.

  US policy on Taiwan is hamstrung by the same fear of escalation that inhibits Biden from providing Ukraine with the advanced weapons systems it needs to decisively defeat Russia, out of fear that a humiliated Putin might lash out with weapons of mass destruction.

  However, to the extent that Washington constrains Taiwan’s capability to not only defend itself, but to deter Chinese aggression, it increases the need to enhance the US’ own “capacity to resist” it, as mandated by the TRA.

  No administration since 1979 has issued a definitive declaration that the US would actively defend Taiwan, aside from sending it limited arms with which it could try to defend itself. It is called the policy of strategic ambiguity.

  Then-US president Bill Clinton’s administration told Chinese officials in 1995 that Washington did not know what it would do if China attacked Taiwan, saying: “It would depend on the circumstances.”

  Bush told reporters in 2001 that the US would do “whatever it took,” suggesting Washington did know what it would do, even if China did not.

  Trump said menacingly: “China knows what I’m gonna do.”

  So, now, Washington and Beijing are in on US intentions toward the defense of Taiwan, but Americans and Chinese remain in the dark about the prospects of war over Taiwan.

  Biden attempted to shed new light on the situation by stating four times, in increasingly specific terms, that the US would send its own fighting forces to defend Taiwan.

  Yet, with each president’s comments, White House and US Department of State spokespeople “explained” that their words reflected no change in the US’ “one China” policy and peaceful resolution of cross-strait differences, a repetitious evasion of strategic clarity on defending Taiwan.

  US National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan was recently asked about his boss’ multiple statements that the US “would defend Taiwan militarily,” and confirmed only “our commitment to the [TRA], which does commit the United States to ensuring we’re providing the articles for Taiwan’s defense.”

  Sullivan did not say that the US would exercise the “capacity” to defend Taiwan, also mandated by the TRA.

  Another open question is who defines what “articles” Taiwan needs to defend itself — Taipei or Washington? This replicates the tensions Washington and Kyiv confront on Ukraine’s security requirements.

  Now, reports indicate that Ukraine and Taiwan might be in competition for weapons from dwindling US stocks, which is good news for “no limits” strategic partners Russia and China as they coordinate to pull Washington’s attention and resources in different directions. That is all the more reason for Biden to state formally a US commitment to defend Taiwan while ensuring that Ukraine gets all it needs to defend itself.

  Joseph Bosco served as China country director for the US secretary of defense from 2005 to 2006, and as Asia-Pacific director of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief from 2009 to 2010. He served in the Pentagon when Russian President Vladimir Putin invaded Georgia and was involved in US Department of Defense discussions about the US response.
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