The 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) ended on Oct. 22 and was followed the next day by the first plenary session of the CCP’s 20th Central Committee. At the one-day plenary session, three of the Politburo Standing Committee’s seven members were re-elected, while four were replaced.
The four who stepped down were Chinese Premier Li Keqiang (李克強), Standing Committee Chairman Li Zhanshu (栗戰書), National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference Chairman Wang Yang (汪洋) and State Council Senior Vice Premier Han Zheng (韓正), with Li Qiang (李強), Cai Qi (蔡奇), Ding Xuexiang (丁薛祥) and Li Xi (李希) replacing them.
The four new members are close associates of Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平), the CCP’s general secretary.
One of the four new members — Li Qiang, who triggered controversy with his strict enforcement of a COVID-19 lockdown in Shanghai — is likely to become China’s next premier in March.
Combined with Xi’s unprecedented third term as general secretary and president, Xi’s faction has gained full control of the party and the state.
Xi in his first two terms as president eliminated his political opponents in the name of fighting corruption, suppressed private enterprises under a policy of “state ownership advances while private ownership retreats,” and worked to expand mass surveillance and control, creating an “Orwellian” empire.
China has become a one-man show run by Xi. Most ominously, the specter of Xi’s “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” is set to haunt the whole world.
The state-capitalist reforms launched by former Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping (鄧小平) in the late 1970s opened up some previously forbidden areas of the communist system, attracted Western capital, technology and talent, and stimulated the desire for prosperity. These measures generated considerable economic growth, lifted China out of poverty and set it on the path to becoming a moderately prosperous society.
However, institutional changes were limited to the level of economics and did not touch political institutions or scrutinize the legitimacy of the CCP’s rule. Paradoxically, instead of ushering in democratic reforms, China’s economic success became a talisman for the CCP to preserve its regime.
Moreover, China’s economic growth has largely resulted from imitating the strong points of Western systems and stealing intellectual property, along with the determination of Chinese to become wealthy, rather than having anything to do with the CCP’s rule.
However, the CCP claims credit for China’s rise to justify its perpetual hold on power. Consequently, the expectation in the West that economic development would move the CCP away from dictatorship through democratic reforms has been dashed, and since Xi came to power such countries have become more deeply aware of the threat posed by China.
According to the theory of modernization, when a nation’s economy has developed to the point where its people are well fed, educated and connected to other cultures, its people yearn for more independence, giving rise to democratic movements that can turn it into a wealthy, civilized society.
Unfortunately, this course of development did not take root in China. Instead of nurturing democracy, economic growth turned it into an even tighter prison of autocracy. Deng’s successors — Jiang Zemin (江澤民) and then Hu Jintao (胡錦濤) — only maintained the illusion of “reform and opening up.”
However, Xi U-turned and completely rejected Deng’s line along with the international order. He has tried to create an “internal circulation” system with regard to domestic demand and a digital dictatorship in the political sphere.
On the international front, Xi abandoned Deng’s line of “keeping a low profile” and “not becoming a hegemon,” and has instead tried to challenge the US and create a new global order that “rises in the east and sets in the west.”
China’s huge population and economic power gives Xi the confidence to approach other countries on an equal footing. On the surface, China’s ambition to displace the US might seem possible, but Xi has misjudged the situation.
He has put forward slogans and policies such as “amazing China,” the Belt and Road Initiative, “made in China 2025,” the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” and the “Chinese dream,” highlighting “socialism with Chinese characteristics for a new era,” saying that these can defeat liberal capitalism and that a “Beijing consensus” would replace the “Washington consensus.”
He has abolished the previous two-term limit on Chinese presidents, with the aim of becoming ruler for life. His undisguised ambition has finally alerted Western democracies that if they continue to respond passively, the catastrophe of the “red menace” is likely to befall them.
Xi has copied former Chinese leader Mao Zedong (毛澤東) by adopting a fierce, confrontational approach. This has been met with countermeasures from the US and other countries, causing China’s economy to weaken as it becomes embroiled in external conflicts. The country has turned away from prosperity and is heading into decline.
Xi’s stubborn adherence to Mao’s line has run into severe difficulties. For example, while Chinese industry appears to be booming, US restrictions on exports of silicon chips to China are pushing its semiconductor sector toward collapse, and its huge state subsidies are proving ineffective.
The confrontation between the US and China encompasses a trade war, a technology war and a financial war, and has been described by foreign media as likely to send China back to the stone age.
It also demonstrates that the Chinese economy is more appearance than substance, and that Xi’s confrontation with the West has been a foolish mistake.
Xi’s enthronement for a third term as president marks the beginning of his empire’s collapse. The more tightly he attempts to control the country, the stronger the challenges to his rule will be.
Xi’s imperial dream already faces countermeasures from the West. If China invades Taiwan or any other nation, it is sure to face counterattacks from the free world. If that happens, it would not only plunge the world into war and disorder, but also destroy China’s decades of economic success.
However tight its domestic surveillance and control might be, cracks are sure to appear. The anti-Xi slogans displayed by a lone protester in Beijing on the eve of the Congress are indicative of broader social discontent.
The situation is worsened by the Chinese government’s endless “zero COVID-19” policy, which is unscientific and interferes with lives and livelihoods. Chinese are losing their patience.
If public discontent reaches a critical point, it will consist of more than a single anti-Xi warrior hanging banners on Beijing’s Sitong overpass. Xi’s policies would end as the public rises to sweep his empire into the dustbin of history.
Translated by Julian Clegg
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