The West and the Kremlin have one thing in common: Both like to point out that Russian President Vladimir Putin has an 80 percent approval rating, and opinion polls have consistently shown that a majority of Russians support the war in Ukraine. What was once carefully referred to as “Putin’s war” has now become “Russia’s war” — or so it seems.
However, polling and focus groups conducted by the independent Levada Center reveal a picture that is more nuanced than the headline figures suggest.
For starters, support for the Kremlin’s so-called “special military operation” in Ukraine is not necessarily wholehearted. Last month, less than half of survey respondents (46 percent) reported that they “definitely support” the Russian military’s activities, with 30 percent saying that they “mostly support” them. The figures have barely changed since April.
For the latter group, backing the war is probably less a matter of conviction than of conformism. Some respondents have commented, for example, that they cannot know exactly what is going on, indicating that the Russian government knows best. People in this group might have some doubts — they are more likely to express fear and anxiety over the conflict, and unlikely to express pride — but the desire to remain in their psychological and intellectual comfort zone prevails.
That comfort zone is built largely on the belief that, fundamentally, this is a defensive war.
First, most Russians are convinced that the Russian-speaking population in Ukraine — particularly in the eastern Donbas region — was under attack. Most of those who expressed support for the war highlighted the need to protect this group. For them, this imperative justifies actions that might otherwise seem unthinkable.
Second, Russians — especially older people — largely believe that their country had to “fight back” against those who would seek to destroy it.
In February, just before Russia’s invasion, 60 percent of survey respondents said that the US and NATO were to blame for the Donbas conflict since 2014. That figure was up 10 percentage points from November last year.
As widespread as these beliefs are, the Ukraine war still has plenty of detractors in Russia.
Last month, about 17 to 20 percent of Russians said in a poll that they do not agree with their country’s actions in Ukraine, up from 14 percent in March. This group is dominated by young urban dwellers who consume news from the Internet, rather than state-controlled television, although people who fit this description were still more likely than not to support the “special operation.”
The only category of people in which a majority opposed the war comprised those who broadly disapprove of Putin, the Russian government and the State Duma. These people voted against the 2020 amendments to the Russian constitution, which enabled Putin to reset the term limits of his office and potentially prolong his rule until 2036. They also have a history of supporting opposition figures and are likely to have attended anti-Putin protests early last year. This group is also more likely to hold positive views of the West.
However, Russians with long histories of dissent are not alone; more Russians oppose the fighting in Ukraine today than did after the violence first erupted in 2014.
No more than 10 percent spoke out against the annexation of Crimea — half the number who declare their opposition to the war in Ukraine today — and only 11 to 12 percent of people said they were dissatisfied with Putin eight years ago, compared with 15 to 16 percent today.
Even as the ranks of Russians who oppose the war have grown, the likelihood of anti-war protests has plummeted.
It is not difficult to understand why. Taking part in unsanctioned protests is now punishable by hefty fines and prison sentences for repeat offenses. Moreover, Russians can face criminal charges for inciting “others to take part in unsanctioned protests” or for “discrediting the Russian armed forces,” and a nationwide ban on mass events, introduced during the COVID-19 pandemic, has yet to be lifted.
The will to rebel is further depleted by simple desensitization.
“People have gotten accustomed to what is happening and have simply stopped paying attention,” one survey respondent said.
As long as there is no military mobilization and the most dissatisfied Russians are able to leave the country, a sense of normality prevails.
Of course, there are challenges that cannot be ignored, such as higher prices and the loss of savings, but the conflict, much like the pandemic, is viewed as a storm that must simply be weathered. While most Russians hope it will end soon — even among the war’s supporters, many would like Russia simply to declare victory and agree to peace terms — they are bracing themselves for an extended conflict and confrontation with the West.
Regardless, Russians seem willing to assume that things will eventually return to normal.
“I think everything will work out soon,” one respondent said.
“It will sort itself out one way or another,” another responded said.
In the meantime, there is little reason to think Putin’s regime is in any real danger. Russians largely blame their current struggles on the US, Europe and NATO — an impression that sanctions have done nothing to dispel.
Moreover, the political opposition and civil society have been destroyed, and the threat of repression looms large. Putin is also ready to suppress those ultranationalists who think he is too soft. Imperialism and war are his niche, and he will surrender it to no one.
The question is whether the further deterioration of socioeconomic conditions could cause Russians to turn on Putin. In Russia, protests against the government have often been sparked by unexpected developments in unexpected places, and before long, Russia will be headed into its next presidential election campaign, which will require Putin to articulate a powerful new vision to Russians.
The war in Ukraine alone is not enough. That bullet has already been fired — and has not stopped ricocheting.
Andrei Kolesnikov is a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Denis Volkov is director of the Levada Center.
Copyright: Project Syndicate
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