Following US House of Representatives Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taipei, military exercises conducted by the Chinese People’s Liberation Army in the waters and airspace around Taiwan raised concerns about Beijing’s ambition of pursuing hegemony by embracing the “might is right” approach — that is, intimidating its weaker neighbors whenever it can.
Concerns over the possibility that China might soon launch a military invasion of Taiwan have been lingering, especially in Taiwan’s neighbors such as Japan and South Korea. Even before Pelosi’s visit, 73 percent of respondents in the two countries believed that China might soon take military measures to unify Taiwan, and a majority expected their leaders to enhance ties with the US to deter Beijing’s risky actions, according to a survey released by Japan’s Yomiuri Shimbun and South Korea’s Hankook Ilbo in June.
While international pundits voiced concerns over the fate of Taiwan, a large number of Taiwanese — amid the brewing tensions across the Taiwan Strait — have remained unusually calm and continued their daily routines as normal. No panic buying, stockpiling, or hoarding happened; and people remained disciplined. In general, the social atmosphere in Taiwan — “the most dangerous place on Earth,” as declared by The Economist in May last year — has been quiet, with no indication of worry or hasty posturing.
Although the current situation is tense and pressing, residents of Taiwan have been cognizant of China’s provocative actions for more than 20 years and know that they serve Beijing’s propaganda purposes rather than its military goals. For Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平), the leader of the world’s second-largest economy, to look weak on Taiwan, which has been framed by Chinese leaders as one of Beijing’s core interests, is unthinkable. Hence, China’s retaliation to Pelosi’s visit aimed at cementing Xi’s image among Chinese.
It is unlikely that China will in the short term launch a full-scale war against Taiwan. Domestic politics matter. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is heading toward its 20th National Congress, which is critical, as it would set out strategic tasks for the next five years. Hence, a crisis in the Taiwan Strait could trigger dissent or a crisis at home, which could impair the reputation of the CCP and Xi. As Xi is seeking to secure a third term as leader, a foreign crisis caused by his reckless calculation is something he would undoubtedly seek to avert.
China’s domestic issues are not concerning enough to pose a challenge to Xi’s power and his re-election seems to be a foregone conclusion. For an autocratic leader who wants to have his name etched alongside the two other greatest figures in the CCP’s history, Mao Zedong (毛澤東) and Deng Xiaoping (鄧小平), a situation beyond Xi’s control would undoubtedly be a nightmare.
In the event of an armed conflict in the Strait or even Taiwan’s successful invasion, Beijing could face sanctions and condemnation from the international community. It might have gleaned lessons from democratic countries’ diplomatic and economic countermeasures against Russia for its unjustified invasion of Ukraine.
Beijing’s economic interests, which are intertwined with the world specifically through its ambitious Belt and Road Initiative, could be significantly affected in the event of a conflict in the Strait. Getting bogged down in a quagmire in Taiwan could downgrade China’s economic status to the level of a regional middle power, making it possible for the US to bolster its economic position globally.
Furthermore, regional and global conditions are not in China’s favor. The international community has been paying more attention to Taiwan — a democracy standing against a totalitarian regime — which now has more economic agency, notably in the semiconductor industry.
Regional powers coming together under security frameworks — such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue comprising the US, Japan, Australia and India, and AUKUS comprising the US, the UK and Australia — could also be emboldened to take countermeasures against China’s potential military adventurism against Taiwan.
As for Washington, its “strategic ambiguity” — which has caused controversy for not indicating an official posture in the event of a conflict or crisis in the Strait — could make China think twice before starting a war to annex Taiwan.
For the US, its allies and middle powers in the Indo-Pacific region, military engagement is not off the table. Instead, Washington’s dangling the possibility of supporting Taiwan militarily seems to be a “strategic card,” rather than a dubious take.
Cross-strait tensions seem to have cooled down following a temporary halt to Chinese military exercises on Aug. 7. The drills have had little effect on Taiwanese’ daily routines, but it would be a mistake to interpret this as an indication that there would not be a conflict in the Strait. Believing that China would not start a war against Taiwan would be risking complacency.
Last year, Taiwanese Minister of National Defense Chiu Kuo-cheng (邱國正) said that Beijing would be “fully able” to mount an invasion of Taiwan by 2025. The Pentagon has maintained its assessment that China would not attack Taiwan in the next two years, but remained prudent by saying that China is seeking to “create a kind of new normal” and “salami slice their way into a new status quo” in the Strait.
After the departure of Pelosi, Chinese military jets and naval vessels continued to appear around Taiwan, and Chinese aircraft even crossed the median line of the Taiwan Strait. Violations of Taiwan’s air defense identification zone by Chinese aircraft would likely continue, alongside increased tensions.
Minister of Foreign Affairs Joseph Wu (吳釗燮) in a statement on Tuesday last week said: “China has used the drills in its military playbook to prepare for the invasion of Taiwan.”
“After the drills conclude, China may try to routinize its action in an attempt to wreck the long-term status quo across the Taiwan Strait,” he added.
Even though the military exercises seem to have ended, cross-strait relations are still vulnerable, as there are no mechanisms to navigate the tense relationship between Taiwan and China. Stability and peace in the Taiwan Strait require negotiation and communication.
President Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) in her latest speech demonstrated her willingness to have dialogue with Chinese leaders, saying: “We strive to maintain the status quo across the Taiwan Strait, and always keep an open mind for constructive dialogue.”
Even before Pelosi’s visit, Tsai in 2020 extended an olive branch to Chinese leaders by calling for “meaningful dialogue” on an equal basis.
However, Beijing has shown no sign of engaging in sincere dialogue or other interactions with Taiwan. Without a foundation of goodwill from China, the chances of launching a dialogue is virtually nil.
Even if a war with Taiwan might not happen any time soon, China could continue to step up the pressure, potentially by using military exercises around Taiwan to gradually establish long-term control over the Strait. In this way, it could take a step toward denying the US military access to the region.
The clock is ticking for Taiwan, the US and regional countries. A prudent stance, instead of complacency, is vital for concerted efforts to prevent a crisis.
Huynh Tam Sang, an international relations lecturer at Ho Chi Minh City University of Social Sciences and Humanities, is a research fellow at the Taiwan NextGen Foundation and nonresident WSD-Handa Fellow at the Pacific Forum.
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