Relations between Taiwan and the EU have gradually blossomed, given shared universal values such as human rights, democracy and freedom, and shared concern about the authoritarian rise of China and the growing need to enhance ties amid global uncertainties, notably the COVID-19 pandemic and Russian President Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine.
Taiwan and the EU could be viewed as natural partners, given their shared commitments toward a rules-based international order and democratic principles. As such, leaders from both sides have jointly condemned Moscow for waging war against Kyiv, and imposed sanctions on Russia.
Trade and economic relations between Taiwan and the EU have become increasingly discernible. Taiwan has emerged as the EU’s 15th largest trading partner, while the EU ranks fifth among Taiwan’s top trading partners, with bilateral trade reaching US$68.7 billion last year. Moreover, the EU has stood out as the largest foreign investor in Taiwan.
Nevertheless, a free-trade agreement between Taiwan and the EU, although an aspiration for Taipei, has been slow to progress. Should the two sides intertwine their interests, especially in semiconductor supply chains, a bilateral investment agreement would still hold strategic significance.
Both sides have considered cooperation on green and digital economies as priorities for the bilateral relationship.
During the EU-Taiwan Trade and Investment Dialogue last month, they reached a consensus to deepen ties in a wide variety of areas, such as trade, investment, supply chains, security and technology. These have become key assets in a world that values collaboration and has become much more integrated.
Regarding semiconductors, the center of Taiwan’s growing economic prowess, Taiwan and the EU agreed to jointly monitor supply chains, “in line with the EU’s plans under the European Chips Act.”
Notably, the dialogue has been upgraded to ministerial level, providing opportunities to leverage dialogues to an even higher state.
Even before Moscow’s war on Kyiv, security in the Taiwan Strait has loomed large in the EU’s strategic assessment.
The EU strategy for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region, released in April last year, underscored the intense competition in the region and voiced concern over China’s military buildup, adding that continued tension in the Taiwan Strait “may have a direct impact on European security and prosperity.”
Beijing’s awkward and vague rhetoric at April’s EU-China Summit, where China voiced support for Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, while refusing to criticize Russia, has left a sour taste in a majority of EU member state governments, notably with European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, who admitted that no progress was achieved on several bilateral issues.
To the EU, China’s increasingly aligned stance with Russia has been a major factor in widening the gap between the two sides.
China’s authoritarian precept and practices are compelling factors encouraging the pragmatic cooperation between Taiwan and the EU.
Beijing’s trade restrictions on Lithuania, obstacles imposed on European companies seeking access to the Chinese market, and the EU’s discontent over human and labor rights violations in Xinjiang have all attributed to the downward spiral and political division between the EU and China — which the bloc sees as a “systemic rival,” possibly leading to the gradual collapse of China as a primary market for European investment.
The overriding priority for deepened ties between Taiwan and the EU is likely the need to work together to uphold security in the Taiwan Strait, where a geopolitical crisis would mean a deterioration of the regional balance of power.
In this sense, regional interests should be viewed through the lens of security, which encompasses a broad set of interconnected priorities, including economics, political stability and sociopolitical preferences.
An Indo-Pacific-oriented bloc such as the EU would likely suffer from the demise of Taiwan, which has invaluable expertise in various fields such as public health, cybersecurity, digital democracy, law enforcement and disaster response.
To translate its economic prowess into political leverage, the EU should strive to become an independent and relevant power in the Indo-Pacific structure.
Toward this goal, the EU — in the long run — should prepare for uncertainties in the Taiwan Strait, as a conflict in East Asia would have a detrimental effect on the links of semiconductors, which are important for European security.
Perhaps a paradigm shift in the foreign policy of major players in the EU, such as Germany, France and Italy, could strengthen the bloc’s determined approach to enhance ties with Taiwan as a strategy of diversifying their economic relations.
The EU and Taiwan have ample opportunities to enhance ties. For instance, both sides should initiate innovative developments to help Taiwan address green energy, and European firms could forge their cooperation with Taiwanese partners regarding offshore wind farms and environmental protection.
The European Green Deal, aimed at addressing climate change and environmental degradation, and Taiwan’s policy to reach a renewable energy target by 2025 could also be aligned.
The transatlantic alliance between the EU and the US is important for Taiwan’s security. With the possibility of a global recession and dysfunction of democracies, the threat of attack could pose lingering and harmful challenges to moral standards.
Hence, protecting the vibrant democracy of Taiwan has been essential, given what has happened in Ukraine.
With a bloody crisis in Ukraine sounding an alarm, the EU has a responsibility to partner with Taiwan to ensure that actions by Beijing do not lead to the collapse of regional security order.
Washington and Brussels have a stake in regional security. Leaders from the US and the EU should provide comprehensive support for Taiwan by building on joint efforts, such as organizing an annual trilateral Taiwan-US-European dialogue aimed at intelligence sharing, harmonizing diplomatic discussions on Taiwan with straightforward messages that emphasize the importance of security and cost of conflict in the Taiwan Strait, raising Taiwan’s profile in multilateral gatherings and carrying out joint freedom-of-navigation operations in the Strait to demonstrate the importance they attach to peace and stability in the region.
An effective strategy for the EU and the US to support Taiwan should be geared toward deterrence, warning Beijing that an invasion against Taiwan would not be tolerated by democratic countries.
This is an urgent task for the EU and regional nations to undertake, as “a conflict in Taiwan would significantly weaken conventional deterrence in Europe in relation to other near-peer adversaries such as Russia,” International Institute for Strategic Studies researcher Franz-Stefan Gady said.
Repercussions of the crisis in Ukraine might have strategic implications for Taiwan and the EU. Hence, the EU should work with like-minded nations in the Indo-Pacific region, such as Australia, Japan and India, to support Taiwan and prepare for a “Taiwan contingency.” A clear and pragmatic line of thought for the EU and its courage to walk away from economic dependence on China would also ensure stronger ties between Taipei and Brussels.
Huynh Tam Sang is international relations lecturer at Ho Chi Minh City University of Social Sciences and Humanities, research fellow at Taiwan NextGen Foundation and nonresident WSD-Handa fellow at the Pacific Forum.
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