On May 10, US Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines told a US congressional hearing that China was “working hard” to build a military capable of taking Taiwan despite US intervention. She said the situation was “critical or acute between now and 2030.”
In March last year, US Admiral Phil Davidson, the head of US Indo-Pacific Command at the time, also said that the Chinese threat against Taiwan would manifest during this decade, “in fact, in the next six years.”
On May 3 this year, US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Mark Milley said that China had set a target of 2027 to possess the military capability to invade Taiwan.
All these warnings from US intelligence and military agencies suggest that Beijing’s goal of invading Taiwan is no longer a self-deceiving slogan, but an imminent possibility in the coming years.
Beijing has become more assertive and aggressive with its growing military competence. Its strategic ambition has expanded beyond Asia, with the ultimate goal of global outreach.
Beijing’s endeavor to establish security pacts with Pacific island countries reveals its desire for global dominance. Strategists predict that its next move is to secure naval bases on the coast of west Africa, which would allow it to outflank Washington from the east side of the Atlantic Ocean and check US military operations in the Pacific.
As the US-China checkerboard has gradually shifted away from Washington’s advantage, the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war has intensified this strategic tension and drastically revamped the underlying rules of international order after the end of the Cold War.
This war has sounded the death knell on globalization and a long-peaceful environment since World War II. As the rationale of realpolitik resurges and dictates each state’s decisionmaking, exerting military means to pursue national interests is no longer unthinkable for political leaders.
The prolonged Russia-Ukraine war will weaken Russia’s national capabilities, but Beijing has decided to side with Moscow and form a united front to resist the West.
The war has not diverted the US’ attention away from China. Conversely, Washington has reinforced military deployments in the Indo-Pacific region by consolidating alliances to deter Beijing’s military adventurism in East Asia.
Beijing’s global ambitions under Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) have escalated US-China tensions. Washington perceives Beijing’s jingoistic military expansion and maneuvers in East Asia as proof of aggression to disrupt regional peace and stability.
Warning Beijing against its military intimidation of Taiwan, US President Joe Biden has said several times that the US is committed to aiding Taiwan militarily in case of a Chinese invasion. Biden’s remarks show a subtle modification that Washington is gingerly shifting toward an assertive stance on this issue to prevent Beijing miscalculating the US’ determination to maintain peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait.
Despite these efforts by Washington, as long as Beijing continues to enhance its military clout, the costs of a US military intervention might eventually become too huge to bear. Any Washington promise will face severe tests at this juncture.
One report indicates that Beijing aims to boost its nuclear arsenal to 1,000 nuclear warheads by 2030, allowing it to hold significant atomic capabilities to deter a US military intervention, just as Russia is doing in the war with Ukraine.
Moreover, after completing its third aircraft carrier and a sufficient number of advanced missiles, Beijing would become even more confident about its anti-denial capabilities against US military intervention.
The continuous advancement of Chinese military capabilities might eventually reach a tipping point and dissuade US military intervention. When that game-changing day arrives, Washington might be forced to alter its calculations on assisting Taiwan.
Beijing’s determination to unify Taiwan has been unyielding, so the only questions that remain concern the optimal timing and the level of cost that Beijing is willing to pay.
Once Beijing finalizes its military preparations by 2027 or 2030, the last question is how much cost Chinese leaders are willing to bear. This hinges on three aspects of political calculations: China’s domestic repercussions, Taiwan’s resistance and the consequences of the international reaction.
Assuming that Xi successfully consolidates his power in the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) this fall and continues his reign, China, under his leadership, would be more willing to endure the consequences of invading Taiwan. Although Xi’s third term would not be without challenges, whoever climbs to the top of the CCP would not quickly abandon the goal of unifying Taiwan.
As for international reaction, military intervention from Washington and its allies remains the foremost obstacle preventing Beijing from invading Taiwan. However, if Beijing is confident about its ability to neutralize US military deterrence, the odds of a Chinese military offensive against Taiwan would significantly increase, regardless of the possible costs of economic sanctions from the West.
Beijing’s confidence comes from at least three fronts:
First, China is the second-largest economy with a vast consumer market. The West would eventually submit to domestic pressure and resume business with China.
Second, the Chinese economy is deeply intertwined with the global economy. The West’s double-edged economic sanctions are not sustainable, and Beijing will be prepared to take these hits.
Finally, Western solidarity might not be as strong as it would like it to be. Beijing is adept at various tactics to circumvent the West’s sanctions.
Regarding Taiwan, faced with Beijing’s daunting military threats, Taipei is determined to boost its military preparedness by increasing its defense budget to produce more missiles and bolster its asymmetrical capabilities. Nevertheless, Taiwan’s current efforts have yet to become a formidable deterrence against Beijing’s military adventurism.
The coming years do not seem optimistic for Taiwan. If Xi remains in power, he is likely to pursue his ambition of making his mark in history by unifying Taiwan, whether by peaceful or forceful means. Additionally, despite Washington bolstering its regional military presence, Beijing’s swelling nuclear arsenal would eventually make Washington think twice before assisting Taipei militarily.
Taiwanese resolve to resist a Chinese invasion may be the last crucial factor affecting Beijing’s calculation. However, due to severe partisan divides in national identity, lack of alertness in society and other factors, the Taiwanese government has not taken comprehensive and sufficient measures to counter this looming danger.
As the logic of the international system moves toward realpolitik thinking, Taiwan’s self-defensive resolve is the key to its survival. Israel’s formidable military strength is an admirable model for Taiwan to survive in this turbulent environment. Whether Taiwan can safely weather this upcoming geopolitical storm ultimately hinges on political leaders’ foresight and prudence, and the unwavering determination of Taiwanese
Eric Chiou is an associate professor at National Yang Ming Chiao Tung University.
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