Supply chain disruptions and logistics backlogs caused by strict COVID-19 lockdowns in major Chinese cities have affected the operations of Taiwanese companies there, which could weigh on export orders in the coming months, the Ministry of Economic Affairs said on Wednesday. Although some Taiwanese businesses in China are preparing to reopen factories, returning to full capacity would take time, as travel in some cities remains restricted, while only a few people have been cleared to work and resources are limited, the ministry said.
The Chinese government’s rigorous “zero COVID-19” policy to curb the spread of the highly transmissible Omicron variant of SARS-CoV-2 with rolling lockdowns in key economic hubs, such as Shanghai and Kunshan, has almost paralyzed global industrial supply chains ranging from auto parts to electronics components and consumer products. An American Chamber of Commerce survey this month showed that 82 percent of US businesses in China said they had slowed or reduced production due to a lack of workers and supplies amid the lockdowns, while 86 percent said supply chain disruptions had affected their operations.
On Friday, Voice of America’s Chinese-language service reported that Shanghai’s lockdown has affected more than 3,000 South Korean companies that rely on China for parts. South Korean president-elect Yoon Suk-yeol’s transition committee is considering policies to offer more assistance to companies seeking to move their operations home. South Korean economic and trade experts quoted in the report said that supply chain flexibility would become the core of the new government’s economic security policy, and that South Korea’s economy would inevitably decouple, to a certain degree, from China.
Like Taiwan, South Korea’s economy is highly dependent on exports and the Chinese market. While a complete break from China in terms of trade might be a far-fetched idea, greater decoupling is in line with South Korea’s economic needs: Seoul would welcome a diversified supply chain, considering changes in China’s business environment, and hostilities between Beijing and Washington.
Shanghai’s lockdown and its consequences are only a manifestation of global supply chain problems. The COVID-19 pandemic has exposed a major flaw of globalization: that it is risky for dozens of countries to concentrate production in a single nation. While cross-border trade would remain important to the global economy, and China still has a major role to play as a consumer and producer of goods, the pandemic has reminded governments of the importance of risk diversification. World Bank president David Malpass earlier this month said that countries are working to diversify their supply chains and reduce their dependence on China, which is “probably good for everyone.”
Low cost is not necessarily a factor for supply chain realignment, but countries with key technologies are more likely to attract investment. In other words, global supply chains would be differentiated by quality and technology. An obvious example is that of Taiwanese server makers, who have over the past two to three years moved production of high-end models home, while producing low-end models in China or elsewhere.
Moreover, countries increasingly want to be part of value systems shared by like-minded nations, and the world economy will likely develop into blocks centered on major powers such as the US and China. Against this backdrop, the world would see supply chain realignment characterized less by concern over production costs, and more by risk controls, the assurance of critical technology and shared values.
US president-elect Donald Trump continues to make nominations for his Cabinet and US agencies, with most of his picks being staunchly against Beijing. For US ambassador to China, Trump has tapped former US senator David Perdue. This appointment makes it crystal clear that Trump has no intention of letting China continue to steal from the US while infiltrating it in a surreptitious quasi-war, harming world peace and stability. Originally earning a name for himself in the business world, Perdue made his start with Chinese supply chains as a manager for several US firms. He later served as the CEO of Reebok and
US$18.278 billion is a simple dollar figure; one that’s illustrative of the first Trump administration’s defense commitment to Taiwan. But what does Donald Trump care for money? During President Trump’s first term, the US defense department approved gross sales of “defense articles and services” to Taiwan of over US$18 billion. In September, the US-Taiwan Business Council compared Trump’s figure to the other four presidential administrations since 1993: President Clinton approved a total of US$8.702 billion from 1993 through 2000. President George W. Bush approved US$15.614 billion in eight years. This total would have been significantly greater had Taiwan’s Kuomintang-controlled Legislative Yuan been cooperative. During
US president-elect Donald Trump in an interview with NBC News on Monday said he would “never say” if the US is committed to defending Taiwan against China. Trump said he would “prefer” that China does not attempt to invade Taiwan, and that he has a “very good relationship” with Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平). Before committing US troops to defending Taiwan he would “have to negotiate things,” he said. This is a departure from the stance of incumbent US President Joe Biden, who on several occasions expressed resolutely that he would commit US troops in the event of a conflict in
Former president Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) in recent days was the focus of the media due to his role in arranging a Chinese “student” group to visit Taiwan. While his team defends the visit as friendly, civilized and apolitical, the general impression is that it was a political stunt orchestrated as part of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) propaganda, as its members were mainly young communists or university graduates who speak of a future of a unified country. While Ma lived in Taiwan almost his entire life — except during his early childhood in Hong Kong and student years in the US —