On the eve of the Lunar New Year on Jan. 31, the Vatican announced that the pope had appointed Archbishop-elect Arnaldo Catalan — the charge d’affaires at the Holy See’s Embassy to the Republic of China in Taipei — to be its new ambassador, or apostolic nuncio, to Rwanda effective this month. Taiwan once again faces a situation in which the Holy See has no ambassador or charge d’affaires stationed in Taipei.
Meanwhile, Taiwan’s Ambassador to the Holy See, Matthew Lee (李世明), received a three-year extension of his posting, which expired in November last year. A Taiwanese diplomat can be stationed in a particular location for up to six years, extended by three years depending on need, according to Ministry of Foreign Affairs guidelines. A posting cannot last for longer than nine years. This means that Lee cannot be assigned to the Holy See beyond the end of 2024.
This, together with China’s meddling in relations between Taiwan and the Vatican, and the continuing progress in relations between China and the Holy See, could lead to a shift in relations with Taiwan’s only diplomatic partner in Europe. We must therefore pay close attention to any changes that might take place.
The ongoing dispute between Ukraine and Russia, along with increasingly frequent intrusions by China’s military and civilian aircraft into Taiwan’s air defense identification zone, have led to increasingly tense relations across the Taiwan Strait. China might use this time of international tensions to rob Taiwan of its only European diplomatic partner — the Holy See — be it to put a brake on Taiwan’s diplomatic successes or to retaliate for Lithuania’s friendly diplomatic gestures toward Taiwan.
There are 12 million Catholics in China, compared with 200,000 in Taiwan, so the Vatican must devote more effort to the pastoral care of Chinese Catholics — especially with regard to their lack of religious freedom, and the restrictions and imprisonment that they could face, which are problems that Pope Francis and senior Vatican officials must always be concerned about.
On Sept. 22, 2018, following four years of bilateral consultations between the Holy See and China, the Vatican’s Secretariat for Relations with States and China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs signed the Provisional Agreement Between the Holy See and the People’s Republic of China Concerning the Nomination of Bishops, which was originally valid for two years.
On Feb. 14, 2020, Vatican Secretary for Relations with States Archbishop Paul Gallagher and Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs Wang Yi (王毅) held a bilateral meeting on the sidelines of the Munich Security Conference. It was the first ministerial meeting between the two sides since 1952, when communist China expelled all Vatican diplomats.
In October 2020, the authoritative Jesuit magazine America reported that the Holy See might be planning for a meeting between Vatican Secretary of State Cardinal Pietro Parolin and Chinese Premier Li Keqiang (李克強), and that it hoped to open a permanent representative office in Beijing, as well as sending official delegations to China.
On Oct. 22 of the same year, Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesman Zhao Lijian (趙立堅) announced that the interim agreement on the nomination of bishops would be extended by two years, which would take it to Sept. 22 this year.
Given the dynamics of the Holy See’s China-oriented diplomatic trajectory, it is difficult to find any reason for it to stop moving in that direction. Therefore, Taiwan must make efforts to attain a better diplomatic arrangement between the Holy See and Taiwan, or even to revive the arrangement advocated by the Holy See under Pope Paul VI at the UN in 1965, whereby the “two Chinas” would join the international community at the same time.
Could the upcoming rotations of ambassadors or charges d’affaires between Taiwan and the Holy See pose a risk to continued bilateral relations? Who might be Taiwan’s next ambassador of the Republic of China to the Holy See?
The posting must be assigned to someone who understands the Vatican’s missions in China, Hong Kong, Macau, Taiwan and the greater China region, and who has the political stature needed to stand up and speak up for Taiwan.
How should Taiwan respond to closer diplomatic relations between the Holy See and China? Taiwan’s government and foreign affairs departments should give serious thought to all these questions.
For Taiwan’s foreign ministry, the Holy See might not be as important as the US and Japan, but losing diplomatic ties with the Vatican would be a symbolic blow to Taiwan’s foreign relations.
Thomas Tu’s master’s thesis is titled The Holy See’s Diplomacy: The Mission to Divided and Disputed Nations.
Translated by Julian Clegg
US President Donald Trump has gotten off to a head-spinning start in his foreign policy. He has pressured Denmark to cede Greenland to the United States, threatened to take over the Panama Canal, urged Canada to become the 51st US state, unilaterally renamed the Gulf of Mexico to “the Gulf of America” and announced plans for the United States to annex and administer Gaza. He has imposed and then suspended 25 percent tariffs on Canada and Mexico for their roles in the flow of fentanyl into the United States, while at the same time increasing tariffs on China by 10
Trying to force a partnership between Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co (TSMC) and Intel Corp would be a wildly complex ordeal. Already, the reported request from the Trump administration for TSMC to take a controlling stake in Intel’s US factories is facing valid questions about feasibility from all sides. Washington would likely not support a foreign company operating Intel’s domestic factories, Reuters reported — just look at how that is going over in the steel sector. Meanwhile, many in Taiwan are concerned about the company being forced to transfer its bleeding-edge tech capabilities and give up its strategic advantage. This is especially
US President Donald Trump last week announced plans to impose reciprocal tariffs on eight countries. As Taiwan, a key hub for semiconductor manufacturing, is among them, the policy would significantly affect the country. In response, Minister of Economic Affairs J.W. Kuo (郭智輝) dispatched two officials to the US for negotiations, and Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co’s (TSMC) board of directors convened its first-ever meeting in the US. Those developments highlight how the US’ unstable trade policies are posing a growing threat to Taiwan. Can the US truly gain an advantage in chip manufacturing by reversing trade liberalization? Is it realistic to
Last week, 24 Republican representatives in the US Congress proposed a resolution calling for US President Donald Trump’s administration to abandon the US’ “one China” policy, calling it outdated, counterproductive and not reflective of reality, and to restore official diplomatic relations with Taiwan, enter bilateral free-trade agreement negotiations and support its entry into international organizations. That is an exciting and inspiring development. To help the US government and other nations further understand that Taiwan is not a part of China, that those “one China” policies are contrary to the fact that the two countries across the Taiwan Strait are independent and
RSS