Former Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) vice chairman Hau Lung-bin (郝龍斌), a former Taipei mayor, on Sunday said that the KMT and the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) would benefit from joining forces in the Taipei mayoral election later this year.
National Policy Foundation vice chairman Sean Lien (連勝文), the KMT candidate in the 2014 Taipei mayoral race, and Broadcasting Corp of China chairman Jaw Shaw-kong (趙少康) have also given their support to the idea. Hau, Lien and Jaw, to varying degrees, represent the KMT leadership position. Their support appears to be a concerted effort to promote the idea.
However, there is little appetite among KMT city councilors to work more closely with Taipei Mayor Ko Wen-je (柯文哲), the TPP chairman.
When asked about the prospective joining of forces, Ko said that he did not see the point in discussing it, as there was not even a consensus within the KMT about the issue.
The idea of an alliance between the blue camp and the white camp has been mulled before, but has been given renewed impetus with the upcoming local elections, as many consider there to be significant points of convergence between the two parties.
Both are seen as pro-China and anti-Taiwan independence, but the similarities are mostly superficial.
Ko’s willingness to work with China is purely practical, if a bit naive. He does not see the point of taking an antagonistic approach when he sees the economic benefits of engagement, the most concrete manifestation being the Taipei-Shanghai forum.
The KMT’s approach to China is purely ideological, although it is increasingly difficult to pin down what this is exactly, because its stated loyalty to the Republic of China (ROC) is at odds with its willingness to cozy up to a hostile neighbor, the logical conclusion of which can only be the elimination of the ROC and almost certainly the KMT itself.
It is difficult to see exactly what the TPP would stand to gain from such an alliance, while the KMT has everything to gain, but is playing with a weak hand.
Association with the KMT would actually damage the TPP’s electoral support, much of which comes from blue-leaning voters disaffected with the KMT or former Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) supporters who would certainly be turned off by an alliance with the KMT.
Hau’s assessment is that the TPP has not achieved much thus far, but is currently in the ascendant and its support is enough to drag down the KMT in the mayoral election.
The problem is that, while the TPP is attracting more voters, the KMT is very much fighting on the back foot. Having just emerged from a series of bruising defeats in referendums, recalls and a by-election, coupled with confused messaging given the very different objectives of former chairman Johnny Chiang (江啟臣) and a weak incumbent chairman, Eric Chu (朱立倫), the KMT is adrift and directionless.
What the KMT leadership seems to be offering the TPP, even before it has an internal party consensus on the issue, is an alliance that it is hoping would prevent the TPP from fielding a Taipei mayoral candidate and split the blue-leaning vote. All it can offer is the potential to reduce the chances of the DPP candidate becoming Taipei mayor by asking Ko to allow the KMT to carry the torch for a blue-white alliance because of the party’s historically strong support in the capital.
However, this assessment is out of date: It is the TPP that should be concerned about the KMT splitting its vote. Hau might want to focus on the TPP’s unproven record, but he seems to be forgetting that Ko was elected Taipei mayor as an independent and unproven political neophyte, and the KMT’s poor showing in all elections since its sweep of the 2018 mayoral elections outside of Taipei.
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