What form of foreign relations would meet Taiwan’s national development goals?
This is neither a difficult question to answer nor a difficult choice to make.
Just ask: Does Taiwan need to make friends with countries such as Lithuania and Slovakia, or with regimes such as that of Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega?
Which way would be more beneficial to each side’s collective interests?
Public opinion in Taiwan would surely provide the right answer.
What makes this question so easy and the solution so intuitive is that it reflects Taiwan’s most practical needs at this stage of its pursuit of survival and progress.
Diplomacy’s main purpose is to serve a nation and its citizens, so of course it must keep up with the times and serve the newest and greatest interests.
So, while everyone is talking about transitional justice, the nation’s foreign relations mindset and orientation must also go through a major transition.
When the Republic of China (ROC) government crossed the sea to exile in Taiwan in 1949, it had 47 diplomatic partners. This number rose to a peak of 70 in 1969, but that total lasted less than a year.
After the ROC was forced to withdraw from the UN in 1971, the number of countries with which it had diplomatic relations quickly plunged to 56.
Thereafter, the ROC suffered major setbacks year after year, so that by the time Chiang Kai-shek (蔣介石) died in 1975, there were only 27 remaining.
In other words, Chiang’s 25-year rule in Taiwan was marked by additions and subtractions, with a difference of 43 between the highest and lowest points.
Chiang’s son Chiang Ching-kuo (蔣經國) became president in 1978 and died in office in 1988, never having gone abroad in his capacity as head of state, while the number of diplomatic partner countries fluctuated between 22 and 25 — fewer than at any time under his father’s rule. Most crucially, Taiwan lost official diplomatic relations with the US in 1979.
During the 12 years of former president Lee Teng-hui’s (李登輝) administration, the number of diplomatic partner countries rose to 30, a fair achievement.
During this time, Taiwan’s democratization process was getting under way.
Under Lee’s policy of “pragmatic diplomacy,” Taiwan’s diplomatic circles began to reconsider how important the number of diplomatic partner countries really was. During the struggle over sovereignty after 1971, when the People’s Republic of China replaced the ROC as the representative government of China, the international realities were such that the ROC on Taiwan, which was still under martial law, could no longer maintain great-power relations.
Instead, it had no choice but to deal with underdeveloped countries that were in dire need of economic aid.
Given the limited choice of countries with which diplomatic deals could be achieved, a considerable number of were dictatorships, and the aid that Taiwan gave to those countries frequently ended up in their leaders’ pockets.
Although such expedient measures had their use under the special circumstances of the time, as the public grew better informed and ordinary citizens had more opportunity take part in public discussion, questions were sure to be asked about the return on investment from this traditional way of doing things.
Under subsequent presidents over the past 20-odd years, Lee’s “pragmatic diplomacy” has been followed by Chen Shui-bian’s (陳水扁) “plural diplomacy,” Ma Ying-jeou’s (馬英九) “viable diplomacy” and President Tsai Ing-wen’s (蔡英文) “steadfast diplomacy.”
As the years passed, there has been less shock each time a country announces that it is breaking diplomatic ties with Taiwan and establishing them with China.
Thus, Beijing’s “diplomatic war” has had an ever-diminishing impact on Taiwan. Whenever a diplomatic partner leaves, more Taiwanese calmly say: “Off you go then. Please shut the door on the way out.”
This explains why when Nicaragua announced its switch to China a couple of weeks ago, there were just a few daytime news reports in Taiwan, with no penetrating news coverage and hardly any discussion.
That China arranged for Taiwan to face this diplomatic rupture on Dec. 9, just as the US was convening its Summit for Democracy, makes clear China’s malicious intent to spoil the show.
The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ gleeful attitude, as if it had won a great victory, and the portrayal of Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) and Ortega as being side-by-side was Beijing shooting itself in the foot.
Given that Taiwan did not send a congratulatory message to Ortega after he was elected on Nov. 7, it is clear that Taipei had seen the split coming.
Although the break-off of diplomatic ties was not Taiwan’s decision, it can still be considered a positive development if it contributes to transforming the nation’s foreign relations.
Tzou Jiing-wen is editor-in-chief of the Liberty Times (the Taipei Times’ sister paper).
Translated by Julian Clegg
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