Despite the debate over whether Washington should adopt a position of strategic clarity or keep its strategic ambiguity stance for the benefit of Taiwan’s national security, the US’ position on cross-strait dynamics has been largely consistent, although its support for Taiwan has been more explicit since the administration of former US president Donald Trump.
Meanwhile, the EU has moved away from its conservative, hands-off position on cross-strait relations in what can be described as an abrupt recalibration since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic. This change is due mainly to alarm at Beijing’s increasingly aggressive approach to international affairs, and the realization of what Taiwan has to offer in terms of technology, supply chain security, contributions to the international community, and adherence to democratic freedoms and human rights.
Those are the broad strokes. However, an interesting catalyst in this change of direction has been Lithuania, a small Baltic state with a population of fewer than 3 million people that has inspired the EU and spurred the bloc’s support for its actions.
Lithuania’s size matters. Its history with larger, far more powerful actors, such as the former Soviet Union, is intensely relevant to Taiwan, despite one important difference: Lithuania had to struggle for its independence from Moscow; Taiwan is already independent, but must rely on recognition of this status from other members of the international community if it is to become a normal country.
Lithuanian lawmaker Matas Maldeikis is an outspoken critic of China and chairman of the Lithuanian Parliamentary Group for Relations with Taiwan. He is one of many politicians in the country who believe Lithuania should align itself with others based on shared values rather than economic interest.
On Tuesday, Maldeikis arrived in Taipei as head of a delegation of Lithuanian lawmakers to participate in a conference on democracy later this week. In an interview with Radio Taiwan International in late October, Maldeikis explained the parallel he saw between Taiwan’s situation and Lithuania’s. He spoke of how the country had wanted to be independent from the Soviet Union and how major Western powers had essentially asked it to be silent and let them deal with the situation, citing the complex geopolitics involved and the importance of the Soviet Union.
It was another small country, Iceland, that in February 1991 was the first to recognize Lithuania’s independence. Maldeikis said it was a small step, but one that changed the dynamic, as other countries followed Iceland’s example. Now, “we see this injustice against Taiwan, and we are saying that loudly,” Maldeikis added.
The parallels are not perfect, and yet his point remains.
In September last year, EU lawmaker Reinhard Butikofer, chairman of the European Parliament’s Delegation for Relations with the People’s Republic of China, cowrote an op-ed titled “Revisiting Europe’s ‘One China Policy.’” He and his coauthors reiterated that Europe must work to safeguard the cross-strait “status quo” in line with its “one China” policy, but said that Beijing had “undermined and delegitimized” the “status quo” and thereby destroyed the credibility of its own Taiwan policy. Beijing is risking war in the Taiwan Strait, with implications for the international order, prosperity, and the lives, democracy and freedom of Taiwanese, they wrote.
This volatility is all the Chinese Communist Party’s doing, which, if left unchecked, will almost certainly lead to terrible injustice. The vision of “revisiting” the EU’s China approach recognizes the pernicious nature of Beijing’s actions, but does not go as far as Maldeikis’ vision of hope.
What Lithuania is doing is providing a model for the EU and other countries of how to call China out on its unjust ways. If Maldeikis is right, the first domino has already fallen.
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