The government on Monday expressed concern that Taiwanese officials in Hong Kong would be required to return home at the end of the year, as the territory has so far not responded to requests to renew their visas.
This is probably for the best, given that the Hong Kong government — likely acting on instructions from Beijing — has demanded that the Taiwanese officials sign documents acknowledging Beijing’s “one China” principle. To do so would effectively cede the Republic of China’s sovereignty claims, which would be counter to President Tsai Ing-wen’s (蔡英文) policy of not acknowledging the so-called “1992 consensus.”
It used to make sense for Taiwan to have representation in Hong Kong and Macau, but China destroyed any illusions of the territories’ autonomy when it forced the National Security Law on Hong Kong in June last year. Even former president Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) — who typically favors good relations with China — on March 12 said that the “one country, two systems” formula was a “thing of the past,” after Beijing the day before announced plans to overhaul Hong Kong’s electoral system.
A representative office in Hong Kong is not strictly necessary, as before 2011 its primary function in issuing visas was handled through the China Travel Service. There were hopes last year that Taiwanese officials in Hong Kong could help dissidents in the territory planning to relocate to Taiwan. However, the arrests of many over the past year — including 12 who were arrested at sea while attempting to reach Taiwan’s shores — show that China will stop at nothing to detain and persecute anyone who defies it.
If Taiwanese officials were to communicate with dissidents in Hong Kong, it would serve only to endanger the dissidents and the officials themselves. This is especially true since the passage last month of a new immigration law that gives “apparently unfettered power” to the territory’s immigration authorities, as the Hong Kong Bar Association said.
That power includes stopping people entering or leaving Hong Kong, which could spell trouble for Taiwanese officials there if Beijing applied pressure on Taipei.
China has demanded Tsai’s recognition of the “1992 consensus” as a prerequisite for Taiwan to gain participation in the World Health Assembly and other international forums. This is not necessary, as Taiwan is not now and never has been under the jurisdiction of the People’s Republic of China. For Taiwan to have officials in Hong Kong only legitimizes Beijing’s claims, particularly its claim of sovereignty over Taiwan, and its claim that Hong Kong and Macau have autonomy — as they differ from mainland China in having Taiwanese representation.
It might have once benefited Taiwan to have a Hong Kong office, as it facilitated trade with what was an international hub of commerce largely free of the restrictions in other parts of China. That no longer being the case, it is hard to justify maintaining an office that puts Taiwanese officials at risk and offers Taiwanese little to no benefit.
Taiwan retains unofficial links with China through the Mainland Affairs Council and the Straits Exchange Foundation, which should suffice for communications with Hong Kong and Macau. The Tsai administration should send a clear message that it does not recognize Beijing’s claims regarding autonomy in the two so-called “Special Administrative Regions,” and that it will no longer afford them any special treatment. Handling Hong Kong and Macau in this way would drive home the point that Taiwan has no interest in the “one country, two systems” framework.
The Ma administration tried to warm ties with China, and the Hong Kong office was born out of that approach. As it ultimately failed, its legacy should be undone. Rather than wait for their visas to expire, Tsai should recall the officials from Hong Kong now, and take the upper hand.
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