The US administration’s guidelines on exchanges with Taiwan have finally been released. The new version announced by the US Department of State on Friday last week relaxes restrictions on US exchanges with Taiwan. This will improve US-Taiwan relations, and affect interactions between Taiwan, the US and China.
Since diplomatic relations between the US and the Republic of China (ROC) were severed in 1979, Washington has maintained unofficial relations with Taiwan based on its Taiwan Relations Act. During this period, all US government agencies had restricted contact with Taiwan.
During the administration of former US president Donald Trump, tensions between Washington and Beijing increased, and the US polished the “Taiwan card.” Before Mike Pompeo stepped down as US secretary of state, he canceled contact guidelines announced in 2015, and eliminated all internal restrictions on official contact between US officials and Taiwan, to which China expressed strong dissatisfaction.
Since US President Joe Biden moved into the White House, everyone has been paying attention to his administration’s handling of US-Taiwan relations and guidelines for contact with Taiwan.
The new guidelines basically follow Pompeo’s policy, greatly relaxing restrictions on the contact that US officials have with their Taiwanese counterparts. US and Taiwanese officials can now visit each other’s government offices on official business. Work-related meetings between US and Taiwanese officials can be held at US federal institutions or at Taiwan’s representative office in the US, the Taiwan Economic and Cultural Representative Office.
In the past, such exchanges were explicitly banned. The new guidelines have clearly elevated US-Taiwan relations, and bilateral exchanges will take on a more official significance, making them more equal and effective.
This is a reflection of the Biden administration’s China strategy, which treats Beijing as the US’ biggest adversary. In keeping with its strategy, the US is bringing together its allies — including Taiwan — to counterbalance China.
Although the Biden administration is not deliberately playing the Taiwan card, it is happy to elevate practical bilateral relations and exchanges.
The Biden administration’s wish to raise official relations with Taiwan is clearly at an early stage, as on March 25 it signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) to establish a coast guard working group with Taiwan, and on March 28, US Ambassador to Palau John Hennessey-Niland visited Taiwan, together with Palauan President Surangel Whipps Jr.
In addition, Joseph Young, charge d’affaires ad interim at the US embassy in Tokyo, invited Representative to Japan Frank Hsieh (謝長廷) to the US embassy for talks early last month. These are all examples of how the US has dropped past restrictions on US-Taiwan relations.
Although the Biden administration intends to strengthen US-Taiwan relations, it is also aware of the effects on US-China relations, and has not accepted the previous administration’s all-out lifting of restrictions.
The state department said in a statement that the new guidelines “encourage US government engagement with Taiwan that reflects our deepening unofficial relationship” and that these “new guidelines liberalize guidance on contacts with Taiwan, consistent with our unofficial relations, and provide clarity throughout the executive branch on effective implementation of our ‘one China’ policy, which is guided by the Taiwan Relations Act, the Three Joint Communiques, and the ‘six assurances.’”
The Financial Times has reported that the guidelines allow US officials to attend events at the Twin Oaks Estate in Washington, although not events marking major Taiwanese holidays. This is probably a reference to Taiwan’s Double Ten National Day celebrations and is intended to avoid complicating the US’ “one China” policy.
The Biden administration is maintaining continuity with past administrations’ treatment of the “one China” policy, but also displaying expertise and predictability, which are indicative of a deep understanding of how sensitive this issue is to China and a wish to avoid overstepping this particular Chinese red line.
However, China reacted to the signing of the coast guard MOU and Hennessey-Niland’s visit to Taiwan by sending a large number of military aircraft into Taiwan’s air defense identification zone as a display of its dissatisfaction, doing so even after Washington had said that this was in line with the US’ “one China” policy.
The US and Taiwan are likely to continue expanding official exchanges, but judging from China’s reaction, it might react further if it views the US guidelines as an attempt to erode Washington’s “one China” policy.
Wang Kao-cheng is a professor in Tamkang University’s Graduate Institute of International Affairs and Strategic Studies.
Translated by Perry Svensson
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