On March 25, Taiwan and the US signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) to establish a coast guard working group. In the past few years, the Coast Guard Administration has increasingly taken on the role of an auxiliary navy, while the US Coast Guard operates as one of the six branches of the US armed forces.
The MOU is not only the first joint agreement between Taiwan and the US under the administration of US President Joe Biden, it also represents a significant first step toward the formation of a quasi-military alliance between the two nations.
Just over two years ago, on March 25, 2019, US Coast Guard cutter the USCGC Bertholf and US Navy guided-missile destroyer the USS Curtis Wilbur transited through the Taiwan Strait on a freedom of navigation operation. It was the first such voyage involving a US Coast Guard vessel and the operation demonstrated that the coastal protection force was capable of operating alongside the US Navy, forward-deployed in the western Pacific for politically charged frontline duties such as traversing the Strait.
Moreover, on Dec. 17 last year, the US Navy, US Marine Corps and US Coast Guard published a joint report, titled “Advantage at Sea: Prevailing With Integrated All-Domain Naval Power.” The report was a follow-up to an earlier strategic guidance paper, titled “Forward, Engaged and Ready: A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower,” published in March, 2015.
Right from the outset, last year’s report directly identifies China and Russia as “determined rivals” to the US, although China is referenced 33 times in the main body of the report, compared with only 16 mentions of Russia — twice as often. This demonstrates that the US military views China as by far the more serious threat.
The report also emphasizes that by working closely together and pooling their resources, these three branches of the US military can achieve synergies and a force multiplier effect so that US maritime power and the interests of US allies are not threatened.
In Taiwan, on Dec. 12 last year the first of 12 Anping-class patrol vessels — a modified and improved version of the Tuo Chiang-class missile corvette — entered service with the Coast Guard Administration. In addition to carrying the Chen Hai high-explosive missile system, the vessels are also capable of being retrofitted with the Hsiung Feng “Brave Wind” II and III anti-ship missile systems.
In other words, if required, the Anping-class patrol vessels can be upgraded to have the same capability as the navy’s planned 12 Tuo Chiang-class missile corvettes, providing the navy with an additional 12 fast-attack boats for deployment into a theater of war.
Additionally, before taking up the post at the beginning of the year, Coast Guard Administration Director-General Chou Mei-wu (周美伍) was a National Security Bureau special adviser based in Washington for a little more than two years. Chou’s time in Washington would have allowed him to establish communication channels and gain experience that would stand him in good stead for his current role. The government might have planned it this way to enable cooperation with the US on a broad range of maritime matters.
Defending against Chinese “gray zone” conflict in the Strait is to be the common security issue facing Taiwan and the US in the years ahead.
The signing of the MOU is a response to China’s Coast Guard Law, which came into effect on Feb. 1. The MOU is a potent signal of the shared stance and aspirations of both nations and a sign of deepening cooperation between Taipei and Washington that has sown the seed for a US-Taiwan quasi-military alliance.
Huang Wei-ping is a former think tank researcher.
Translated by Edward Jones
A gap appears to be emerging between Washington’s foreign policy elites and the broader American public on how the United States should respond to China’s rise. From my vantage working at a think tank in Washington, DC, and through regular travel around the United States, I increasingly experience two distinct discussions. This divergence — between America’s elite hawkishness and public caution — may become one of the least appreciated and most consequential external factors influencing Taiwan’s security environment in the years ahead. Within the American policy community, the dominant view of China has grown unmistakably tough. Many members of Congress, as
The shifting geopolitical tectonic plates of this year have placed Beijing in a profound strategic dilemma. As Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) prepares for a high-stakes summit with US President Donald Trump, the traditional power dynamics of the China-Japan-US triangle have been destabilized by the diplomatic success of Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi in Washington. For the Chinese leadership, the anxiety is two-fold: There is a visceral fear of being encircled by a hardened security alliance, and a secondary risk of being left in a vulnerable position by a transactional deal between Washington and Tokyo that might inadvertently empower Japan
After declaring Iran’s military “gone,” US President Donald Trump appealed to the UK, France, Japan and South Korea — as well as China, Iran’s strategic partner — to send minesweepers and naval forces to reopen the Strait of Hormuz. When allies balked, the request turned into a warning: NATO would face “a very bad” future if it refused. The prevailing wisdom is that Trump faces a credibility problem: having spent years insulting allies, he finds they would not rally when he needs them. That is true, but superficial, as though a structural collapse could be caused by wounded feelings. Something
Former Taipei mayor and Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) founding chairman Ko Wen-je (柯文哲) was sentenced to 17 years in prison on Thursday, making headlines across major media. However, another case linked to the TPP — the indictment of Chinese immigrant Xu Chunying (徐春鶯) for alleged violations of the Anti-Infiltration Act (反滲透法) on Tuesday — has also stirred up heated discussions. Born in Shanghai, Xu became a resident of Taiwan through marriage in 1993. Currently the director of the Taiwan New Immigrant Development Association, she was elected to serve as legislator-at-large for the TPP in 2023, but was later charged with involvement
RSS