“Testy,” “divisive,” “frigid,” “an exchange of insults” were some of the media descriptions of last month’s meeting in Anchorage, Alaska, between US Secretary of State Antony Blinken, US National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan and their Chinese counterparts.
Council on Foreign Relations president Richard Haass said that, rather than the “deft handling” needed in US-China relations, this encounter was “mishandled, a terrible start [with] way too much public signaling.”
Yet, contrary to conventional wisdom, the acrimonious encounter with Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs Wang Yi (王毅) and Chinese Central Foreign Affairs Commission Director Yang Jiechi (楊潔篪) was a great success for US diplomacy and bodes well for long-term bilateral relations.
The supposedly good news that traditionally came out of earlier US-China meetings invariably advanced China’s interests at the expense of the US’ interests. Decades of Beijing’s “win-win” outcomes are what brought US-China relations to their present parlous state.
Former US president Donald Trump’s administration was in the process of halting that dynamic and Beijing had convinced itself that US President Joe Biden, who as vice president had cultivated a personal relationship with Chinese leader Xi Jinping (習近平), would return to the congenial mode of the administrations of former US presidents Bill Clinton, George W. Bush and Barack Obama.
That is why, after initially flaunting the images of Wang and Yang’s tirades against the Americans, the Chinese government tried to characterize the meeting as ending with the usual net plus for Chinese diplomacy.
The Trump administration was portrayed as the troublesome outlier.
Afterward, China’s official Xinhua news agency reported: “The delegation pointed out that in the past few years, the previous US administration went against the trend of the times and carried out highly erroneous anti-China policies, which seriously damaged both China’s interests and China-US relations.”
Wang and Yang seemed to be trying to turn what, for Beijing’s objectives, was a lemon of a meeting into public relations lemonade.
“The two sides agreed to follow the spirit of the Xi-Biden telephone conversation on Feb. 11 to maintain dialogue and communication, conduct mutually beneficial cooperation, avoid misunderstanding and misjudgement, forestall conflict and confrontation, and promote sound and steady development of China-US relations,” their statement said.
That the Chinese side would behave boorishly should have come as no surprise. Wang and Yang had conveyed their bullying intentions in the weeks leading up to the meeting. They were expressing Beijing’s anger that the Biden team thus far had refused to repudiate the Trump administration’s historic defiance against China’s hostile anti-Western policies.
What China’s diplomatic team apparently did not expect was that the Americans would carry the resistance in to face-to-face talks, where the tough rhetoric traditionally has only come from China’s side of the table.
The Blinken-Sullivan public refusal to back down clearly caught the hardline negotiators off guard — and discomfited those in the foreign policy establishment, such as Haass, who believe that diplomatic politesse serves US national interests better than straight talk.
The US officials seem to have learned a costly lesson from the Obama administration: that soothing Chinese rhetoric at high-level meetings does not assure concrete positive action.
China’s flagrant violation of the US-negotiated agreement for it to withdraw from Philippines territory in the Scarborough Shoal (Huangyan Island, 黃岩島) and Xi’s flouting of his direct promise to Obama not to militarize China’s illegal artificial islands in the South China Sea are vivid examples of the Chinese Communist Party’s untrustworthiness — and the US’ credulity. Both commitments were hailed as US diplomatic successes at the time.
Beijing’s resort to deception and disinformation was shown even in the arrangements for the meeting in Alaska. Having pleaded for high-level talks in the months since Biden’s election, Wang and Yang felt it necessary to assert that they had been “invited” by the US side, only to be treated rudely.
On matters great and petty, they regularly displayed their disregard for rules and undertakings. The agreed-upon two minutes for each speaker’s opening remarks was trashed by Wang’s 16-minute, finger-waving tongue-lashing.
This time, Blinken did not blink. He asked the cameras to remain and proceeded to deliver a factual, values-laden rebuttal — part of the “signaling” that Haass and others found gratuitous.
Yet words matter — as the Chinese side well knows — and Blinken ensured that the world understands that this administration, like its immediate predecessor, will stand up for Western interests against Beijing’s aggressive behavior. Countries in the Indo-Pacific region and elsewhere need to know that they are not alone.
The test of the Biden administration’s steadfastness will be in the follow-through and the president’s own willingness to back up his diplomats.
Trump too often undercut the progress that former US vice president Mike Pence, former US secretary of state Mike Pompeo and others on the national security team were making in establishing a new values-based policy toward China.
The first indication from Biden was positive. Asked the next day for his reaction to the meeting, he said that he was “very proud” of his secretary of state.
It is important that he adhere to that approach and not allow his prior personal relationship with Xi — “I know him well and he knows me well” — soften the clear-eyed policy articulated by Blinken and Sullivan.
In that regard, it would be interesting to learn the content and dynamic of the two-hour Biden-Xi conversation and why its “spirit of cooperation” was so touted by Wang and Yang before and after the Anchorage meeting as the guideline for US policy going forward.
For example, did Biden apologize or dismiss as campaign rhetoric his description of Xi as “a thug”? Or, did he warn him to expect more of the same unless Beijing moderates its internal and external policies, anticipating the tough Blinken-Sullivan approach?
In his confirmation hearing and repeatedly since then, Blinken has laid out a long-term strategy toward China.
He said that US policy would be “competitive when it should be, collaborative when it can be and adversarial when it must be.”
His and Sullivan’s most recent direct dealing with representatives of the communist regime in Beijing surely must have steeled them to the realization that the default policy would be confrontation.
Even in the limited areas of presumed Sino-US cooperation — climate change, North Korea, nonproliferation and the COVID-19 pandemic — collaboration has ranged from illusory to nonexistent. Instead, Beijing has leveraged those existential dangers to bolster its own existential threat to the West.
In the first sign of the US’ seriousness following Anchorage, the Biden administration joined with European allies and security partners to impose sanctions on Chinese officials for “serious human rights abuses” against Uighur Muslims. The action demonstrates its commitment to human rights and its reliance on multilateralism to achieve US policy goals.
If this is the Biden approach to foreign policy and national security, let the beat go on.
Joseph Bosco, who served as China country director in the office of the US secretary of defense, is a fellow of the Institute for Taiwan-American Studies and a member of the Global Taiwan Institute’s advisory committee.
The Chinese government on March 29 sent shock waves through the Tibetan Buddhist community by announcing the untimely death of one of its most revered spiritual figures, Hungkar Dorje Rinpoche. His sudden passing in Vietnam raised widespread suspicion and concern among his followers, who demanded an investigation. International human rights organization Human Rights Watch joined their call and urged a thorough investigation into his death, highlighting the potential involvement of the Chinese government. At just 56 years old, Rinpoche was influential not only as a spiritual leader, but also for his steadfast efforts to preserve and promote Tibetan identity and cultural
Former minister of culture Lung Ying-tai (龍應台) has long wielded influence through the power of words. Her articles once served as a moral compass for a society in transition. However, as her April 1 guest article in the New York Times, “The Clock Is Ticking for Taiwan,” makes all too clear, even celebrated prose can mislead when romanticism clouds political judgement. Lung crafts a narrative that is less an analysis of Taiwan’s geopolitical reality than an exercise in wistful nostalgia. As political scientists and international relations academics, we believe it is crucial to correct the misconceptions embedded in her article,
Sung Chien-liang (宋建樑), the leader of the Chinese Nationalist Party’s (KMT) efforts to recall Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) Legislator Lee Kun-cheng (李坤城), caused a national outrage and drew diplomatic condemnation on Tuesday after he arrived at the New Taipei City District Prosecutors’ Office dressed in a Nazi uniform. Sung performed a Nazi salute and carried a copy of Adolf Hitler’s Mein Kampf as he arrived to be questioned over allegations of signature forgery in the recall petition. The KMT’s response to the incident has shown a striking lack of contrition and decency. Rather than apologizing and distancing itself from Sung’s actions,
US President Trump weighed into the state of America’s semiconductor manufacturing when he declared, “They [Taiwan] stole it from us. They took it from us, and I don’t blame them. I give them credit.” At a prior White House event President Trump hosted TSMC chairman C.C. Wei (魏哲家), head of the world’s largest and most advanced chip manufacturer, to announce a commitment to invest US$100 billion in America. The president then shifted his previously critical rhetoric on Taiwan and put off tariffs on its chips. Now we learn that the Trump Administration is conducting a “trade investigation” on semiconductors which
RSS