On the day before Double Ten National Day, the Gulei Port Economic Development Zone Administrative Committee in Zhangzhou, China, and the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) jointly issued an announcement banning navigation in an unprecedented way: Live-fire exercises would be conducted in Chinese internal waters east of the Gurei Peninsula from Oct. 13 to 17.
This was the closest live-fire exercise to Taiwan since the Chinese Ministry of National Defense announced on Aug. 13 that it would demonstrate “multi-unit and multi-directional systemized actual combat drills” in the Taiwan Strait — both the north and south ends.
PLA exercises in the Yellow Sea, East China Sea and South China Sea have since July become more frequent than ever. It is generally believed that they are a Chinese military swagger against Taiwan.
However, it is much more probable that the PLA is offsetting its shortage of military capability.
As for the Yellow Sea, a 215km-long isosceles triangle was first set on the southern coast, which is fit for exercises involving Hongqi-22 and Hongqi-9B (HQ-9B) long-range air-defense missiles.
The second part was the navigational warnings LYG0043 and LYG0057 issued on Aug. 25. Six rounds of live-fire drills were executed in the same location on the west side of the Port of Lianyungang. It is evaluated that such a cone-shaped littoral target region of about 12.5km long and 5.5km wide would only be suitable for anti-aircraft artillery and short-range air defense missiles.
In the East China Sea, live-fire was brought into practice in the Huangdayang waters of the Zhoushan Islands off Zhejiang Province, and Daishan Waterway and Baisha Island (白沙) in Taizhou in mid-August.
Early last month, military operations were carried out near Queerao Island (雀兒嶴), Yijiangshan Island (一江山) and Dachen Island (大陳島) in the East China Sea. Navigation warnings ZJG0722 and ZJG0726 were issued for live-fire exercises on Yushan Islands (漁山) late last month.
The range of the target area is the same as that in the Yellow Sea exercises, whose dimensions did not surpass the range of anti-aircraft artillery and short-range air-defense missiles.
As to military activities in the East China Sea, from Dachen Island to the southernmost end of the target area, there is still a depth of about 120km, where it would be possible to proceed to a medium and long-range HQ-9 air-defense missile exercise.
In the South China Sea, exercises were focused on Woody Island (Yongxing Island, 永興島) in the Paracel Islands (Xisha Islands, 西沙群島).
It is not difficult to see that the purposes of summer military exercises in the Yellow Sea, East China Sea and South China Sea are analogues. All of them involve medium and long-range air-defense missiles with a range of more than 120km, anti-aircraft artillery with a range of 12.5km and short-range air-defense missiles.
In short, the PLA’s successive exercises this summer focused on carrying out comprehensive drills for “arming islands and consolidating alongshore air defenses.”
What kinds of threat from enemies has made the PLA feel a thorn in its side and feel the necessity to strengthen island and alongshore air defenses? It is the US military deployment in the Indo-Pacific this year and Taiwan’s arms purchases.
Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs Wang Yi (王毅) at last month’s 10th East Asia Summit foreign ministers’ video meeting said that US military aircraft conducted more than 3,000 activities in the South China Sea in the first half of this year.
The “close-in reconnaissance” conducted by US electric reconnaissance aircraft and P-8A maritime patrol aircraft is the main reason. The Arleigh Burke-class destroyer USS Rafael Peralta (DDG 115) cruised in the Yellow Sea, East China Sea and South China Sea from February to July.
Furthermore, Taiwan has purchased MQ-9B (Sea Guardian) uncrewed reconnaissance aircraft from the US, posing a threat to PLA’s air defense and military security.
The PLA, therefore, launched exercises aimed at “arming islands and consolidating alongshore air defense.”
It nonetheless exposed the PLA’s air defense restrictions on islands of internal waters. The anti-aircraft artillery and short-range air-defense missile exercises in those seas were held after sunrise and before sunset, displaying the PLA’s deficiency in nighttime combat.
The PLA’s summer military exercise this year is nothing but a commencement. From this time forth, it would further bolster its night-vision capabilities and make them regular to defend against close-in reconnaissance by Taiwanese and US uncrewed vehicles.
Many media have interpreted the PLA’s intensive military exercises as an omen to invade or intrude on Taiwan.
However, based on the aforementioned analysis and judgements, they are not the PLA’s preparations for an armed invasion of Taiwan; they are instead to bridge its own combat gaps.
Lu Li-shih is a former instructor at the Republic of China Naval Academy and a former captain of a Ching Chiang-class patrol corvette.
Saudi Arabian largesse is flooding Egypt’s cultural scene, but the reception is mixed. Some welcome new “cooperation” between two regional powerhouses, while others fear a hostile takeover by Riyadh. In Cairo, historically the cultural capital of the Arab world, Egyptian Minister of Culture Nevine al-Kilany recently hosted Saudi Arabian General Entertainment Authority chairman Turki al-Sheikh. The deep-pocketed al-Sheikh has emerged as a Medici-like patron for Egypt’s cultural elite, courted by Cairo’s top talent to produce a slew of forthcoming films. A new three-way agreement between al-Sheikh, Kilany and United Media Services — a multi-media conglomerate linked to state intelligence that owns much of
The US and other countries should take concrete steps to confront the threats from Beijing to avoid war, US Representative Mario Diaz-Balart said in an interview with Voice of America on March 13. The US should use “every diplomatic economic tool at our disposal to treat China as what it is... to avoid war,” Diaz-Balart said. Giving an example of what the US could do, he said that it has to be more aggressive in its military sales to Taiwan. Actions by cross-party US lawmakers in the past few years such as meeting with Taiwanese officials in Washington and Taipei, and
Denmark’s “one China” policy more and more resembles Beijing’s “one China” principle. At least, this is how things appear. In recent interactions with the Danish state, such as applying for residency permits, a Taiwanese’s nationality would be listed as “China.” That designation occurs for a Taiwanese student coming to Denmark or a Danish citizen arriving in Denmark with, for example, their Taiwanese partner. Details of this were published on Sunday in an article in the Danish daily Berlingske written by Alexander Sjoberg and Tobias Reinwald. The pretext for this new practice is that Denmark does not recognize Taiwan as a state under
The Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan has no official diplomatic allies in the EU. With the exception of the Vatican, it has no official allies in Europe at all. This does not prevent the ROC — Taiwan — from having close relations with EU member states and other European countries. The exact nature of the relationship does bear revisiting, if only to clarify what is a very complicated and sensitive idea, the details of which leave considerable room for misunderstanding, misrepresentation and disagreement. Only this week, President Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) received members of the European Parliament’s Delegation for Relations