According to the survey “Taiwanese Core Political Attitude Trend,” conducted by National Chengchi University’s Election Study Center and released on July 3, 67 percent of respondents identify as “Taiwanese” rather than “Chinese,” the highest percentage since the center started surveying national identity.
In terms of unification or independence, the survey showed that the proportion of people willing to “maintain the ‘status quo,’ [but] move toward independence” rose drastically, from 15.1 percent in 2018 to 27.7 percent this year.
This unprecedented change in political attitude reflects mainstream public opinion support for “Taiwanese identity,” but it also implies a higher possibility that Taiwan will move from a two-party system to a system dominated by a single party. Does that mean that the main opposition party — the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) — will never regain power and that the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) can remain in power indefinitely?
During 24 years of direct presidential elections, Taiwan’s two major political parties have seen their support rise and fall. As both parties have a solid support base, they have kept each other in check.
Most KMT supporters acknowledge that there is a certain contextual relationship between the Republic of China (ROC) and China, and they also affirm the party’s contribution to Taiwan’s economic miracle.
The DPP’s strongest support comes from millennial voters — generally defined as those born in the 1980s and the first half of the 1990s — in addition to the so-called benshengren (本省人, those who came to Taiwan before World War II), who have been treated unfairly and unequally.
The young generation supports the DPP on account of their abhorrence of the traditional bureaucratic system, and a yearning for democracy and freedom.
The contrast between the two parties’ supporters is evident from the perspective of generational politics. Having lived through Taiwan’s economic miracle, a majority of the KMT’s supporters hold dear the expectations of cross-strait peace and economic prosperity. They do not want Taiwanese independence advocates to destroy the “status quo,” which is why they do not demand that the KMT reform, even if it means that the party will fail to live up to their expectations.
Unfortunately for them, time and tide wait for no one — their loyalty cannot change the fact that they have entered the latter half of their life.
By comparison, the politicians that emerged from the 1990 Wild Lily student movement generation have become the backbone of the present government. The young “woke” generation from the 2014 Sunflower movement has also become die-hard pan-green-camp supporters. In short, the color “green” seems to have become the symbol of political correctness in the 20-to-40 age group.
The latest survey results underscore a complete generational shift. While the voice of traditional pan-blue camp supporters is important, it is an undeniable fact that they are gradually withering away. For this group, the economic take-off, the Four Asian Tigers era and the “1992 consensus” — which remains controversial within the party — are matters of unforgettable glory, but for the young generation, it is merely part of impersonal history.
With the generational political shift, the KMT’s revival now depends on whether the party really takes the direction of public opinion into account and how determined it is to undertake reform.
As former US president Franklin Roosevelt put it: “We cannot always build a future for our youth, but we can always build our youth for the future.” Even if the KMT might not see any short-term opportunity to turn things around, it must take immediate action to cultivate a support base among the younger generation.
Even when the KMT at rock bottom, it would not be easy for the DPP to remain in power forever. There is no strong contender at the moment, but holding both the presidency and a legislative majority, the party has to face examination of its governing performance.
At least three challenges lie ahead in the next few years.
First, in the face of the freeze in cross-strait relations, the DPP administration must ensure that it takes the right side in the conflict between the US and China without triggering a war.
Second, the DPP must ensure that the Taiwanese economy will not be marginalized, while reaching out and creating new business opportunities.
Third, it must keep its promises to resolve social issues, such as the imbalance in wealth distribution.
In addition, it has made more than 10,000 political appointments after taking power and any major corruption scandal could stir up a storm.
As public opinion becomes increasingly homogeneous on the national identity and cross-strait issues, it can be expected that the younger generation will not get hijacked by the unification-versus-independence issue and that they will have different opinions on other social issues.
The generational transition will not remain exclusive to DPP supporters.
If the ruling party fails to solve problems, and if the opposition parties can discover shifts in mainstream public opinion at an early stage and adjust accordingly, the DPP would sooner or later see the unification-versus-independence issue lose its attraction and it might even lose the support of the Sunflower movement generation.
Dennis Weng is an assistant professor of political science at Sam Houston State University in Huntsville, Texas.
Translated by Chang Ho-ming
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