Now that former Kaohsiung mayor Han Kuo-yu (韓國瑜) has been recalled, will the worrying trend that he rode to his initial electoral success — political fandom — disappear?
The past two years saw the emergence of the “Han fans,” a group of staunch supporters cleaving more to Han than to the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT).
It was because of them that Han organized huge rallies outside of Kaohsiung, even before he was nominated last year as the KMT’s presidential candidate. He and his fans fed off each other, and his image grew to something vastly more inflated than the hapless Han could live up to.
He plummeted to the ground like a modern-day Icarus, but his core supporters are the reason Han has become so troublesome for the KMT leadership, initially to former KMT chairman Wu Den-yih (吳敦義) and now to KMT Chairman Johnny Chiang (江啟臣).
Neither was prepared for voters being so overwhelmingly wedded to an individual politician rather than to the party and its platform — and neither had any idea how to deal with this new phenomenon.
Wu deferred the presidential nomination to a political neophyte and untested populist, while he settled for a place on the party’s legislator-at-large list. Chiang was forced to protect Han, whose supporters would like to see him steal the chairmanship at the nearest opportunity.
Vice President William Lai (賴清德) also had staunch followers prior to the Democratic Progressive Party presidential election primaries. After he lost to President Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文), however, he did nothing to encourage divisions, putting the good of the party before himself.
Former president Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) had charisma to bolster his political credentials. His inner circle enabled him to win battles within the KMT, but in public, Ma always represented the party first. However, his brand and charisma only went so far and his popularity ratings remained low for much of his time in office.
In the end, his political fortunes sank along with the party, when the electorate became suspicious of his pro-China policies.
Han also promoted pro-China policies, but he presented himself entirely differently. To his followers, he was a maverick and his popularity obliged the party, hijacked by the “Han fans,” to fall in line.
How has Taiwan come to this point, where personality cults manufactured around individual politicians can trump political parties?
So-called “retribution” recalls have already been mooted, although neither Han nor the KMT leadership back the idea, which has been driven by Han’s core supporters.
On Saturday last week, a rally to protest the recall was held in Taipei, drawing about 500 people, few of whom were from Kaohsiung, and most of whom were in their 50s and 60s. Again, these were mostly Han supporters, although Han had discouraged them from attending, and the KMT leadership, again, kept their distance.
The Han fans seem to have taken on a life of their own. The demographic of the crowd and the speeches suggested that the rally attracted a generation whose political ideals have been left behind by the nation’s majority.
The question is, have those who still believe that the overall good of a party is more important than individual demagoguery also been left behind?
Is this phenomenon a sign of the times, or could it be a mere worrying trend that will come to an end with Han’s probable political demise?
Fandom in the arts, entertainment and sports engages people on a personal level. It is OK for the objects of unquestioning adoration to be more idols than realities. The same cannot be said for political fandom, as politicians greatly affect the future of the nation.
Concerns that the US might abandon Taiwan are often overstated. While US President Donald Trump’s handling of Ukraine raised unease in Taiwan, it is crucial to recognize that Taiwan is not Ukraine. Under Trump, the US views Ukraine largely as a European problem, whereas the Indo-Pacific region remains its primary geopolitical focus. Taipei holds immense strategic value for Washington and is unlikely to be treated as a bargaining chip in US-China relations. Trump’s vision of “making America great again” would be directly undermined by any move to abandon Taiwan. Despite the rhetoric of “America First,” the Trump administration understands the necessity of
US President Donald Trump’s challenge to domestic American economic-political priorities, and abroad to the global balance of power, are not a threat to the security of Taiwan. Trump’s success can go far to contain the real threat — the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) surge to hegemony — while offering expanded defensive opportunities for Taiwan. In a stunning affirmation of the CCP policy of “forceful reunification,” an obscene euphemism for the invasion of Taiwan and the destruction of its democracy, on March 13, 2024, the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) used Chinese social media platforms to show the first-time linkage of three new
If you had a vision of the future where China did not dominate the global car industry, you can kiss those dreams goodbye. That is because US President Donald Trump’s promised 25 percent tariff on auto imports takes an ax to the only bits of the emerging electric vehicle (EV) supply chain that are not already dominated by Beijing. The biggest losers when the levies take effect this week would be Japan and South Korea. They account for one-third of the cars imported into the US, and as much as two-thirds of those imported from outside North America. (Mexico and Canada, while
The military is conducting its annual Han Kuang exercises in phases. The minister of national defense recently said that this year’s scenarios would simulate defending the nation against possible actions the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) might take in an invasion of Taiwan, making the threat of a speculated Chinese invasion in 2027 a heated agenda item again. That year, also referred to as the “Davidson window,” is named after then-US Indo-Pacific Command Admiral Philip Davidson, who in 2021 warned that Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) had instructed the PLA to be ready to invade Taiwan by 2027. Xi in 2017
RSS