As former Panamanian dictator Manuel Noriega’s fortunes fluctuated with the whims of the US government, it is apt that reports of his death on Tuesday focused on his blow-hot-and-cold relationship with Washington.
What is not so well-known, even here in Taiwan, is the role Taipei played in the relationship. Chinese-language media in Taiwan alluded to the training and assistance Noriega received in Taipei, but these were generally fleeting references.
A fuller picture provides a fascinating insight into the then-Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) government’s nefarious activities in Central America during the 1980s.
Noriega was a keen student of subjects ranging from the exotic to the mundane: Archive administration and jungle warfare were among the courses he took at training facilities around the world, most notably the notorious School of the Americas — now the The Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation.
He also took classes in media manipulation at Fort Bragg where he rubbed shoulders with Taiwanese, Iranians and fellow Latin Americans.
Military academic Thomas Marks — who has glossed over some of the most egregious KMT abuses — contends that Noriega was not among the many Panamanian officers and civilian leaders who graduated from the notorious political warfare program at Fu Hsing Kang College.
However, old “pineapple face” certainly received some kind of instruction during his early visits to Taiwan.
Elsewhere, Frederick Kempe, president and chief executive officer of the Atlantic Council think tank, has described Noriega’s enrollment in courses offered by Taiwan and Israel, which along with South Africa formed a pariah triumvirate. These nations could be depended on by Washington for proxy operations that circumvented congressional oversight.
Kempe said that Noriega — who had once entertained aspirations of being a psychiatrist — was particularly interested in psychological warfare, a known component of the Fu Hsing Kang syllabus.
In Taiwan, Kempe said, Noriega participated in “police investigative courses,” a description that sounds strikingly close to what was on offer at Fu Hsing Kang, Marks’ insistence to the contrary notwithstanding.
The late Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, an authority on US relations with Taiwan and China, confirmed that Noriega underwent “military and intelligence training” in Taipei early in his career.
Whatever it was he was learning, Noriega cultivated a steadfast friendship with Admiral Sung Chang-chih (宋長志), who, in his positions as chief of general staff and subsequently minister of national defense, was to prove an invaluable ally just when Noriega needed one.
With the US shoulder starting to freeze, Sung was appointed ambassador to Panama in 1987, a role which saw him involved in what Tucker refers to as “clandestine enterprises” aimed at undermining Beijing.
Once again, Marks emerges as the KMT’s ablest apologist, insisting that Sung was dispatched to reason with his old drinking buddy, rather than abet him in any skullduggery.
Marks’ proof for this claim comes straight from the horse’s mouth.
“I told him he was in a very dangerous situation ... that he could not alienate the US,” Sung told Marks. “If General Noriega had accepted my ideas, things could have worked out better.”
Far from condoning Noriega’s behavior, Marks says, the KMT government was trying to rein him in. The orders came from then-president Chiang Ching-kuo (蔣經國) with Sung casting himself as a reluctant errand boy.
“I didn’t want to, but our diplomatic situation was so sensitive that I had to go,” Sung said.
Worse still, “I didn’t make a penny,” Sung lamented.
This holier-than-thou version of events is unconvincing.
Taipei’s ignominious bit-part in the Iran-Contra scandal is now well documented.
Yet before an alternative method of funneling funds to the Contras in Nicaragua was agreed, Noriega was put forward as a potential intermediary in late 1984. The plan eventually collapsed, but it was far from the end of Taipei’s illicit dealings with Noriega.
With Washington angling behind the scenes for Noriega’s resignation in 1988, Taiwan was again approached to supply the bribe money required to ensure he took the fall.
While the ruse also fell through, Washington’s official break with Noriega left a gap for Taipei to ratchet up weapons sales to Panama.
A US$1 billion “development” fund saw its way to state coffers the following year, with Noriega’s adviser, Mario Rognoni, saying: “The Taiwanese were the ringleaders of those helping us. The others followed.”
The death of this brutal dictator should serve as a stark reminder of the depths to which Taiwan was once prepared to descend in its bid for international recognition.
James Baron is a freelance writer and journalist based in Taipei.
Concerns that the US might abandon Taiwan are often overstated. While US President Donald Trump’s handling of Ukraine raised unease in Taiwan, it is crucial to recognize that Taiwan is not Ukraine. Under Trump, the US views Ukraine largely as a European problem, whereas the Indo-Pacific region remains its primary geopolitical focus. Taipei holds immense strategic value for Washington and is unlikely to be treated as a bargaining chip in US-China relations. Trump’s vision of “making America great again” would be directly undermined by any move to abandon Taiwan. Despite the rhetoric of “America First,” the Trump administration understands the necessity of
US President Donald Trump’s challenge to domestic American economic-political priorities, and abroad to the global balance of power, are not a threat to the security of Taiwan. Trump’s success can go far to contain the real threat — the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) surge to hegemony — while offering expanded defensive opportunities for Taiwan. In a stunning affirmation of the CCP policy of “forceful reunification,” an obscene euphemism for the invasion of Taiwan and the destruction of its democracy, on March 13, 2024, the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) used Chinese social media platforms to show the first-time linkage of three new
If you had a vision of the future where China did not dominate the global car industry, you can kiss those dreams goodbye. That is because US President Donald Trump’s promised 25 percent tariff on auto imports takes an ax to the only bits of the emerging electric vehicle (EV) supply chain that are not already dominated by Beijing. The biggest losers when the levies take effect this week would be Japan and South Korea. They account for one-third of the cars imported into the US, and as much as two-thirds of those imported from outside North America. (Mexico and Canada, while
The military is conducting its annual Han Kuang exercises in phases. The minister of national defense recently said that this year’s scenarios would simulate defending the nation against possible actions the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) might take in an invasion of Taiwan, making the threat of a speculated Chinese invasion in 2027 a heated agenda item again. That year, also referred to as the “Davidson window,” is named after then-US Indo-Pacific Command Admiral Philip Davidson, who in 2021 warned that Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) had instructed the PLA to be ready to invade Taiwan by 2027. Xi in 2017
RSS