Taipei Times: How do you view Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) Chairman Lien Chan's (
Lin Chong-pin (
TT: Will Taiwan's society be polarized by Lien's trip? What is the impact of this polarization?
TAIPEI TIMES FILE PHOTO
Lin: The public opinion in Taiwan on his trip, I think, is polarized. It may become even more polarized after his trip, to the secret pleasure of Beijing.
One opinion is this: that Lien made a breakthrough. I grant that the atmosphere has been less tense. That's his contribution, and we have to give him credit.
The other side argues that Lien did not say anything about our grand achievements: democracy and freedom. He did not mention the Republic of China (ROC) out loud. And the third thing is that he seems to be criticizing his own people outside of his home. I'm afraid that leaves a bad smell. It's going to be an endless point of argument [since he came back]. However, I have to give him credit for an excellent personal performance. In comparison to his past performance, he really did a fabulous job. He memorized poems, he gave an arousing speech and he showed humor.
The downside is of course the further division of our society, making it even more difficult for people to reach a consensus. I'm afraid that is so, at least in the short run.
TT: What strategy did Beijing use to handle Lien's visit?
Lin: Beijing gave Lien last minute gifts, a relaxation of travel restrictions, a promise to reduce tariffs and restrictions on the export of Taiwanese fruit, and a pair of pandas. The KMT announced that Lien acquired concrete results from his trip.
China waited until the last minute to make concessions. This is Beijing's manipulation of Lien's trip. I am not sure, but I suspect Beijing knew Lien did not want to go home emptyhanded, so they made no concessions in order to put pressure on Lien's eight-day trip and to restrict his rhetoric. I am not sure, but I suspect that is why Lien did not mention democracy, freedom or the ROC, and criticized his own people at Peiking University. Beijing waited until the last minute before making any concessions. This is Beijing's tradition in conducting negotiations; the Chinese Communist Party's traditional style.
TT: Is it possible that Beijing will meet with President Chen Shui-bian (
Lin: Oh, I think Beijing is dying to talk to Chen [laughs]. Beijing's ultimate target is definitely Chen. If Hu talked to Chen, he would achieve at least three achievements. Domestically, Hu would score by obtaining something that could not be done under former president Jiang Zemin (
TT: Do you think there is an urgent need for Chen to meet with Beijing?
Lin: I can't speak for him.
TT: How should the government respond to Beijing's "peaceful offensive"?
Lin: Given the circumstances, the government should take a more humble attitude in handling the situation. Our rhetoric and attitude should not be too harsh, leaving room for the government to adjust its policies. The government must prioritize its competing national goals. Political dignity, economic development and military security are what we all want, but in what order should they come? The government has to prioritize and choose, and then decide how best to handle the situation.
TT: Do you think "China fever" is a temporary phenomenon?
Lin: I don't think China fever is only for the time being. It is going to last for a while. Two things: One, Beijing has a deliberate policy on using exchanges to achieve its purpose. Beijing has put more emphasis on the bottom-up functional issues, rather than the top-down political issues like in the past. So this is one reason why China fever does not seem to be a temporary phenomenon.
The second is that for some time economic exchanges across the Taiwan Strait have been going on very strongly, and since it is difficult to stop such economic interactions, it may continue. The growing cross-strait economic interaction should be viewed within the context of China's growing interaction with its neighbors, all of them, economically.
TT: So China fever is economically driven?
Lin: I think mainly. Partly economically driven, partly policy driven, and the policies come from leaders in Beijing who have developed and implemented what I call a new grand strategy since the summer of 2002. The strategy is to incorporate by an increasing amount the degree of integrated domestic policies, foreign policies, defense policies and cross-strait policies. And the contradictions among the policies have been reduced to a minimum to allow Beijing to attain the greatest amount of total benefits. You know, by way of synergy. So this is China's new grand strategy, and China's cross-strait policy is only part of this grand strategy. So I'm elaborating on what I meant by Beijing's deliberate policy. This is part of the new grand strategy.
TT: Your assumption seems to be that China's economy will continue to grow stronger. But is it possible that China's economy will slide downward?
Lin: It's possible. The most notable problem at this time is the danger of overheating. Last year, overheating looked even more probable, but at the beginning of this year, overheating seems to be under some degree of control. But the danger is always there, and part of the reasons for overheating is the uncontrollable property market in Shanghai. So that's one danger: overheating.
The second is structural ailments or defects. We're talking about bad loans in banks. We're also talking about the income gap in the society, which is widening. So these are looming dangers. But again, years ago, I remember in 1998, people started to talk about the collapse of China's economy. That was 7 years ago.
It hasn't happened yet. So global economists are asking why. One possible explanation is the scale of China's economy, which has never been seen by human history. Economists have been studying the economy of France or England or Germany or even the US, but none of the previous cases have the size and scale of China's economy. Therefore China could postpone the explosion of the economic time bomb by pushing the problems inward, from the coast to the central belt by Chongqing, Zhengzhou and other areas. And when the time bomb explodes in the central belt, it could push inland to Xinjiang and Yunnan provinces, and Tibet and other areas. And that would be many years down the road. That's one explanation.
So we don't really know the final answer yet, but so far, for several years now the expected explosion of China's economic problems has been postponed. But that does not say the basic problems have been solved. No. They are still there, and they're getting even worse perhaps. And the overheating is linked with corruption and corruption is linked with the political system, so that's the current situation. We don't really know if China's economy will collapse or if its problems will explode. We don't know yet, but so far, it looks to be under control for some years now.
TT: Chinese President Hu Jintao (
Lin: It is interesting because my colleagues returning from China lately noticed that Beijing and even Chinese TV commentators had refrained from mentioning certain phrases during Lien's visit. One was "one country, two systems." They even refrained from mentioning the "one China" principle. They even refrained from mentioning the People's Republic of China. So, apparently Beijing has become more skillful in trying to win the hearts and minds of the Taiwanese people. In fact, the way I feel is that on the surface Lien was the honored guest. And he really enjoyed the glory and grandeur, you know, of being treated like a head of state. But I think the real honored guest in Beijing's mind was the millions of TV viewers in Taiwan. They were the real honored guests, because Beijing's ultimate target is to win the hearts and minds of these people, the Taiwanese audience.
TT: "One country, two systems" was the system of governance China was going to give Taiwan. But if they don't mention this, then what sort of policy might replace it?
Lin: What is new is that this time the phrase "one country, two systems" was not mentioned at all. This is new. Whether Beijing has a new system in mind, we don't know. We can say that Beijing tried to avoid hurting the feelings of the Taiwanese people. They finally realized that "one country, two systems" is not acceptable to the Taiwanese people. It's counterproductive to what they are trying to achieve, winning the hearts and minds of the people.
TT: So is this part of the new grand strategy?
Lin: I don't know what Beijing's ultimate design is for the cross-strait future arrangement. I don't know yet, and I don't think they know yet. They're looking for something new. I did notice that China's think tanks have been toying with some new ideas. As I have said publicly before, they have been toying with the name "United States of Chinese Republics." And they have been studying the concept of overlapping sovereignty -- by saying that sovereignty can be overlapped, but it cannot be divided. They have been studying the cases of the three seats held by the former Soviet Union in the UN. These three seats, since 1945 to 1992, have been held by Belarus, Russia and the Ukraine. And so, I think -- I'm pretty sure -- they have been looking at these things, toying with these ideas. What the final conclusion they will arrive at is not clear. I don't think they're clear yet. They just realized "one country, two systems" does not work.
TT: So what is China's new Taiwan policy?
Lin: There are several things under Hu which are different from Jiang's time. The first is that there is no timetable for unification. At least under Hu, a timetable is not mentioned. Under Jiang, a timetable had been mentioned, maybe not officially, but at least by think tanks or by the People's Liberation Army (PLA). Under Hu the timetable has disappeared from public statements.
The second distinction is that under Hu the soft and hard hands have become even more enhanced in different directions. However, there is a caveat. Under Jiang, Beijing tried to divide the government and the people, the government and businesspeople. But now, under Hu, Beijing is trying to divide even the government and the ruling party.
Therefore, Beijing's approach under Hu is to drive a wedge in the ruling party between the hardcore, independence advocates and all of the rest. Beijing is trying to win over the rest. Therefore, the target area under Hu has shrunk, while what Beijing is trying to win over has been enlarged. So that's the second distinction. You could call it greater differentiation.
The third distinction is that under Hu there has been a greater emphasis on non-military instruments. These instruments go beyond the so-called "three wars" based on the December 2003 decree announced by the PLA: media warfare, legal warfare and psychological warfare. But Beijing's non-military instruments go far beyond these three. They extend into the religious front, the economic front, the social and cultural front; they go into foreign policy -- much wider areas. And all of these are bloodless. They are not military. Under Hu these will receive greater emphasis, but that does not mean the military has been abandoned. No, no, no. The military is constantly prepared. That's the third distinction.
I think the fourth distinction is that under Hu, Beijing's approaches will be more agile and in many forms more multifarious.
The last one is yet to emerge. The fifth distinction is that Beijing may treat sovereignty issues with greater latitude, as I just mentioned. But these are yet to emerge. That has not really surfaced yet. It's waiting there. So that's the fifth.
But two areas remain the same. One is a continuation of rapid and quiet modernization of the PLA, with three major themes or three major items of emphasis. The first is a survivable nuclear deterrence against the United States. By survivable, I'm talking about the Type 094 nuclear-powered submarine, which will be deployed any time -- maybe this year or next year. Each Type 094 will carry 16 Great Wave II intercontinental ballistic missiles, with 3 warheads. So if they acquire three Type 094s they will have 144 warheads, and that is the minimum they need to have a deterrent against Washington. The way it works in Beijing's mind, I think, is that by possessing these weapons, Washington will in the future find it difficult to decide whether to send its aircraft carriers to intervene in the Taiwan Strait. By forcing the US to deliberate over this issue for some time, Beijing can use other instruments to seize Taiwan.
So that's the first item of emphasis in the PLA's modernization. The second is what I have been saying about the capabilities of "Acupuncture Warfare" (
The second thing that has not changed is Beijing's international circumvention of Taiwan, its diplomatic war, especially in Africa and Latin America, where a lot of countries recognize the ROC. So these are the new -- you ask me what are the new -- Taiwan policies.
TT: What is the US attitude to cross-strait exchanges lately? Has the US lost control of the cross-strait situation?
Lin: I think Washington would like to see dialogue, cross-strait dialogue for sure, but whether Washington would like to see a rapid unification is questionable. As [Georgetown history professor] Nancy Tucker wrote several years ago in a Washington Quarterly article, she posed the very important question: will unification solve all of the US' problems? She posed that question, but she didn't answer it. It was a very important question to pose, and that also reflects a deep anxiety on the part of the US of the prospect of China-Taiwan unification. Although it was not verbalized, no one has said publicly anything yet, but you can feel there is anxiety.
There are at least some people in Washington who are not very comfortable about this prospect. Perhaps not all, but some people. Others in Washington would like to see that, because I mentioned Beijing's new grand strategy is to squeeze out US influence in East Asia without fighting. One retired admiral said to me, "Chong-pin, wouldn't you say that's better than fighting a war?" [Laughs] So there are people who think this way, but also other people who don't feel very comfortable about a unified Taiwan and China, especially when China remains undemocratic.
TT: Some people say there is an immediate need for negotiations between Taiwan and China. Do you see an urgent need?
Lin: If talking to Beijing leads to a relaxation of tension, I think most people would like to see that, but if it leads to instant unification, I'm not sure.
Negotiations or dialogue on functional issues or issues concerning the welfare of people on both sides of the Strait, like illegal immigrants, fishing disputes, these have always been in need, even when I was with the MAC, we had been appealing to Beijing to talk about these things. Beijing at that time was not forward, forthcoming. I think, concerning people's lives or livelihood, there is always a need.
But concerning political status, I don't think there is an urgent need to solve the political entanglement, and I think it's better for both sides to wait on the political issues. They're not immediately solvable. They only waste a lot of time and lead to a lot of friction.
TRAGEDY: An expert said that the incident was uncommon as the chance of a ground crew member being sucked into an IDF engine was ‘minuscule’ A master sergeant yesterday morning died after she was sucked into an engine during a routine inspection of a fighter jet at an air base in Taichung, the Air Force Command Headquarters said. The officer, surnamed Hu (胡), was conducting final landing checks at Ching Chuan Kang (清泉崗) Air Base when she was pulled into the jet’s engine for unknown reasons, the air force said in a news release. She was transported to a hospital for emergency treatment, but could not be revived, it said. The air force expressed its deepest sympathies over the incident, and vowed to work with authorities as they
A tourist who was struck and injured by a train in a scenic area of New Taipei City’s Pingsi District (平溪) on Monday might be fined for trespassing on the tracks, the Railway Police Bureau said yesterday. The New Taipei City Fire Department said it received a call at 4:37pm on Monday about an incident in Shifen (十分), a tourist destination on the Pingsi Railway Line. After arriving on the scene, paramedics treated a woman in her 30s for a 3cm to 5cm laceration on her head, the department said. She was taken to a hospital in Keelung, it said. Surveillance footage from a
BITTERLY COLD: The inauguration ceremony for US president-elect Donald Trump has been moved indoors due to cold weather, with the new venue lacking capacity A delegation of cross-party lawmakers from Taiwan, led by Legislative Speaker Han Kuo-yu (韓國瑜), for the inauguration of US president-elect Donald Trump, would not be able to attend the ceremony, as it is being moved indoors due to forecasts of intense cold weather in Washington tomorrow. The inauguration ceremony for Trump and US vice president-elect JD Vance is to be held inside the Capitol Rotunda, which has a capacity of about 2,000 people. A person familiar with the issue yesterday said although the outdoor inauguration ceremony has been relocated, Taiwan’s legislative delegation has decided to head off to Washington as scheduled. The delegation
Another wave of cold air would affect Taiwan starting from Friday and could evolve into a continental cold mass, the Central Weather Administration (CWA) said yesterday. Temperatures could drop below 10°C across Taiwan on Monday and Tuesday next week, CWA forecaster Chang Chun-yao (張竣堯) said. Seasonal northeasterly winds could bring rain, he said. Meanwhile, due to the continental cold mass and radiative cooling, it would be cold in northern and northeastern Taiwan today and tomorrow, according to the CWA. From last night to this morning, temperatures could drop below 10°C in northern Taiwan, it said. A thin coat of snow