There are more people of Japanese extraction living in Brazil’s Sao Paulo Province than there are in all the other countries of the world put together, Japan excluded.
The remarkable immigration began in 1908, a year after the US had prohibited virtually all further Japanese arrivals. The government in Tokyo encouraged it, believing their country had too many farmers for the land available. And many more arrived in Brazil in the years immediately following World War II. But few of the Japanese Brazilians, known locally as “Nikkei,” remained farmers for long. Most took education very seriously, and many moved into the city and quickly became prosperous middle-class success stories. And the other Brazilians were if anything proud of them. If these hard-working and talented people can run our businesses and use their Japanese connections, went the general opinion, then maybe one day Brazil will be as rich as Japan.
A Discontented Diaspora looks at the phenomenon in general, then goes on to investigate two specific areas of Japanese-Brazilian activity — their participation in erotic movies and their involvement in political radicalism, both during the 1960s and 1970s.
The films the author discusses don’t appear very erotic by the standards of today’s pornography. Screened 40 years ago in mainstream Sao Paulo cinemas, they seem rather to be social comedies on mildly sexual topics. He describes researching them at somewhere called the Canal X Pornography Superstore where he sat on the floor with his laptop peeling open plastic containers of films that hadn’t been touched, let alone rented out, for decades. The regular customers thought he was a tax-inspector.
What characterizes them, he considers, is that their female Japanese-Brazilian performers were considered both “exotic” and alluring. Whether they were alluring because they were exotic, or whether the two categories simply co-existed, isn’t clear. Either way, the supposed attractiveness — and submissiveness — of Japanese-Brazilian women is part of Brazilian folklore, it seems, along with the docile, hard-working nature of the men — plus their tendency to be less than entirely admirable as drivers.
Jeffrey Lesser probably opts to study the Japanese-Brazilian involvement in student militancy opposed to the dictatorship of President Arthur da Costa e Silva (which began in 1964) because of the ethnic-based movements of that period in the US, such as the Black Panthers. He finds the involvement of minorities in Brazil to have been far smaller, though not insignificant. In the popular view at the era, these reserved, conservative citizens could quite possibly be bank robbers in their free time. But more often it was simply students who became radicalized, as did so many others students elsewhere, with their ethnicity of only marginal importance. The press however, compliant with the regime, presented them as being uniquely violent in what was perceived as a Japanese tradition.
A precursor in terms of Japanese political involvement was a secret society from the 1940s, Shindo Renmei, that aimed to preserve Japanese language and culture in Brazil, and even denied Japan’s defeat in the war. The student militants of the 1960s and 1970s, by contrast, wanted to be a part of a wider Brazilian student radicalism, and not be seen as specifically Japanese.
There doesn’t turn out to be a great deal of material for Lesser to work on. He tracks the careers of two Japanese-Brazilian militants of the period, then spends a lot of time on the 1970 kidnapping of the Japanese Consul to Sao Paulo by student radicals. The release of five students being held (and tortured) by the authorities was the condition for the consul’s release, and one of these was known to the public as “Mario Japa” (“Japanese Mario”). The exchange took place after the consul had been held for five days, and he made the headlines on his release by refusing to condemn his captors. They had behaved, he said, like gentlemen. The students were deported to Mexico but allowed to return to Brazil nine years later. The consul later became Japan’s ambassador to Brazil.
As for this book’s author, he’s an Atlanta professor who’s written two other books on Brazilian immigrants. He describes himself as being Jewish-American, and his wife, born and raised in Sao Paulo, as Jewish-Brazilian. His Japanese-Brazilian interviewees found these facts reassuring. He, too, was an outsider, they concluded, and so would understand their problems.
Sao Paulo is a place of immigrants. In addition to its 1.2 million Japanese-Brazilians it boasts the world’s largest Italian community outside Italy and the world’s largest Lebanese community outside Lebanon. And despite the fact that there are a quarter of a million Japanese Brazilians now living back in Japan, ostensibly looking for temporary work (a movement that began in the 1980s), the subjects of this book can’t nowadays really be described as “discontented.” They’re often well off, are admired by other Brazilians and are in many ways the South American version of the US idea of a “model minority” writ large.
Of course the student radicals of 40 years ago were discontented, as were student radicals all over the world, and in this sense the phrase provides a catchy title for what is an interesting, often surprising and generally well-researched book.
If the Japanese-Brazilians are discontented at all these days it’s because they want to be considered simply as Brazilians like everyone else, an appellation the rest of the population stubbornly resists. But Brazil’s fondness for them, and pride in them, is unmistakable. This proprietorial sense, combined with a continuing feeling of difference, was exemplified by a famous 1992 advertisement for Semp Toshiba (a Brazil-based company making electronic products) that in Portuguese announced proudly “Our Japanese are more creative than everyone else’s Japanese.”
Taiwanese chip-making giant Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co (TSMC) plans to invest a whopping US$100 billion in the US, after US President Donald Trump threatened to slap tariffs on overseas-made chips. TSMC is the world’s biggest maker of the critical technology that has become the lifeblood of the global economy. This week’s announcement takes the total amount TSMC has pledged to invest in the US to US$165 billion, which the company says is the “largest single foreign direct investment in US history.” It follows Trump’s accusations that Taiwan stole the US chip industry and his threats to impose tariffs of up to 100 percent
From censoring “poisonous books” to banning “poisonous languages,” the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) tried hard to stamp out anything that might conflict with its agenda during its almost 40 years of martial law. To mark 228 Peace Memorial Day, which commemorates the anti-government uprising in 1947, which was violently suppressed, I visited two exhibitions detailing censorship in Taiwan: “Silenced Pages” (禁書時代) at the National 228 Memorial Museum and “Mandarin Monopoly?!” (請說國語) at the National Human Rights Museum. In both cases, the authorities framed their targets as “evils that would threaten social mores, national stability and their anti-communist cause, justifying their actions
In the run-up to World War II, Admiral Wilhelm Canaris, head of Abwehr, Nazi Germany’s military intelligence service, began to fear that Hitler would launch a war Germany could not win. Deeply disappointed by the sell-out of the Munich Agreement in 1938, Canaris conducted several clandestine operations that were aimed at getting the UK to wake up, invest in defense and actively support the nations Hitler planned to invade. For example, the “Dutch war scare” of January 1939 saw fake intelligence leaked to the British that suggested that Germany was planning to invade the Netherlands in February and acquire airfields
The launch of DeepSeek-R1 AI by Hangzhou-based High-Flyer and subsequent impact reveals a lot about the state of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) today, both good and bad. It touches on the state of Chinese technology, innovation, intellectual property theft, sanctions busting smuggling, propaganda, geopolitics and as with everything in China, the power politics of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). PLEASING XI JINPING DeepSeek’s creation is almost certainly no accident. In 2015 CCP Secretary General Xi Jinping (習近平) launched his Made in China 2025 program intended to move China away from low-end manufacturing into an innovative technological powerhouse, with Artificial Intelligence