Following Tsai Ing-wen’s (蔡英文) dramatic victory in January, it seems appropriate to look ahead to 2020 (though alas, not with perfect vision!) and consider where relations with the United States might trend. At the same time, we need to consider reactions from the mainland to President Tsai’s convincing win, retaining as well — albeit with a slightly smaller margin — the DPP’s majority in the Legislative Yuan.
First, let us congratulate President Xi Jinping (習近平) on his central role in the DPP’s victory. Polls early last year suggested a rather different outcome, but Madame Tsai focused on good governance, nursing the Taiwan economy to a solid performance despite Beijing’s attempts to punish the island. The drop in mainland tourism may have hit certain sectors of the economy, although enhanced trade with the US and Asian neighbors effectively offset that factor.
The most striking factor assisting Tsai’s party was the harsh and clumsy Chinese handling of Hong Kong during the course of the year. Xi Jinping gets the lion’s share of credit for this policy, since as supreme ruler for life, all important policy decisions lie with him. Tsai’s triumph was also evident in local elections that were dominated by pro-democracy (also by definition anti-CCP) candidates presenting a surprisingly strong showing.
The KMT has some serious soul-searching ahead of it as it considers the future. Han Kuo-yu (韓國瑜) not only was trounced in the Presidential balloting, but now faces a recall movement from Kaohsiung citizens alienated by his reneged promise to concentrate on their concerns after his election to the southern city’s leadership a year ago.
President Tsai can continue to rely on solid support from the United States, spearheaded by Congressional leaders, state governments, and a White House that has — if somewhat haphazardly — shown support for the democratic people of Taiwan even as it continued a trade war with the mainland. I won’t go into the political implications of the newly emerged coronavirus now sweeping the mainland, other than to note that this will not be good for its economy.
Assessing PRC internal politics is a fraught occupation, but it does seem Xi Jinping has entered into some rough waters. One wonders how long the heretofore docile Politburo will continue to support Xi’s imperial ambition to reign sovereign for the rest of his life, effectively denying any of them a chance at the top job.
Meanwhile, independent assessments suggest the economy was slowing even before the coronavirus erupted. We all have to hope this new contagion will quickly subside, given the threat it poses throughout the region and perhaps globally. In sum, this looks like a rocky year for mainland politics. So long as all this does not lead to new aggression against Taiwan, it could even bring a respite in cross-strait tension.
The recent trend of Taiwan industry returning from the mainland should be welcomed. Trade with Taiwan’s neighbors might be a collateral benefit of China’s economic slowdown, as the government’s Go South policy continues to focus on enhanced relations with the economies of ASEAN as well as South Asia.
America is beginning its protracted political season. The primary election in my home state of New Hampshire was on February 11. A number of Democratic candidates have viable paths to the White House as they face a wounded and unpopular President. But November’s elections are still a long way off.
Suffice it to say that the raft of Democratic candidates — while no doubt suspicious of China and inclined toward supporting Taiwan — are not really focused on the cross-strait question as they seek a path to the White House. That said, I remain confident the basic support for our Democratic friends there will be reflected in the policies any Democratic president would bring to office next year.
Meanwhile President Trump has waxed soft and hard on China, seeking trade deals while authorizing arms sales and solid defense ties with Taipei. John Bolton’s departure from the administration means the loss of a longtime friend of Taiwan, but there are other kindred souls in Washington’s executive and legislative bodies.
The Trump Administration has spoken up on behalf of Taiwan as Beijing threatens its remaining diplomatic partners, and Washington will continue to do so, with strong Congressional support. The US does have influence with some of these countries, but China also has been assiduous in wooing them with financial and diplomatic inducements.
Mr. Xi might choose to go after some of the remaining fifteen countries that retain formal diplomatic relations with Taipei. However, this can only go so far. Meanwhile, as I have long argued, the real core of Taiwan’s international support is more centered on the informal, but robust commercial and people-to-people ties with such stalwart friends as the US, Japan, ASEAN and South Asian countries.
The coronavirus epidemic has unmasked Beijing’s churlish attitude toward health issues in Taiwan, given its unwillingness even to permit data from the World Health Organization (WHO) to be shared with the island. It also appears to be triggering the first real political crisis for strongman Xi, who has appeared indecisive and more interested in covering up the facts than addressing this serious health challenge. One only hopes that Xi will not try to distract attention from his own mismanagement by concocting another cross-strait crisis.
American politics is in flux, as the Democratic Party tries to find the best candidate to challenge Trump this fall. But whoever emerges as the winner in November’s presidential election, Taiwan can count on solid bipartisan support from the Congress. Hopefully this will include further advanced arms sales to counter China’s ongoing effort to intimidate Taipei.
In sum, there are risks and opportunities for our Taiwan friends as 2020 unfolds. Still I remain generally confident. The island has weathered much worse. Its economy is in solid shape. Its partnership with America continues to be the surest guarantee against Beijing bullying. It has a sound political system and a leader who is experienced in dealing with the mainland. Taiwan is going to be just fine!
Ambassador Stephen M. Young (ret.) lived in Kaohsiung as a boy over 50 years ago, and served in AIT four times: as a young consular officer (1981-’82), as a language student (1989-’90), as Deputy Director (1998-2001) and as Director (2006-’9). He visits often and writes regularly about Taiwan matters. Young was also US Ambassador to Kyrgyzstan and Consul General to Hong Kong during his 33-year career as a foreign service officer. He has a BA from Wesleyan University and a PhD from the University of Chicago.
The 75th anniversary summit of NATO was held in Washington from Tuesday to Thursday last week. Its main focus was the reinvigoration and revitalization of NATO, along with its expansion. The shadow of domestic electoral politics could not be avoided. The focus was on whether US President Biden would deliver his speech at the NATO summit cogently. Biden’s fitness to run in the next US presidential election in November was under assessment. NATO is acquiring more coherence and teeth. These were perhaps more evident than Biden’s future. The link to the Biden candidacy is critical for NATO. If Biden loses
Shortly after Hu Jintao (胡錦濤) stepped down as general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 2012, his successor, Xi Jinping (習近平), articulated the “Chinese Dream,” which aims to rejuvenate the nation and restore its historical glory. While defense analysts and media often focus on China’s potential conflict with Taiwan, achieving “rejuvenation” would require Beijing to engage in at least six different conflicts with at least eight countries. These include territories ranging from the South China Sea and East China Sea to Inner Asia, the Himalayas and lands lost to Russia. Conflicts would involve Taiwan, the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia,
The Sino-Indian border dispute remains one of the most complex and enduring border issues in the world. Unlike China’s borders with Russia and Vietnam, which have seen conflicts, but eventually led to settled agreements, the border with India, particularly the region of Arunachal Pradesh, remains a point of contention. This op-ed explores the historical and geopolitical nuances that contribute to this unresolved border dispute. The crux of the Sino-Indian border dispute lies in the differing interpretations of historical boundaries. The McMahon Line, established by the 1914 Simla Convention, was accepted by British India and Tibet, but never recognized by China, which
In a recent interview with the Malaysian Chinese-language newspaper Sin Chew Daily, former president Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) called President William Lai (賴清德) “naive.” As always with Ma, one must first deconstruct what he is saying to fully understand the parallel universe he insists on defending. Who is being “naive,” Lai or Ma? The quickest way is to confront Ma with a series of pointed questions that force him to take clear stands on the complex issues involved and prevent him from his usual ramblings. Regarding China and Taiwan, the media should first begin with questions like these: “Did the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT)