On Jan. 11, President Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) was re-elected and the party retained its legislative majority, thereby maintaining complete control of the government for the next four years.
Looking at the numbers, voter turnout reached 74.9 percent and Tsai received an unprecedented 8,170,231 votes, defeating her primary rival — Kaohsiung Mayor Han Kuo-yu (韓國瑜) of the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) — by 2.6 million votes, a massive win.
The outcome has drawn a variety of interpretations, but saying no to China and opposing Beijing’s “one country, two systems” framework has now become a consensus in Taiwan.
There is also general agreement that the “Hong Kong effect” prompted young Taiwanese to vote and that Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) has been Tsai’s most effective election worker.
Political parties have responded and made adjustments in reaction to this change in public opinion. The defeated KMT immediately plunged into internecine strife: Wu Den-yih (吳敦義) resigned as chairman, young and middle-aged members have urged the party to abandon the so-called “1992 consensus” and the party’s elected representatives have even proposed that it remove the word “Chinese” from its name.
As for the DPP, some have said that Tsai might once again take over as party chair and it has been confirmed that Premier Su Tseng-chang (蘇貞昌) will stay on in that post, while the competition to take over as legislative speaker silently unfolds.
Among the smaller parties, Taipei Mayor Ko Wen-je’s (柯文哲) Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) is calling for the formation of an alliance of opposition parties; small parties that received more than 3 percent of the party vote have celebrated their qualification for government subsidies, while many others face the risk of dissolving; and some politicians even announced that they would permanently quit politics.
The DPP saw gains and losses: Tsai won 57.13 percent of the vote in the presidential election, just slightly more than 1 percentage point more than in the election four years ago. The party received 33.98 percent of the party vote, a sharp decrease of 10 percentage points.
The high turnout contributed to the record-high vote for Tsai, but Han also received 1.71 million votes more than then-New Taipei City mayor Eric Chu (朱立倫) did four years ago when he ran against Tsai.
That the DPP’s share of the party vote decreased so drastically, despite the surge in the voter turnout, is a sign that the party cannot afford to overlook.
One major reason is the change in parties over the past four years. People First Party Chairman James Soong (宋楚瑜) once again threw his hat in the ring for the presidential race, while Ko established the TPP and criticized the DPP in a departure from his past pro-green stance and took quite a few votes with him.
During the elections, as many as 30 to 40 small parties — including pro-Taiwanese independence parties, social activist groups and many others established to advocate a single social or political project — either proposed their own legislator-at-large nominees or fielded their own district candidates.
Their enthusiasm for political participation reflects diversity of Taiwan’s democracy, and some voters split their ballots for presidential, party and district legislator three ways. This scenario significantly underscores society’s dissatisfaction with the DPP’s complete control of the government over the past four years.
Although the DPP retained the presidency and its legislative majority, the collective message from voters cost the party seven legislative seats and made it clear that the DPP should not let the victory go to its head.
Tsai’s re-election was crucial. The unprecedented number of votes is a sign of voter acknowledgment, and that the votes for her outstripped the DPP’s party votes by 23 percentage points accentuates the high expectation voters have for her based on her grasp of basic issues and public support.
Four years ago, Tsai swept to power on the back of the Sunflower movement; this time, public opposition to Beijing’s “one country, two systems” formula and the effects of the pro-democracy protests in Hong Kong brought strong public support. In addition, her main opponent committed many mistakes.
Although Tsai’s administrative performance has not always been outstanding, these factors, in combination with her persistent opposition to the “one country, two systems” model, gave her the ammunition she needed as she promoted a sense of impending doom among young voters.
All this contributed to her win, much to the happiness of pro-Taiwanese independence voters.
It remains to be seen how China will react to the election outcome, but the external circumstances clearly remain in Taiwan’s favor. Soon after the election results highlighted the point that democratic Taiwan is resisting China, international Taiwan-friendly forces started to emerge.
Xi’s turning his back on former Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping’s (鄧小平) doctrines and putting his ambition on display has resulted in growing opposition to China among democratic nations.
Among these countries, the US and Japan are the most crucial and friendly to Taiwan, and they are also the two countries with which Taiwan is the most likely to be able to achieve an economic and trade breakthrough. This is an opportunity Taiwan must seize and make good use of.
After the elections, the US made it clear to Taiwan that opening its market to US beef and pork products is a crucial issue, and Taipei can no longer justify a ban on Japanese food imports from prefectures near the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant.
The government must display its determination and substantively enhance Taiwan’s ties with these two nations to alleviate its economic and trade marginalization. These issues offer both opportunities and challenges, and as the DPP holds complete control over the government, these are responsibilities that it cannot ignore.
Essentially, the major issues at stake during the elections were Taiwan’s sovereignty and cross-strait relations, while domestic affairs and governance did not receive much of the spotlight. Therefore, voters sent out a balanced, two-part message affirming the DPP’s efforts to protect Taiwan and safeguard democracy, while not necessarily appreciating its handling of domestic affairs and governance.
The DPP should not get too carried away by its victories and make sure that talk of being humble is not mere lip service, as the Tsai administration needs to respond to public expectations with sincerity and make the best efforts to demonstrate efficacy in interior affairs and governance.
Over the past four years, the DPP has implemented quite a few reforms. For Tsai, getting the right person for the right job and widening the decisionmaking circle have always been the focus. The composition and operations of the National Security Council, the president’s primary think tank, need to be refined with care.
As for the DPP, high-level party members often draw controversy with their misconduct and reckless remarks, which contributes to their poor public image. Internal cliques have also long kept administrative resources under their control, thus giving rise to the view that the party engages in pork barrel politics with too many “fat cats” occupying important positions.
The DPP’s legislative caucus is skilled at mobilizing its members to vote, but it often forgets the Legislative Yuan’s responsibility to supervise and monitor government departments, and leaves something to be desired in terms of legislative efficiency.
As for the government, there is still a lack of horizontal communication and coordination between the ministries and agencies.
The DPP will also face greater challenges in both the legislature and policy implementation, as during its second term it must focus on doing the right thing, using the right people and creating improvements for the nation.
If it does not, another swing in voter support could occur in the 2022 local elections, as the focus will be on the government’s domestic policy execution and governance.
The Tsai administration’s response to public opinion is closely related to the interests of the nation as a whole.
With eyes wide open, the public is watching closely whether the DPP will respond with caution and vigilance to the renewed voter trust, or if it will get carried away by its wins.
Translated by Chang Ho-ming
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