President Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) on March 11 posted a message on Facebook entitled “Guiding principles for the response and opposition to China’s ‘one country, two systems’ plan for Taiwan.” The government’s strategy deserves the public’s full support.
Upholding national security and the nation’s sovereignty can be split into two distinct areas: external — national defense and foreign affairs — and internal — counterespionage and infiltration.
Although the Tsai administration has made considerable progress on the external front, it has placed less of an emphasis on countering Beijing’s comprehensive infiltration of Taiwanese society, which has made it increasingly difficult to distinguish between friend and foe.
The reason for this is, first, the nation’s economic dependency on China and the infiltration of Taiwan through cybertechnology, and second, Beijing’s use of Taiwan’s democracy for its antidemocratic purposes.
In the past, Taiwan and China were clearly separate and the enemy could be excluded, but an intertwining of economies — the result of globalization and the Internet — has brought porous borders and created a range of challenges that hitherto did not exist.
Tsai’s seven guiding principles, although highly commendable, nevertheless beg the question: What is the next concrete move that the government should make?
The US is at the forefront of the democratic free world’s pushback against China. Washington has for some time been taking steps to counter Chinese infiltration in US society.
Two bills in Australia show Canberra’s realization that laws there are inadequate to deal with the problem of meddling by foreign powers in domestic affairs: the Espionage and Foreign Interference Bill and the Foreign Influence Transparency Scheme Bill, both introduced by Australian Attorney General Christian Porter and passed into law on June 28 last year.
New legal tools are required to counter the threat of Chinese interference and infiltration.
National Security Council Deputy Director-General Arthur Iap (葉國興) has stated that “the enemy is already among us.”
The next step is for Taiwan to create its own set of defensive legal tools, so Tsai’s aim of creating a “democratic defensive shield” can become a reality.
As the fifth anniversary of the 2014 Sunflower movement approaches, many politicians are calling for a new legal framework to govern cross-strait political agreements, taking the nation from the Cross-Strait Agreement Supervisory Act (兩岸協議監督條例) to a “cross-strait political agreement supervisory mechanism.”
However, is this really necessary? The situation in Taiwan today is different from that of Hong Kong before the handover to Beijing.
Britain was forced to enter into negotiations with China over Hong Kong because the territory’s limited land mass had reached a saturation point relative to the population size. British officials feared that the uncertainty caused by its 99-year lease coming to an end would have detrimental effects on investments in Hong Kong.
By contrast, the Taiwanese government does not need to enter into negotiations with China. The nation does not need supervisory laws to govern any future negotiations with Beijing, but rather fresh laws that protect and defend Taiwan from China.
If next year’s presidential election ends up sending more pro-China signals to the international community, countries that are friendly toward Taiwan might stop lending their support. After all, selecting a president is the embodiment of the public’s collective will.
Hung Cheng is director of information gathering and analysis at Taiwan Radical Wings Party.
Translated by Edward Jones
Concerns that the US might abandon Taiwan are often overstated. While US President Donald Trump’s handling of Ukraine raised unease in Taiwan, it is crucial to recognize that Taiwan is not Ukraine. Under Trump, the US views Ukraine largely as a European problem, whereas the Indo-Pacific region remains its primary geopolitical focus. Taipei holds immense strategic value for Washington and is unlikely to be treated as a bargaining chip in US-China relations. Trump’s vision of “making America great again” would be directly undermined by any move to abandon Taiwan. Despite the rhetoric of “America First,” the Trump administration understands the necessity of
US President Donald Trump’s challenge to domestic American economic-political priorities, and abroad to the global balance of power, are not a threat to the security of Taiwan. Trump’s success can go far to contain the real threat — the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) surge to hegemony — while offering expanded defensive opportunities for Taiwan. In a stunning affirmation of the CCP policy of “forceful reunification,” an obscene euphemism for the invasion of Taiwan and the destruction of its democracy, on March 13, 2024, the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) used Chinese social media platforms to show the first-time linkage of three new
If you had a vision of the future where China did not dominate the global car industry, you can kiss those dreams goodbye. That is because US President Donald Trump’s promised 25 percent tariff on auto imports takes an ax to the only bits of the emerging electric vehicle (EV) supply chain that are not already dominated by Beijing. The biggest losers when the levies take effect this week would be Japan and South Korea. They account for one-third of the cars imported into the US, and as much as two-thirds of those imported from outside North America. (Mexico and Canada, while
The military is conducting its annual Han Kuang exercises in phases. The minister of national defense recently said that this year’s scenarios would simulate defending the nation against possible actions the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) might take in an invasion of Taiwan, making the threat of a speculated Chinese invasion in 2027 a heated agenda item again. That year, also referred to as the “Davidson window,” is named after then-US Indo-Pacific Command Admiral Philip Davidson, who in 2021 warned that Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) had instructed the PLA to be ready to invade Taiwan by 2027. Xi in 2017
RSS