Former premier Lin Chuan (林全) is out, premier-designate William Lai (賴清德) is in, and a Cabinet reshuffle is under way. There had been distinct rumblings of this, so it came as no surprise.
Lin and Lai are very different propositions. Lin was a chief adviser to President Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) from before she was elected. He is close to Tsai, a dyed-in-the-wool Tsai loyalist.
However, Lai is not: He is part of the Democratic Progressive Party’s New Tide faction. There has long been tense relations between him and Tsai, who has never regarded him as part of her inner circle.
Lai has gotten far stronger support in opinion polls than Tsai and rebuffed several attempts to recruit him as her secretary-general.
More crucially, outside observers see Lai as potential material for president come 2020. That is, with Lai leading the Cabinet, Tsai has one less obstacle to gaining a second term. However, with Lai taking up the post of premier, it is the New Tide faction that emerges as the clear winner.
At the helm of the Executive Yuan, Lai is certain to do some good, although his actual achievements will be severely curtailed by the constitutional framework, as he will be largely stuck with Tsai’s national affairs program.
In a news conference on Monday, Lin spoke of a seamless transition. He could not have said it better, as no matter how powerful Lai is, he will have to proceed along the path already laid down by Tsai, who will not accept any deviations.
Another aspect is worth exploring: Lin was not pushed. He made the decision in June to step down and discussed his succession with Tsai.
This shows that Lin maintains an unusual amount of influence within the Presidential Office. It is by no means certain that Lai will be able to exert the same degree of influence over Tsai.
It was also back in June that Lai first mentioned his “pro-China, love Taiwan” stance.
It was quite a departure from his previous strong pro-independence leanings, and the apparent turnaround suggested that Lai has “bent the knee” and will be largely deferential to Tsai.
According to Lin’s characterization of events, the hastily arranged news conference on Monday afternoon was necessitated by his resignation letter being leaked.
How is it that confidential communications between the Executive Yuan and the Presidential Office were leaked? What sort of political intrigue lay behind that? Was it curiosity over whether Lin was pushed or went of his own accord?
More importantly, in the announcement of Lin’s resignation released by Presidential Office Secretary-General Joseph Wu (吳釗燮) and published by the Central News Agency, the list of his achievements included items that Lin himself did not mention.
Two items particularly stand out: fiscal discipline and transitional justice.
Transitional justice is clearly something very important to Tsai, and yet it did not appear on Lin’s own list.
However, the mention of fiscal discipline is most noteworthy here, as this was something that Lin’s “old, [pan-]blue and male” Cabinet was most criticized for — essentially being out of touch with ordinary Taiwanese.
Through the emphasis on this in Wu’s announcement, was the Presidential Office hinting that Lai will be expected to make changes in this regard, setting the Cabinet off on a new course?
Lai’s appointment will have repercussions throughout the government, as well as on next year’s elections.
However, the direction this new Cabinet is to take, any inferences about how much of a stamp Lai will put on this and whether policies are to be revised will have to be gleaned from his Cabinet lineup.
Chin Heng-wei is a political commentator.
Translated by Paul Cooper
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