The two-day cross-strait talks that ended yesterday in Fuzhou, China, are said to be the last high-level cross-strait meetings that will take place under President Ma Ying-jeou’s (馬英九) watch. China’s Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits Chairman Chen Deming (陳德銘), in a speech delivered during the talks, remarked — in a comment aimed at a specific audience — that the future of cross-strait relations “would not be plain sailing,” lending weight to Chinese President Xi Jinping’s (習近平) comment that if the so-called “1992 consensus,” is not accepted, “the earth will move and the mountains will shake.”
With the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) having a better-than-even chance of winning next year’s presidential election, Chen’s statement is more like a shot across the bow for that party — possibly the future administration, which has avoided discussing its stance on the “1992 consensus” — than a threat directed at Taiwan’s voters.
Taipei Mayor Ko Wen-je (柯文哲), who visited Shanghai last week, said before he traveled to China that he “understands and respects” — without going to the extent of “accepting” — the “1992 consensus.” The Chinese authorities recognized Ko’s vague terms, and gave the Taipei-Shanghai forum the green light. It is said that Ko’s understanding of the “1992 consensus,” along with his statement that the two sides of the Strait are “one family,” has put a lot of pressure on the DPP, which staunchly opposes any “one China” rhetoric.
However, is this really the case? If Beijing can accept Ko’s vague statements and his “2015 new standpoint,” it indicates that Ko has created a model of cross-strait interactions that lies outside the bounds of the nation’s two-party spectrum.
The DPP might be worried that Ko’s flexibility over cross-strait ties could see him lean too far toward Beijing, but as Ko is managing to communicate with China without having to align himself with “one China” rhetoric, it is those who see themselves as the guardians of the “1992 consensus” who should be in a cold sweat.
Cross-strait communication should not be monopolized by a single party.
After the Sunflower movement occupied the Executive Yuan in protest over secretive agreements signed between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT), Beijing must now be aware that giving the KMT the exclusive right to conduct cross-strait business does not promote the interests of the CCP in the long term: It benefits the KMT, which can dole out business perks as favors, but the CCP will be dragged down by the KMT when the latter fails.
Since winning over Taiwan, rather than working with the KMT, is Beijing’s top priority, there is no reason for the CCP to put all its eggs in one basket.
To achieve its aims, Beijing must engage in a tug-of-war, and success requires calculated rhetoric, diplomatic adroitness and sensitivity. However, what Beijing needs most in Taiwan is popular support, which is proportionate to political power in a democratic country. That is something that Beijing — no matter how bitterly — must bow to, especially as there is likely to be a change in the governing administration next year.
Chen’s warning is more of a bluff than a show of resolve. During the DPP’s eight years in power, cross-strait economic and trade exchanges did not decelerate, let alone halt, therefore the CCP, it could be argued, is the party that would now want to reap the political benefits out of cross-strait commerce.
No agreement was reached in the last cross-strait negotiations to be held under Ma on Chinese travelers being allowed to transit through Taiwan, a deal much anticipated by some in Taiwan. It is said that China might use the issue against the next administration as a bargaining chip, which, insofar as it is for “bargaining,” is apparently to be used in negotiations, not in the void of no formal exchanges between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait.
A chip made by Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co (TSMC) was found on a Huawei Technologies Co artificial intelligence (AI) processor, indicating a possible breach of US export restrictions that have been in place since 2019 on sensitive tech to the Chinese firm and others. The incident has triggered significant concern in the IT industry, as it appears that proxy buyers are acting on behalf of restricted Chinese companies to bypass the US rules, which are intended to protect its national security. Canada-based research firm TechInsights conducted a die analysis of the Huawei Ascend 910B AI Trainer, releasing its findings on Oct.
Pat Gelsinger took the reins as Intel CEO three years ago with hopes of reviving the US industrial icon. He soon made a big mistake. Intel had a sweet deal going with Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co (TSMC), the giant manufacturer of semiconductors for other companies. TSMC would make chips that Intel designed, but could not produce and was offering deep discounts to Intel, four people with knowledge of the agreement said. Instead of nurturing the relationship, Gelsinger — who hoped to restore Intel’s own manufacturing prowess — offended TSMC by calling out Taiwan’s precarious relations with China. “You don’t want all of
In honor of President Jimmy Carter’s 100th birthday, my longtime friend and colleague John Tkacik wrote an excellent op-ed reassessing Carter’s derecognition of Taipei. But I would like to add my own thoughts on this often-misunderstood president. During Carter’s single term as president of the United States from 1977 to 1981, despite numerous foreign policy and domestic challenges, he is widely recognized for brokering the historic 1978 Camp David Accords that ended the state of war between Egypt and Israel after more than three decades of hostilities. It is considered one of the most significant diplomatic achievements of the 20th century.
In a recent essay in Foreign Affairs, titled “The Upside on Uncertainty in Taiwan,” Johns Hopkins University professor James B. Steinberg makes the argument that the concept of strategic ambiguity has kept a tenuous peace across the Taiwan Strait. In his piece, Steinberg is primarily countering the arguments of Tufts University professor Sulmaan Wasif Khan, who in his thought-provoking new book The Struggle for Taiwan does some excellent out-of-the-box thinking looking at US policy toward Taiwan from 1943 on, and doing some fascinating “what if?” exercises. Reading through Steinberg’s comments, and just starting to read Khan’s book, we could already sense that