It has become fashionable in China to talk about “thinking about things from other people’s perspective.” This is the age of “the rise of China,” in which Chinese society is full of “patriotism” and other grand narratives that match this key theme, as well as boastful and acquisitive ideas such as “putting money ahead of everything else.”
At such a time, it is refreshing to hear calls for mutual sympathy, objective viewpoints and an empathetic approach that seeks social harmony and urges people to restrain their egotism. Such calls are equally applicable to a wider area that includes Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macau.
Many Hong Kongers dislike the behavior of Chinese visitors, and Hong Kong actor Chapman To (杜文澤) raised hackles by defending Taiwanese entertainers against their Chinese critics.
Taiwan has seen waves of protest against the cross-strait service trade agreement, and Taiwanese singer Bobby Chen (陳升) caused annoyance in China by supporting the Sunflower movement and saying that Taiwan might be better off without Chinese tourists. Evidently, there is an issue of trust between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait, and a bit more empathy would be welcome in cross-strait relations.
The odd thing is that this idea of thinking about things from other perspectives seems to be restricted by borders. Is there any room for empathy when borders and national territory are at stake? The answer might become apparent when one considers the nature of territorial disputes.
Why are territorial issues so contentious for so many people? Why are there scenes of public indignation whenever friction over territorial conflicts crops up? It is because these quarrels go beyond questions of territory alone, and become a matter of nationalism that is focused on territorial demands — in other words, territorial nationalism — and that is the most inflammatory and explosive kind of nationalism.
When territorial nationalism is inflamed, all kinds of rational thought — objectivity, understanding, sympathy and empathy — are forced out of the picture.
Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials have slammed Japan for “ignoring the facts” and “refusing to recognize that there is a dispute concerning sovereignty over the Diaoyutai Islands” (釣魚台) — known as the Senkakus in Japan — but then they turn around and tell the Philippines that “there is no dispute concerning sovereignty over the Scarborough Shoal” (Huangyan Island, 黃岩島).
On May 26, Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesman Qin Gang (秦剛) said: “Recent violent activities in Vietnam involving beating, smashing, looting and arson against foreign companies and personnel have caused great casualties and property losses to Chinese companies and individuals. We urge the Vietnamese authorities to immediately carry out a thorough investigation into the case, strictly punish the perpetrators and compensate relevant Chinese companies and personnel for their losses. The Vietnamese authorities should take concrete and effective measures to ensure the safety of Chinese institutions, companies and personnel there. Only by doing so can Vietnam win back the confidence of the international community.”
If Qin’s words sound familiar, it is because they are almost the same as those of Japanese officials in 2012, when anti-Japanese riots broke out in some Chinese cities in reaction to a clash that took place near the Diaoyutais. One need only change the words “in Vietnam” to “in China,” “we urge the Vietnamese authorities” to “we urge the Chinese authorities” and “ensure the safety of Chinese institutions, companies and personnel” to “ensure the safety of Japanese institutions, companies and personnel” to make the statements almost identical.
Notably, Qin went further when answering a question about Vietnam’s claim to the disputed Paracel Islands (Xisha Islands, 西沙群島). Unusually, Qin used some rather disdainful language in his response, saying: “remarks made by the Vietnamese side once again showed that this country bends history, denies facts and goes back on its words. This country has a low credibility rating.”
It may come as a surprise to hear such hostility being exchanged between two of the few remaining socialist countries. Setting aside for the moment the harm such talk could do to the causes of socialism and communism, Qin’s remarks are discriminatory to an extent that goes beyond accepted norms.
It is widely known that the question of how to make Chinese people more civil has become a key task now that China has become a rising power. Qin’s remarks set a bad example for those in China who want to see people speaking and behaving in a more civil fashion.
In such circumstances, how can one expect Chinese to stop using pejorative terms when talking about Japanese, Koreans, Hong Kongers and Taiwanese?
China has been having territorial conflicts with Japan in the East China Sea, and with Vietnam and the Philippines in the South China Sea. Considering how sensitive and risky territorial issues are, it goes without saying that the countries concerned should be very cautious about exploiting resources in disputed areas.
The most recent clash between China and Vietnam arose because China set up an oil rig in a part of the South China Sea that is disputed by the two countries, causing Vietnam to intervene forcefully and sparking large-scale anti-Chinese riots.
What would happen if something similar happened in the East China Sea, with Japan, which exercises de facto control over the Diaoyutais, setting up a rig there to prospect for the oil reserves that have been known about since 1968? One can well imagine how much damage it would do to Sino-Japanese relations.
The interests of people and nations can come into direct conflict over territorial issues , and this makes them very inflammatory. Given the character of the problem, asking people to see things from the other person’s point of view might not be realistic. Nonetheless, when handling territorial disputes it is important to consider all the elements objectively, and there should be room for different approaches.
In China’s case, the softly-softly approach that former Chinese premier Zhou Enlai (周恩來) and Deng Xiaoping (鄧小平) often used to considerable effect could well be applied by the current Chinese administration to the issues of today.
John Lim is an associate research fellow in the Institute of Modern History at Academia Sinica.
Translated by Julian Clegg
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