Earlier this month, approximately 120 important figures from Taiwan and China gathered at the first ever cross-strait peace forum held in Shanghai.
Apart from being attended by Chinese government officials and policy advisers, several former political officials from the pan-blue and pan-green camps also took part, which made the forum something of a first. China presented an overall attitude of being candid, open and tolerant during this forum.
Each person was allowed to openly express themselves, including former vice premier Wu Rong-i (吳榮義) of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), who proposed the idea that Taiwan and China represent an “allegiance of brotherhood,” while the Taiwanese academics in attendance insisted that the Republic of China (ROC) be acknowledged.
However, the forum also highlighted the political chasm that exists between Taiwan and China. China is still unable to accept the existence of the ROC, while Taiwan’s blue and green camps are both unable to accept China’s precondition of unification.
Why would China, a nation vastly stronger than Taiwan both economically and politically, be willing to go through nongovernmental political dialogue to promote cross-strait political talks?
When the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) was in power, Taiwan hoped to engage in political dialogue to facilitate the establishment of an interactive framework for cross-strait peace and stability. President Ma Ying-jeou’s (馬英九) government is not willing to do so, while China has had to resort a public forum to promote the idea of cross-strait political dialogue. So, just what are China’s goals?
China wants to pressure Ma into engaging in political talks. In the face of the Ma government’s refusal, China now wants to use the more relaxed atmosphere of nongovernmental political dialogue to lower the psychological resistance to cross-strait political talks and to create a mindset among Taiwanese that is supportive of them.
However, as soon as the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) government accepts China’s idea of political negotiations, the KMT’s past verbal promises on cross-strait policy will all have to be turned into written agreements. This will be very hard for the Ma government to pull off. The verbal promises were aimed at brushing China off; writing these agreements into law would definitely meet with strong resistance from the public.
The goals of China’s “peaceful offensive” are probably not just aimed at the Ma administration. Given that Ma only has two-and-a-half years left in office, it will be impossible to get him to sign a cross-strait peace initiative, especially when he has already promised that he will not enter into any talks on a cross-strait peace initiative with China during his term.
Over the past five years, Taiwan and China have signed 19 agreements, but the cross-strait diplomatic and military standoff has never ended and Taiwanese are opposed to unification. The number of people who consider “Taiwan” to be their country is rising quickly, even faster than the number of people who thought so during former president Chen Shui-bian’s (陳水扁) two terms in office. This raises major doubts for long-term peace in cross-strait developments. Peace could become nothing more than an illusion if accidents happen or if there is another change in the ruling party.
Chinese Academic Yen Anlin (嚴安林) made China’s mode of thinking very clear when he said that the peace and stability of the two nations are not only directly linked to the safety, stability and development of Taiwan’s economy, but also to breeding a peaceful and stable environment that China needs now that it has opened up and conducted reforms. He also said peace and stability are linked to the Chinese dream of seeing the re-emergence of a great China.
What this implies is that only the signing of a systemic framework for development can consolidate peace in the Taiwan Strait and it is only in this way that peaceful development in China can be assured. The real conflicts need to be fundamentally solved, instead of “shelving disputes” and “seeking common ground while reserving differences” as has been suggested in the past.
Following the rapid growth of its economic and military power, China has become more self-confident, tolerant and more willing to handle the political differences that have existed for a long time. At the cross-strait peace forum, China’s Taiwan Affairs Office Director Zhang Zhijun (張志軍) said that the forum is beneficial to encouraging different sectors of society to think about feasible ways to solve political differences.
He also said it is beneficial to creating a more cordial atmosphere for negotiations for cross-strait political talks and useful in providing experience and methods to use in future.
A cross-strait peace initiative is not something that can be achieved overnight, and it is something that requires everyone to face up to the political differences that exist and show an open, tolerant and pragmatic attitude to forge a consensus between the two sides.
This is the only way to go about building a systemic framework for peaceful development between Taiwan and China.
Tung Chen-yuan is a distinguished professor in the Graduate Institute of Development Studies at National Chengchi University.
Translated by Drew Cameron
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