It now seems the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) and the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) are at an impasse on the cross-strait service trade agreement. Yet the issue is simply too important, Taiwanese need to know what the implications of the agreement are, and some way must be found to break the deadlock between the two parties.
A debate between President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) and DPP Chairman Su Tseng-chang (蘇貞昌) is the most effective way forward. However, each wants something different from it.
Ma wants to get away from the quagmire of domestic politics and to return to the cross-strait arena, his comfort zone. Su hopes to dispel doubts over his own leadership and regain the authority befitting the leader of the opposition party.
Each man is convinced that he has the upper hand.
Ma believes he has more authority over the issue; Su believes he has better oratorical skills. Both are confident of victory, and both welcome the debate.
Taiwanese are not concerned with whether Ma and Su accomplish what they want. They are concerned with whether Ma and Su can provide answers on aspects of the trade pact they have yet to address.
The kerfuffle on the agreement has been going on for two months, meaning the public is familiar with its key issues and with the parties’ stances. If the debate merely consists of both sides sticking to their party lines, avoiding the serious issues and not reflecting on the points they are most often questioned on, the significance of this crucial debate will be undermined.
Ma and Su each have specific answers they need to provide.
Ma first needs to account for why the decisionmaking process entailed closed-door meetings, and explain how the negotiations can be more effectively monitored.
Second, he needs to explain how the government will assist those industries affected by the agreement and how it plans to deal with challenges posed by Chinese businesses and Beijing.
Third, after the agreement is inked, what will be done to sign free-trade agreements (FTAs) with other countries?
Fourth, given that the agreement will further cross-strait trade, how will the government avoid Taiwan’s economy being locked onto the Chinese economy?
Su, for his part, needs to account for how Taiwan will deal with the challenge posed by South Korea, given that it has already signed FTAs with 45 countries.
Second, given that South Korea and China could sign an FTA next year, much earlier than was originally expected, how should Taiwan respond?
Third, Su needs to clarify how the DPP is to respond now that many countries have expressed reluctance to sign agreements with Taiwan until China has.
Fourth, Su is opposed to the agreement now, but should he be elected, will he accept it in government?
The only way the debate can convince people is if all parties move beyond party politics. However, if all Ma and Su do is regurgitate party lines and repeat the attacks we have seen pro-blue and pro-green media launch, the debate will be useless and will only worsen the current deadlock between the parties.
Ma and Su must both realize that the only way to benefit the public’s perception of them and to solve the crisis facing the nation is to elevate the level of the debate. After all, after the debate itself there will be a further 16 public hearings in the Legislative Yuan. If the leaders themselves are incapable of stepping up to the occasion, how can we expect the public hearings led by KMT and DPP legislators to contain any real, sincere discourse?
Julian Kuo is a former DPP legislator.
Translated by Drew Cameron
Concerns that the US might abandon Taiwan are often overstated. While US President Donald Trump’s handling of Ukraine raised unease in Taiwan, it is crucial to recognize that Taiwan is not Ukraine. Under Trump, the US views Ukraine largely as a European problem, whereas the Indo-Pacific region remains its primary geopolitical focus. Taipei holds immense strategic value for Washington and is unlikely to be treated as a bargaining chip in US-China relations. Trump’s vision of “making America great again” would be directly undermined by any move to abandon Taiwan. Despite the rhetoric of “America First,” the Trump administration understands the necessity of
US President Donald Trump’s challenge to domestic American economic-political priorities, and abroad to the global balance of power, are not a threat to the security of Taiwan. Trump’s success can go far to contain the real threat — the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) surge to hegemony — while offering expanded defensive opportunities for Taiwan. In a stunning affirmation of the CCP policy of “forceful reunification,” an obscene euphemism for the invasion of Taiwan and the destruction of its democracy, on March 13, 2024, the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) used Chinese social media platforms to show the first-time linkage of three new
If you had a vision of the future where China did not dominate the global car industry, you can kiss those dreams goodbye. That is because US President Donald Trump’s promised 25 percent tariff on auto imports takes an ax to the only bits of the emerging electric vehicle (EV) supply chain that are not already dominated by Beijing. The biggest losers when the levies take effect this week would be Japan and South Korea. They account for one-third of the cars imported into the US, and as much as two-thirds of those imported from outside North America. (Mexico and Canada, while
The military is conducting its annual Han Kuang exercises in phases. The minister of national defense recently said that this year’s scenarios would simulate defending the nation against possible actions the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) might take in an invasion of Taiwan, making the threat of a speculated Chinese invasion in 2027 a heated agenda item again. That year, also referred to as the “Davidson window,” is named after then-US Indo-Pacific Command Admiral Philip Davidson, who in 2021 warned that Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) had instructed the PLA to be ready to invade Taiwan by 2027. Xi in 2017
RSS