In international politics, nations are either at peace or at war. Even with the end of the Cold War, in the age of globalization, the possibility of conflicts of one type or the other flaring up remains a preoccupation for nations, even if all-out war is kept at bay by the presence of nuclear deterrents and mutual reliance on trade. Cooperation is also important, because competition in its absence has undesirable consequences, including the spread of narcotics, climate change, the disintegration of the financial order, the erection of trade barriers and impediments to the fight against terrorism. If an outbreak of hostilities is to be prevented, some sort of cooperative understanding has to be reached. And indeed, powerful countries do work together behind the scenes on important issues. Look at Afghanistan and Iraq, the nuclear issue in North Korea and Iran, and most recently the Libyan conflict.
Prior to the 1980s, Taiwanese politicians sought to solve the cross-strait issue through non-peaceful means. Since then, the nation’s political leaders — both in opposition and in government — have changed tack. In his 1995 “Six Points” statement, then--president Lee Teng-hui (李登輝) called for talks to end the state of hostility between Taiwan and China to show the world that Chinese people on either side of the Taiwan Strait were above political divisions. The Democratic Progressive Party’s (DPP) 1999 “Resolution on Taiwan’s Future” (台灣前途決議文) broached the idea of engaging the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in a comprehensive dialogue to “establish a framework for peace.” Then-president Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁), who was starting his second term in office, also called for talks with the Chinese communists to establish a dynamic mutual framework for peace and stability. Clearly, whatever interpretation politicians have regarding the nature of Taiwan’s status and regardless of the fact that these are sure to be used as ammunition for mudslinging in the current presidential election campaign, any attempt to formally establish peaceful relations through negotiations or talks with Beijing will later return to inform the choices of policymakers in Taiwan.
As far as the elections are concerned, for purely strategic -considerations, “peace” has become something of a dirty word. Several observers, at home and abroad, have said that Taiwan, while reluctant to explore a peace pact, is not prepared, psychologically or logistically, for the possibility of war. It has instead taken the attitude that relying on the US or Japan is enough, or the belief — completely unfounded — that Beijing will bend over backward to ensure that peace is maintained. On the one hand, Taiwan is reluctant to take the initiative and prepare itself for an outbreak of hostilities, but on the other, it runs from any suggestion of agreements or negotiations. It has reached a point where regardless of who is in government, it has become progressively more difficult for Taiwan to influence the situation, given the rather poor hand it has been dealt. Its only hope for peace is for Beijing to either become distracted by domestic unrest or restrained by other powerful nations. However, China is actually quite stable and its fortunes are very much tied up with those of other major powers for better or for worse. This being the case, the suggestion that Taiwan should be “abandoned,” which has been broached on several occasions recently, starts to take on rather disturbing overtones.
Because of this, Taiwanese politicians are reluctant to talk about peace, but happy to use the idea for their own ends. The reason these two approaches can co-exist is the substantial difference in the type of countries on either side of the Taiwan Strait and in their relative standing internationally. The localization that has taken place in Taiwan as a result of democratization has meant that the difference between Taiwan and China can no longer be understood in terms of the political system, as it was in the 1990s, and is more a matter of the type of country it has become. Behind this difference is the divergence in mindsets of the respective populations raised and living in different environments and of the nationalistic competition between the social elites from the KMT, DPP and CCP (Chinese Communist Party). These differences and a lack of mutual understanding make it impossible for the two sides to determine just who they are negotiating with. It is therefore difficult to get the ball rolling, let alone establish an agenda for discussion. This drifting apart of the countries has only been exacerbated by developments in the international system, which have caused shifts in the relative standing of countries in East Asia.
The US is right now trying to extricate itself from Iraq and Afghanistan, which is proving to be one of the largest challenges since World War II and which just goes to show how far shifts in global power have progressed. Taiwan’s weak position makes Taiwanese hesitant about entering into negotiations, and they have great misgivings about doing so.
In the past three years or so, President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) has only really been able to slow the pace of divergence in status and standing between Taiwan and China and has, through practical negotiations, managed to temporarily stabilize the economic relations that are so vital to Taiwan’s development. As the Guidelines for National Unification (國統綱領) lack legislative legitimacy and have already ceased to apply, the sole legal basis for using the so-called “1992 consensus” — with each side having its own interpretation of how “China” is to be defined — to build a cross-strait economic system is now the Republic of China (ROC) Constitution set out in 1947. The Constitution allows for publicly initiated referendums, making it possible for the public to vote on issues in national plebiscites. This requires that the results of cross-strait political negotiations — regardless of whether they are called frameworks or agreements — be voted on. Beijing is none too happy about this, because it does not tally with its own “unwavering” commitment to peaceful unification. Taiwan’s government has as yet, in the centenary of the ROC, failed to account for the democratic logic behind the “1992 consensus” and peace negotiations under the Constitution, which does little to give the public confidence.
At the same time, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) is playing on public concern about the divergence in status and standing between the countries, but it has discounted the current ROC Constitution and the “1992 consensus” as viable bases for cross-strait relations. However, what alternatives has the DPP proposed as a solid foundation for peace?
If one were to make the case that said the foundation need not be a peace agreement or framework resulting from negotiations per se, and should instead be a multilaterally agreed, internationally recognized dynamic framework, then the “reserving the right to disagree while seeking harmony” (和而求同) approach advocated by the DPP still needs to be fleshed out.
I have yet to see a member of the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) come clean and clarify what the conditions for peace are to be. The DPP, meanwhile, seems to be content to wait until after the election, making all the right noises to make sure the major powers feel satisfied that their concerns are unfounded. This breeds a social climate in which people would prefer not to face up to what is going on and just blame either Beijing for being unreasonable or our allies for appeasing them.
In ancient times, it was said that the main duties of the state was to perform ritual observances and keep enemies at bay. While the democratic process can be manipulated for one’s own political ends, it is far from fine to play games when it comes to peace. Evading war is not the same thing as shying away from it; it is about not getting engaged in military conflict when the conditions are unfavorable. In the future, the security and economic situations in Asia will only get more precarious, and one would hope that leaders of the KMT, DPP and CCP will all step up to the plate and accept the historical opportunities and responsibilities given them with the humility they deserve. Both the governing and opposition parties still need to explain how they intend to secure a dignified and lasting peace, apart from just trying to maintain the “status quo” for yet another decade.
Chang Teng-chi is an assistant professor of political science at National Taiwan University.
Translated by Paul Cooper
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