For the most part, fans of President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) continue to blindly admire him no matter what happens. They only stop short of shouting “long live our heroic leader,” as people did in the bad old days of dictatorship. Ma says that Taiwan’s relations with the US are better than ever, that relations across the Taiwan Strait are more harmonious than ever, and that “the other side of the Strait” (read: China) has shown Taiwan lots of “goodwill.” He tells us that all is well and his faithful followers believe every word of it.
It is ironic that US Vice President Joe Biden has chosen today as his date of arrival in Beijing for his current visit to China. The timing is like a double slap in the face for Ma — one slap from Washington and another from Beijing.
Exactly 29 years have passed since the US and China signed the Aug. 17 Communique, in which the US accepted limits on the quantity and quality of its arms sales to Taiwan and agreed not to pursue policies recognizing “one China, one Taiwan” or “two Chinas.”
This communique amounted to putting pressure on then-president Chiang Ching-kuo (蔣經國) to surrender to China and came as a great shock to the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT).
Out of all the days in the year, Biden had to choose Aug. 17 to arrive in Beijing, yet Ma, apparently oblivious to the significance of this date, seems to think he has a special place in the hearts of both US and Chinese leaders.
In 1978, then-US president Jimmy Carter’s national security advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski picked May 20, the day of Chiang’s inauguration as president, to visit Beijing — a classic joint insult by the US and China to Chiang and the “Republic of China.” At the time, Taiwan’s embassy in Washington mobilized friendly members of the US Congress to lambaste the Carter administration over the incident.
The date of Biden’s arrival in Beijing was reportedly China’s decision, but Biden, having served on the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee for many years and having experienced the controversy that followed the signing of the Aug. 17 Communique, could hardly be unaware of the message Beijing intends to convey.
On his trip to Beijing today, even if he does not tell the Chinese side what the US has decided regarding arms sales to Taiwan, as media reports have been guessing, China is sure to use the opportunity to rub salt into Taiwan’s wounds by demanding that the US stick to the terms of the communique and refrain from interfering in what China considers to be its “internal affairs.”
Biden and the US Department of State are well aware of the tricks China is playing, but they are willing to play along according to China’s script. What is that, if not a double slap in the face for Ma?
After the KMT government retreated to exile in Taiwan, the focus of its diplomatic policy was on keeping its seat in the UN and maintaining good relations with the US. After the US broke off diplomatic relations in 1979, Chiang did all he could to ensure continued US arms sales to Taiwan and uphold national security.
Now it is a different story, as Taiwan’s national identity is watered down bit by bit under the Ma administration. As far as this government is concerned, China’s wish is its command in all matters of foreign policy. Taiwanese diplomats abroad get paid well for sitting around all day and doing hardly anything useful.
Perhaps we should ask our government the same thing that media critics asked then-foreign minister Wei Tao-ming (魏道明) in 1971 when Taiwan lost its UN seat — what kind of foreign policy do you call this?
James Wang is a journalist based in Washington.
TRANSLATED BY JULIAN CLEGG
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