For an administration that has bought into the concept of “soft power,” President Ma Ying-jeou’s (馬英九) Cabinet shot itself in the foot on Friday by executing five death-row inmates, bringing the number of state executions in the past year to nine.
The government defended its action by repeating its claim that while it hopes to eventually abolish the death penalty, public sentiment favors retaining it. In other words, the administration is not guilty. Its hands were tied and, champion of democracy that it is, it had no choice but to listen to the public, even if it meant joining the ranks of the few “rogue” states that continue to defy the global trend toward abolition of capital punishment.
This rationalization contrasts sharply with other instances where, despite substantial public opposition, the Ma administration forged ahead with controversial policies, saying it knew what was in the best interest of the public. Therefore, what we are dealing with is not so much a democratic government, but one that uses democratic tools very selectively and only when it is convenient to do so.
Fully aware of opposition at home and of the sensitive timing of the executions — coming little more than a month after an investigation showed that an airman had been wrongfully convicted and put to death in 1997 — the administration also proceeded with the executions knowing that it would spark angry reactions among its allies.
Soft power, which Ma and other officials have hailed as the reason behind some of the administration’s recent successes abroad, lies in the realm of ideas and principles. Going against the grain, in defiance of growing international norms, is hardly exercising soft power and could likely complicate Taipei’s relations with a number of countries whose support is instrumental to ensure Taiwan obtains the international space it aspires to.
Besides the damage to its reputation, the executions, after a nearly five-year hiatus, also add to a series of developments that are incrementally taking Taiwan closer to China, where state executions are as routine as they are despicable. Not only has the Ma administration been largely silent on human rights abuses in China, it is now adopting some of its harshest practices — hardly a soft power means to distinguish democratic Taiwan from authoritarian China.
The administration’s argument that the executions were in response to public worries about criminality also doesn’t hold water. National Police Agency statistics show that murder and non-negligent offenses recorded by the police in 2000 stood at 1,132. By 2005, when the death penalty was put on hold, that number had dropped to 903. If, as the government claims, the death penalty was an effective deterrent against such types of crimes, we should have seen a resurgence of such offenses from 2006 on. However, rather than shoot upwards, that number continued to drop, reaching a low of 803 in 2008 and 832 in 2009.
Clearly, factors other than the death penalty have had an effect on people’s willingness to commit violent crimes. Several studies by criminologists and psychologists have shown that crime is an irrational act, in which the actor does not logically weigh costs versus benefits. What is more likely to influence criminals is their assessment of the chances of getting away with the crime rather than the nature of the punishment if caught.
Therefore, what matters most is the clearance rate — the percent of cases solved by police. From a low of 90.02 percent in 2001, the clearance rate shot up to 98.26 percent in 2008 and dropped slightly to 97.72 percent in 2009. In other words, police have become increasingly better at solving murders and thus criminals are less likely to get away with their crimes.
If the Ma administration were truly dedicated to addressing crime, it would inject more resources into law enforcement rather than turn to unproven — and immoral — tactics that can only earn it opprobrium and tarnish the nation’s image.
Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) caucus whip Fu Kun-chi (傅?萁) has caused havoc with his attempts to overturn the democratic and constitutional order in the legislature. If we look at this devolution from the context of a transition to democracy from authoritarianism in a culturally Chinese sense — that of zhonghua (中華) — then we are playing witness to a servile spirit from a millennia-old form of totalitarianism that is intent on damaging the nation’s hard-won democracy. This servile spirit is ingrained in Chinese culture. About a century ago, Chinese satirist and author Lu Xun (魯迅) saw through the servile nature of
In their New York Times bestseller How Democracies Die, Harvard political scientists Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt said that democracies today “may die at the hands not of generals but of elected leaders. Many government efforts to subvert democracy are ‘legal,’ in the sense that they are approved by the legislature or accepted by the courts. They may even be portrayed as efforts to improve democracy — making the judiciary more efficient, combating corruption, or cleaning up the electoral process.” Moreover, the two authors observe that those who denounce such legal threats to democracy are often “dismissed as exaggerating or
Monday was the 37th anniversary of former president Chiang Ching-kuo’s (蔣經國) death. Chiang — a son of former president Chiang Kai-shek (蔣介石), who had implemented party-state rule and martial law in Taiwan — has a complicated legacy. Whether one looks at his time in power in a positive or negative light depends very much on who they are, and what their relationship with the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) is. Although toward the end of his life Chiang Ching-kuo lifted martial law and steered Taiwan onto the path of democratization, these changes were forced upon him by internal and external pressures,
The Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) caucus in the Legislative Yuan has made an internal decision to freeze NT$1.8 billion (US$54.7 million) of the indigenous submarine project’s NT$2 billion budget. This means that up to 90 percent of the budget cannot be utilized. It would only be accessible if the legislature agrees to lift the freeze sometime in the future. However, for Taiwan to construct its own submarines, it must rely on foreign support for several key pieces of equipment and technology. These foreign supporters would also be forced to endure significant pressure, infiltration and influence from Beijing. In other words,
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