The flip-flop that resulted from a recent Associated Press (AP) interview with President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) illustrates not just the mishandling of such interviews by the Government Information Office and the presidential press office, but also a more serious problem of how Ma addresses his cross-strait policy to both domestic and external audiences.
A closer examination of Ma’s latest political maneuvering on his strategy of “economics first, politics later” to alleviate Beijing’s pressure for negotiation on political issues after both sides signed the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) in late June shows he has incorporated a series of attempts to frame the debate of cross-strait relations in the so-called “post-ECFA era.”
One tends to overlook the call made by Ma’s closest friend, Red Cross Association president C.V. Chen (陳長文), for a meeting between Ma and Chinese President and Communist Party General Secretary Hu Jintao (胡錦濤). Chen is not the first person to raise the issue of a Ma-Hu meeting. Some US scholars and ex-officials have already suggested a Ma-Hu encounter on a chairman-to-chairman basis at the APEC leadership summit, scheduled to be held by the US government in Hawaii in November next year.
Despite Ma’s alleged effort to test the waters by -appointing Vice President Vincent Siew (蕭萬長) as his special envoy to attend this year’s APEC summit in Tokyo, which was rejected by Beijing, it did show the Ma administration’s interest in paving the way for a Ma-Hu meeting at next year’s APEC summit, not long before the next presidential election in Taiwan.
Chen’s proposal did not touch upon the APEC summit, but instead centered on a Ma-Hu meeting to discuss issues related to the ECFA. Chen’s suggestion implied “a third place” outside the APEC forum for such a meeting.
Were a Ma-Hu meeting to take place during the early stages of the presidential campaign, it would no doubt attract domestic and international attention and could boost Ma’s election campaign — particularly if Ma’s popularity remains sluggish at that time and the opposition Democratic Progressive Party’s (DPP) candidate has the upper hand. In addition to being able to set the agenda for his cross-strait relations in the campaign, Ma could also portray his hand--shaking with Hu as a huge diplomatic breakthrough and cross-strait rapprochement.
The question is, however, whether Hu would play the game with Ma. And most importantly, could Ma meet with Hu in an appropriate capacity without demeaning his status as the democratically elected leader of Taiwan?
Despite Ma and the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) denying that the time is ripe for a potential Ma-Hu meeting, it is fair to say that the Presidential Office has never given up on any possibility for such a meeting before 2012 as an option to help his re-election hopes.
In the controversial AP interview, Ma reacted to the question of “whether he would move to political issues in his second term if economic issues are resolved” by saying that “it depends on how fast they move and whether these issues are satisfactorily resolved.”
The Presidential Office accused AP of misquoting Ma’s answer as saying “the political negotiation could start as early as his second term if he wins re-election in 2012.”
Ma insists there is no timetable for cross-strait political talks and he will stick to his stance of “economics first and politics later.”
Ironically, China’s Taiwan Affairs Office Director Wang Yi (王毅) immediately seconded Ma’s principle of “economics first and politics later” during his trip to the US, but added a Chinese version of “economics with politics” to ensure Ma’s cross-strait agenda remains on Beijing’s “perceived” track.
Wang’s statement also reflects Beijing’s concern of a potential come-back for the DPP in 2012, which has sped up its pressure on the Ma administration to at least maintain the momentum and create the atmosphere for political talks in Ma’s second term.
Wang expressed his concern about the DPP outperforming the KMT in Taiwan’s upcoming five special municipality elections, saying that “if [the DPP is] not effectively and completely controlled then it will be hard to basically stabilize the situation in the Taiwan Strait and relations may run the risk of stalling or going backward.”
Wang’s expression of concern about Taipei’s delaying of political talks and his elaboration of “no clear separation of economic and political issues” should be wake-up calls to the Ma administration to avoid making further concessions to Beijing or bypassing Taiwan’s democratic and legislative procedures for any secret discussion of political issues with Beijing in the remainder of Ma’s term.
The most important task now for Ma is not to engage in fights with AP, but to come up with effective measures to counteract China’s full-scale penetration into Taiwan’s society, financial market, electoral system and security environment along with his China-friendly policy.
Liu Shih-chung is a senior research fellow at the Taipei-based Taiwan Brain Trust.
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