Japanese news outlets have reported that the US is leaning toward the view that the most recent incident between Japan and China in the waters off the Diaoyutai Islands (釣魚台) was organized by the Chinese government and not a random occurrence. However, thanks to US demands that the matter be handled properly, there seems to be hope that the incident, in which a Chinese boat captain was detained by Japanese authorities for the first time in more than a decade and later returned to China, will find a peaceful resolution.
There are reasons for saying that the incident was not a random occurrence. In 1978, China sent more than 200 fishing boats from the Zhoushan Islands off the coast of China’s Zhejiang Province to claim sovereignty over the Diaoyutais. The result was a standoff with Japanese ships. However, in 1979, former Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping (鄧小平) announced that the dispute should be shelved and that the two sides should develop the area together, thus tacitly acknowledging Japan’s de facto occupation of the area. Chinese fishing boats stopped entering the area to claim sovereignty over the islands and after this, only Taiwanese vessels engaged in standoffs with Japanese vessels over the territorial dispute.
It was, therefore, highly irregular to see a Chinese fishing boat try to declare sovereignty over the islands while the US and Japan were holding their first ever joint military exercise in waters off the Diaoyutais.
While the unprecedented tension caused by the detainment of the Chinese captain seems to have ended peacefully, the situation highlights three issues that require further attention.
The first issue is the difficult situation presented by Chinese nationalism. China’s rapid rise and the fact that it handled the recent global economic crisis better than other countries have fueled Chinese ambitions. However, at the same time, conflicts over reducing carbon outputs, the dispute over China’s exchange rate and the North Korean issue have caused tensions to rise between China and the US and contributed to rising Chinese nationalism.
The Tiananmen Square Massacre, together with China’s reforms and opening up, greatly influenced the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) ideology, and as a result, the encouragement of nationalism became the main vehicle for consolidating the legitimacy of the regime.
The current situation and incidents have caused anti-Japanese sentiment to surge, and the Chinese government has adopted its toughest stance ever toward Japan. However, when anti-Japanese members of the public planned to use the Sept. 18 anniversary of the Japanese invasion of China to initiate an anti-Japanese campaign, they were suppressed by the government. Leaders of the movement to protect sovereignty over the Diaoyutais were also monitored and there were few demonstrations around China.
The fact that the CCP suppressed anti-Japanese demonstrations despite its own anti-Japanese stance implies that the regime is wary of the nationalism it has nourished for so long. This is because other countries have shown that when extreme nationalism appears, governments will not be able to meet the demands of the extremists and the government instead becomes the target of populist attacks.
That is why Beijing acts tough toward Japan while at the same time suppresses domestic extremism. However, nationalism is often characterized by a close connection between domestic and international affairs that is difficult to break. The current contradictory handling of the domestic and the international situation is a bit odd, and it is difficult to get a handle on how to best deal with the situation.
Second, because of China’s long tradition of CCP leadership of the army, it is puzzling to see how hawks among the military and academics seem to have directed policy as international conflict has increased over the past year. Policy now seems to be at loggerheads with Chinese President Hu Jintao’s (胡錦濤) overall strategy of peaceful development and diplomacy. Does this mean something has gone wrong with the relationship between the CCP and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA)?
It does look that way. For a start, former Chinese leader Mao Zedong (毛澤東) and Deng were both military leaders who had proven themselves in war, so they had no problems controlling the military. Things were different for former Chinese president Jiang Zemin (江澤民), who had to make concessions to the military.
Even more important, China has traditionally seen unity as the highest value. All values are decided by the leadership and the CCP has always placed particular value on ideology. The CCP general secretary controls the party, the government and the military. The general secretary also controls the propaganda machinery. Mao was depicted as both a political and a military thinker, as was Deng and even Jiang.
Hu, however, is unique as the first national leader without his own brand of military thought. As a result, the PLA has developed its own strategy and military thinking, claiming that the South China Sea is part of China’s core interests.
These examples imply that Hu’s control over China’s military is inferior to that of previous leaders.
Thirdly, Mao and Deng gained power through life-or-death struggles, while Jiang and Hu were anointed by their strongman predecessors. As Hu is about to hand over power, his successor will not be anointed by a strongman, but will instead be nominated and elected through an internal party process. As hopefuls show their abilities, they prefer to lean left rather than right to consolidate their power, giving the military more influence and promoting strong nationalism.
These signs imply that Beijing is facing a new situation. It is worrying that this nationalism is not likely to disappear together with tension over the Diaoyutai Islands.
Lin Cho-shui is a former Democratic Progressive Party legislator.
TRANSLATED BY DREW CAMERON
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