President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) was no doubt pleased last week when Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao (溫家寶) offered his reassurances concerning the missiles China has aimed at Taiwan. Ma has repeatedly called on Beijing to remove the missiles if the two sides of the Taiwan Strait are to begin political negotiations.
However, a closer look at Wen’s remarks indicate little to be pleased about. It was not a policy statement, but merely an indifferent response to questions from a Taiwanese reporter.
As Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) Chairperson Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) said, “will one day be removed” was so vague that it is meaningless.
Not that being more specific would have helped. Had Wen provided a date and timetable, removing the weapons would still be little more than a gesture. Analysts repeatedly point out that if the missiles are moved, they can easily be replaced if negotiations do not produce the desired results. And if China gets what it wants: It can deploy the missiles elsewhere, which makes Taiwan’s problem everyone’s problem since China has no shortage of territorial disputes.
Indeed, an incident last week reminds us of just this. Japan’s unsuccessful attempt to prosecute a Chinese fishing boat captain for colliding with two Japanese Coast Guard vessels in disputed waters off the Diaoyutai Islands (釣魚台) is disturbing for many reasons.
First is Tokyo’s sheer ineptitude in the affair. Having detained the captain and announced plans to try him, officials abruptly reversed course when an enraged China threatened to block exports to Japan of materials essential to high-tech manufacturing. Apparently surprised by the fury of China’s response, Tokyo’s lack of resolve to pursue the case angered many Japanese, who described the decision as foolish and humiliating.
Another reason for alarm is the Chinese response, which, to give the Japanese some credit, was stronger than expected given that such incidents are hardly unusual. For Ma and others who seek to calm concerns about future relations across the Taiwan Strait, China’s treatment of Japan signals not just its growing power, but its aggression. For all the talk of soft power and denials of regional hegemony, China seems willing to use force to achieve its goals.
Most troubling about Japan’s humiliation, however, is that the force China used was not military. For those determined to see Taiwan obtain F-16s and other US military hardware for cross-strait defense, it is worth noting that Japan has plenty of military equipment, and thousands of US troops to operate it.
Another thing analysts have long said is that China’s military threat will ultimately be matched by its economic clout. As Japan’s largest trading partner, China wields immense power over its neighbors. Neither missiles nor any other form of conventional armament could begin to match the damage that could be caused to Japan’s already struggling economy were China to follow through on its threat.
The obvious effect in Taiwan of Japan’s Diaoyutais debacle will be to dampen enthusiasm for the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement, which the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) administration has pushed so strongly. Closer cross-strait economic ties will certainly make Taiwan more vulnerable to Chinese coercion, and warnings of this danger must be harder for the government to dismiss.
Yet the ultimate lesson may be for the DPP. Say what she wants about Wen’s remark, but Tsai too must be wary. China is increasingly the dominant force in the region and it must be dealt with. High seas bravura will not do. If the DPP is to be a viable political alternative, it must develop positions that will make a cross-strait relationship possible.
Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) caucus whip Fu Kun-chi (傅?萁) has caused havoc with his attempts to overturn the democratic and constitutional order in the legislature. If we look at this devolution from the context of a transition to democracy from authoritarianism in a culturally Chinese sense — that of zhonghua (中華) — then we are playing witness to a servile spirit from a millennia-old form of totalitarianism that is intent on damaging the nation’s hard-won democracy. This servile spirit is ingrained in Chinese culture. About a century ago, Chinese satirist and author Lu Xun (魯迅) saw through the servile nature of
In their New York Times bestseller How Democracies Die, Harvard political scientists Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt said that democracies today “may die at the hands not of generals but of elected leaders. Many government efforts to subvert democracy are ‘legal,’ in the sense that they are approved by the legislature or accepted by the courts. They may even be portrayed as efforts to improve democracy — making the judiciary more efficient, combating corruption, or cleaning up the electoral process.” Moreover, the two authors observe that those who denounce such legal threats to democracy are often “dismissed as exaggerating or
Monday was the 37th anniversary of former president Chiang Ching-kuo’s (蔣經國) death. Chiang — a son of former president Chiang Kai-shek (蔣介石), who had implemented party-state rule and martial law in Taiwan — has a complicated legacy. Whether one looks at his time in power in a positive or negative light depends very much on who they are, and what their relationship with the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) is. Although toward the end of his life Chiang Ching-kuo lifted martial law and steered Taiwan onto the path of democratization, these changes were forced upon him by internal and external pressures,
The Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) caucus in the Legislative Yuan has made an internal decision to freeze NT$1.8 billion (US$54.7 million) of the indigenous submarine project’s NT$2 billion budget. This means that up to 90 percent of the budget cannot be utilized. It would only be accessible if the legislature agrees to lift the freeze sometime in the future. However, for Taiwan to construct its own submarines, it must rely on foreign support for several key pieces of equipment and technology. These foreign supporters would also be forced to endure significant pressure, infiltration and influence from Beijing. In other words,