Who controls whom?
It would surely come as some relief to Robin Winkler to know that he is safely mistaken in his diagnosis of what ails Taiwan (“Who speaks for the rule of law?” Aug, 28, p 8).
Winkler’s chastisement of the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) for undermining “the rule of law” is at best a superficial analysis and perhaps even a dishonest one.
The facts to support his argument may be clear to see, but, by framing them in the context of “the rule of law” he diffracts the light away from the true nature of what is happening — this is not simply the behavior of a “rough” executive, Taiwan is quite literally being invaded.
First, there was not, is not, nor can there ever be, a single example of when Winkler’s so-called “rule of law” does not devolve to, or in the more salient cases degrade to, the rule of men.
For sure, there are ample questions as to the degree to which that may occur, but the relevant point is that Winkler’s “rule of law” has always been little more than a rhetorical flourish promoted by popular ignorance of the status of what he calls a “fundamental value of Western society.”
It is not and nor does it make any sense to think of it as such. The obvious question to put to him would be why the overall design of the legal architecture in the US, which he refers to with such mendacious phrasing, was designed in the way it was in the first place?
The answer to that question is that the US legal system was designed with the specific intent of limiting the powers of government and protecting the freedom of the individual.
This idea was, is and always will be anathema to Chinese (and not only Chinese) conceptions of society.
The failure of democratic government in Taiwan to prevent the degradation of the “rule of law” into this sinister “rule of party” is neither unique, nor should it really be a surprise. In fact, the US itself furnishes any honest student with plenty of examples of this trend, both historical and current.
The warping of democratic government in Taiwan may have been exacerbated by the pre-existing organizational power of the KMT, but even that itself can be fully explained by an initial design flaw — a central, unified legal architecture that concentrates political power under a territorial monopoly rather than diffuses power as far as possible toward the individual.
The last time Taiwan was plunged from the beginnings of Western enlightenment into the barbarity of two centuries of Chinese darkness came about as the result of the sudden invasion of Chinese power represented by the forces of Cheng Cheng-kung (鄭成功) back in 1661.
Today, the weapons of combat are different — legal provisions for land theft instead of warships and so on — but the nature of what is happening is similar.
Perhaps a better concept for understanding Taiwan’s current problems comes from the rather unlikely source of Vladimir Ilyich Lenin and his famous formula: “who, whom?”
MICHAEL FAGAN
Tainan
A gap appears to be emerging between Washington’s foreign policy elites and the broader American public on how the United States should respond to China’s rise. From my vantage working at a think tank in Washington, DC, and through regular travel around the United States, I increasingly experience two distinct discussions. This divergence — between America’s elite hawkishness and public caution — may become one of the least appreciated and most consequential external factors influencing Taiwan’s security environment in the years ahead. Within the American policy community, the dominant view of China has grown unmistakably tough. Many members of Congress, as
The Hong Kong government on Monday gazetted sweeping amendments to the implementation rules of Article 43 of its National Security Law. There was no legislative debate, no public consultation and no transition period. By the time the ink dried on the gazette, the new powers were already in force. This move effectively bypassed Hong Kong’s Legislative Council. The rules were enacted by the Hong Kong chief executive, in conjunction with the Committee for Safeguarding National Security — a body shielded from judicial review and accountable only to Beijing. What is presented as “procedural refinement” is, in substance, a shift away from
The shifting geopolitical tectonic plates of this year have placed Beijing in a profound strategic dilemma. As Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) prepares for a high-stakes summit with US President Donald Trump, the traditional power dynamics of the China-Japan-US triangle have been destabilized by the diplomatic success of Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi in Washington. For the Chinese leadership, the anxiety is two-fold: There is a visceral fear of being encircled by a hardened security alliance, and a secondary risk of being left in a vulnerable position by a transactional deal between Washington and Tokyo that might inadvertently empower Japan
After declaring Iran’s military “gone,” US President Donald Trump appealed to the UK, France, Japan and South Korea — as well as China, Iran’s strategic partner — to send minesweepers and naval forces to reopen the Strait of Hormuz. When allies balked, the request turned into a warning: NATO would face “a very bad” future if it refused. The prevailing wisdom is that Trump faces a credibility problem: having spent years insulting allies, he finds they would not rally when he needs them. That is true, but superficial, as though a structural collapse could be caused by wounded feelings. Something
RSS