President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九), when speaking at public occasions, has repeatedly called on the US to continue selling defensive weapons to Taiwan.
On Aug. 6, when meeting a delegation from the US Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) focusing on cross-strait confidence-building measures, Ma once more expressed his hope that the US would agree to sell advanced F-16C/D fighter jets to Taiwan. One can be sure, however, that as China gradually increases its influence, it will become more and more difficult for the US to sell Taiwan sensitive key weapons systems.
On Aug. 7, a delegation of Taiwanese lawmakers on a visit to the US told their hosts that after Kidd-class destroyers purchased from the US went into service in Taiwan, Taiwan’s navy, lacking sufficient technical know-how and spare parts, had some trouble conducting major repairs to the ships. The delegation suggested that the ships could go back to the US for maintenance. The Americans said they would seriously consider this suggestion, and added that if such an arrangement were found to be inappropriate, the US would send qualified personnel to help maintain the ships.
It has also been reported that next year the US State Department, invoking the Department of Defense’s Excess Defense Articles program, will approve the sale to Taiwan of two soon-to-be-replaced Perry-class frigates at just US$20 million each. The only problem with this proposal is that the US is set to take this class of frigate out of service entirely, which means that Taiwan is likely to have the same kind of problems it has had with the Kidd-class destroyers if it doesn’t fully master the skills necessary to service the frigates and if it can’t ensure a supply of spare parts.
In fact none of the items included in two waves of arms sales approved by the US over the last few years are key weapons that Taiwan really needs. Brian Kennedy, president of US think tank the Claremont Institute, wrote in the Wall Street Journal on Jan. 10 that most arms sales have been merely symbolic in nature and if the US really wants to help Taiwan improve its defensive capability it should approve the sale of more advanced weapons.
“Absent such serious defensive weaponry, the sale of arms is just a symbolic gesture rather than a meaningful military acquisition,” Kennedy wrote.
The reality of Taiwan’s arms purchases is in sharp contrast with Ma’s insistence, as expressed at a ceremony at the Ministry of National Defense last December, that money must be spent where it is most effective. Since arms purchases in recent years have been more for the sake of appearance than of practical use, it is not without good reason that some critics dismiss them as “bits and pieces.”
Since Ma took office in 2008, the National Security Council (NSC) has held a string of at least 10 closed-door meetings on the question of proposed submarine purchases, aimed at compiling opinions from various interested parties to formulate policy suggestions. However, after discussing the matter for two years, the NSC has still not come up with any public position.
At a dinner with a US delegation visiting Taiwan recently, Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) Legislator Lin Yu-fang (林郁方) asked former commander of US forces in the Pacific, Admiral Timothy Keating, whether Taiwan needed to buy submarines, to which Keating replied simply: “Of course.”
When Su Chi (蘇起) resigned from his post as secretary-general of the NSC on Feb. 12, he revealed that he had once had a private meeting with then-US director of National Intelligence and former commander of the US Pacific Command Dennis Blair to talk about Taiwan’s submarine purchase plans.
Su recalled that the main reason given by the US for not agreeing to sell the subs was that Taiwan did not have enough deep-water harbor facilities and that it wasn’t capable of follow-up maintenance on the subs. Anyone with any knowledge of military analysis could easily point out the falseness and absurdity of this assertion, but surprisingly neither the Ministry of Defense nor the Navy has refuted it or given any clear response.
Mackenzie Eaglen is a research fellow for national security studies with US think tank the Heritage Foundation. Eaglen writes that, as China actively develops its naval power, Australia, India and countries around the Pacific have taken note of the shifting balance and responded by boosting their own naval armament programs. Notably, Australia, India, South Korea, Indonesia, Vietnam, Malaysia and, just recently, Japan, are all planning to expand their submarine fleets. Evidently, submarines are a priority consideration when it comes to asymmetric warfare preparedness.
Australia, for example, plans to build 12 new generation submarines for its navy. Despite the cost of between US$25 billion and US$35 billion, this plan has won widespread approval from the public, mainly because the policy decision has undergone a defense procurement review, allowing open and transparent information and analysis.
Taiwan’s existing anti-submarine warfare capability lags at least ten years behind the most advanced navies. The passivity and caution of Taiwan’s navy stem from its unwillingness to take on risks and from its determination to protect its vested interests.
This situation cannot go on forever. The Ma administration and the navy should not be allowed to keep putting off a decision on whether to build up our submarine fleet. No matter whether they finally decide for or against it, they should explain the decision clearly, and if the US is not able to supply the subs Taiwan wants, the government and navy should devise backup plans.
Wang Jyh-perng is an associate research fellow at the Association for Managing Defense and Strategies .
TRANSLATED BY JULIAN CLEGG
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