Tue, Aug 10, 2010 page8

• Ma in no rush on political talks

  • By Liu Shih-chung 劉世忠
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  Since the signing of the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) with China on June 29, cross-strait relations have entered a new phase of uncertainty, as Beijing has increased pressure on President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) for negotiations on political issues.

  Despite suggestions that China will not rush into political talks with the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) government, Beijing has made a number of attempts to push forward political negotiations. In his meeting with the former KMT chairman Wu Po-hsiung (吳伯雄) earlier this month, Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary and Chinese President Hu Jintao (胡錦濤) defined the signing of such an agreement as a “political basis for deterring Taiwan independence and embracing the ‘1992 consensus.’”

  In addition, a spokesperson for the People’s Liberation Army revealed China intends to engage in negotiations with Taiwan on withdrawing some of the missiles deployed in Fujian Province. However, the Chinese have insisted such negotiations must be conducted on the basis of the “one China” principle.

  Beijing’s goal is clearly to force the Ma administration to “yield political interests” to China following Beijing’s “yielding of economic interests” in the ECFA negotiations.

  The second goal is to define cross-strait relations under the rubric of the “one China” principle, so that even the Democratic Progressive Party would find it difficult to backtrack if it regained the presidency in 2012.

  The Ma administration’s reaction to Beijing’s new call for “political cooperation following economic cooperation” and “partial withdrawal of its missiles” has so far been cautious. Premier Wu Den-yih (吳敦義) and Presidential Office Spokesperson Lo Chih-chiang (羅智強) reiterated the KMT’s long-time policy of adhering to the “1992 consensus,” without directly challenging Beijing’s “one China” principle. Ma prefered to highlight the news that Taiwan and Singapore are to explore the possibility of signing an economic cooperation agreement under the WTO framework.

  At the same time, in her speech to the American Enterprise Institute in Washington, Mainland Affairs Council Chairwoman Lai Shin-yuan (賴幸媛) identified China’s military threats against Taiwan and its unwillingness to renounce its “Anti-Secession” Law as two major obstacles to better cross-strait relations.

  If Lai’s statements were made with Ma’s approval, they sent a clear message to Beijing that the KMT government, is keen to stick to the current policy of “putting economics first and politics later” and deal with “easier issues first and harder issues later.”

  This strategy aims to downplay Chinese pressure and therefore avoid giving the pan-green camp additional ammunition for the special municipality elections.

  That explains why Ma unveiled his government’s plan to “start” negotiations with the Singaporean government on an “economic cooperation agreement” under the WTO framework. Despite having no set date or concrete content, the agreement would have definite symbolic benefits. Ma’s strategy is to boost his popularity by forging a pact akin to a free-trade agreement (FTA) with non-­diplomatic allies, making good on an earlier pledge he made that Taiwan’s chances of completing FTAs with other countries would improve after signing the ECFA.

  Given such calculations, it is unlikely that Ma will start political talks with his Chinese counterparts in the near future.

  The next step depends on the November elections. If the KMT wins, Ma will have greater leeway to use cross-strait relations as part of his bid for re-­election, starting next spring. The KMT and the CCP could also work to generate public support for political talks on a peace agreement, military confidence-building mechanisms and even a potential Ma-Hu meeting at the APEC summit in Hawaii in November next year.

  If the KMT were to lose badly in the special municipality elections, Ma would slow down his cross-strait policy and focus on consolidating the sovereignty of the Republic of China through next year’s centennial celebrations.

  How would China react to Ma’s go-slow on political talks? Beijing would of course suspect that Ma could be a “peaceful separatist.” Whether China will obstruct the proposed negotiations between Taiwan and Singapore on an economic cooperation agreement remains uncertain, but it is clear that we need to watch carefully the title, content and process of the negotiations.

  Liu Shih-chung is a senior research fellow at the Taipei-based Taiwan Brain Trust.

  Editor’s note: The “1992 consensus” is a term former National Security Council secretary-general Su Chi admitted inventing in 2000 in a bid to describe the KMT claim that Taiwan and China had agreed on the existence of “one China,” but with different interpretations.
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