When the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) held a demonstration on June 26 to protest the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) the Ma administration signed with Beijing, three people were conspicuous by their absence: Tainan Mayor Hsu Tain-tsair (許添財), Tainan County Commissioner Su Huan-chih (蘇煥智) and Kaohsiung County Commissioner Yang Chiu-hsing (楊秋興).
All three are party members, hold key elected positions in the south and would normally attend such a rally.
However, Hsu, Su and Yang have something else in common. They all lost bids for the party’s nomination in their respective areas for the November special municipality elections. Speculation is rife that they now intend to run as independents, thus raising the specter of a split DPP vote.
All three men deny such speculation. Hsu said he didn’t attend the march because he was “exhausted,” Su felt that the party’s position on ECFA was too vague and Yang had voiced displeasure with the party and criticized Kaohsiung Mayor Chen Chu (陳菊) during primaries for the party nomination in Greater Kaohsiung, which she won.
It may be that the other two, like Yang, feel jilted after years of loyal and valuable service. Whatever their grievances, the party has a problem, one that DPP Chairperson Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) must deal with and soon.
While the south is generally considered a DPP stronghold, previous elections have shown this strength to be more apparent than real. The Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) has always run a close second, even winning on occasion. Indeed, Chen’s margin of victory in the 2006 race was a mere 0.14 percent, not much of a cushion if a disaffected Yang chooses to play spoiler in November.
While the chances of an independent mounting a successful campaign are slim, a few percentage points could easily undo the DPP in one or more of the special municipality elections.
Tsai can do two things to resolve this problem. First, she can recognize the contributions of Hsu, Su and Yang and perhaps offer appointments either within the municipal administrations should the DPP candidates win or elsewhere in the party. It may be that their no-show at the ECFA demonstration was intended to elicit such a response. However, all three have proven themselves more than capable in the past and keeping them firmly within the party fold is as important as keeping them out of the upcoming elections.
In the event that appeasement fails and one of the three does decide to go rogue, Tsai should be prepared to denounce that person in no uncertain terms, thus reaffirming party solidarity and mobilizing voter support against betrayal from within.
This may sound melodramatic, but a split in DPP ranks going into the fall election season risks making the party look weak and divided, an especially dangerous situation coming on the heels of significant KMT victories on legislation and international affairs — the ECFA being at the top of the list — and the KMT’s current strength must not be underestimated, even in the south.
This is doubly true for Tsai. Recently re-elected to the DPP’s top post and running her first campaign for office, her chances in the Sinbei mayoral race have shown promise in the last few weeks, but this could change quickly if she is perceived to be unable to manage her own party.
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