As the saying goes, you stand where you sit. Not long ago, when Paul Wolfowitz was closer to defense than the corporatism he now embodies, he was instrumental in the drafting of alarming reports about the rise of the Chinese military and the threat that this represented to US security and, by extension, Taiwan.
Now that he is chairman of the US-Taiwan Business Council, however, Wolfowitz sings a different tune. This does not mean that his views on the Chinese military threat have softened, but his new role forces him to look at the same object from a different perspective. By doing so, he appears to have lost sight of the fact that China remains a threat, especially in the proximate environment of Taiwan.
Wolfowitz, like many others who look at Taiwan from a purely economic angle, appears to have divorced a conundrum that can only be fully understood if all the components are taken into consideration. In other words, despite what President Ma Ying-jeou’s (馬英九) administration has repeatedly said, the question of cross-strait economics simply cannot be addressed without also taking into account matters of politics and security.
However, this is exactly what the hitherto hawkish Wolfowitz appeared to be arguing when he told the American Enterprise Institute in Washington that “I really hope that somehow the two political parties find a way to come together in a truly bipartisan spirit, because getting an ECFA [economic cooperation framework agreement] and getting it right — which means it will be sustainable even if there is a change in administrations in Taipei — is not only important to Taiwan’s economy, it is important to Taiwan’s national security.”
If, as it is becoming increasingly clear, an ECFA and cross-strait economic integration are non-traditional means to achieve the same objective — that is, unification — how can such agreements be “important to Taiwan’s national security”?
What is national security, anyway? Is it simply the absence of war, or is it, more crucially, the assurance that a nation will be allowed to express itself without fear, intimidation and in a manner that reflects the majority of its constituents?
The US has long insisted that the Taiwan question should be resolved by both sides of the Taiwan Strait in a peaceful way. Peaceful, however, does not only apply to military force; negotiations behind closed doors by elite groups that are neither elected nor representative of the public, in which one party does not recognize the legal existence of the other, bears all the hallmarks of hostility. It is subtler and, on the surface, non-threatening, but if the desired result is the subjugation of 23 million people and the eventual curtailment of their identity and freedoms, it is not peaceful. An ECFA is an instrument to create economic hyper-dependence on China that will give Beijing additional means to coerce Taipei politically.
Far too often, the conservative Blue Team in Washington has looked at China from a purely security angle, an influence that at times has undermined relations between Beijing and Washington. Equally misleading is the other end of the spectrum, led by stock investors and business council chairs, which fails to add politics and security to the cross-strait equation and looks at the matter as if it involved two equal entities.
That isn’t the case. One side has a longstanding policy of unification, by force if necessary. While the “by force if necessary” appears unlikely in the current atmosphere, there is no doubt that the military option can be reactivated at a moment’s notice.
Yes, a takeover by economic means is “peaceful” by conventional definition, but the result is the same: 23 million people (minus the minority that seeks unification) are forced to accept an outcome that doesn’t represent their core values.
J. Michael Cole is an editor at the Taipei Times.
Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) caucus whip Fu Kun-chi (傅?萁) has caused havoc with his attempts to overturn the democratic and constitutional order in the legislature. If we look at this devolution from the context of a transition to democracy from authoritarianism in a culturally Chinese sense — that of zhonghua (中華) — then we are playing witness to a servile spirit from a millennia-old form of totalitarianism that is intent on damaging the nation’s hard-won democracy. This servile spirit is ingrained in Chinese culture. About a century ago, Chinese satirist and author Lu Xun (魯迅) saw through the servile nature of
In their New York Times bestseller How Democracies Die, Harvard political scientists Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt said that democracies today “may die at the hands not of generals but of elected leaders. Many government efforts to subvert democracy are ‘legal,’ in the sense that they are approved by the legislature or accepted by the courts. They may even be portrayed as efforts to improve democracy — making the judiciary more efficient, combating corruption, or cleaning up the electoral process.” Moreover, the two authors observe that those who denounce such legal threats to democracy are often “dismissed as exaggerating or
Monday was the 37th anniversary of former president Chiang Ching-kuo’s (蔣經國) death. Chiang — a son of former president Chiang Kai-shek (蔣介石), who had implemented party-state rule and martial law in Taiwan — has a complicated legacy. Whether one looks at his time in power in a positive or negative light depends very much on who they are, and what their relationship with the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) is. Although toward the end of his life Chiang Ching-kuo lifted martial law and steered Taiwan onto the path of democratization, these changes were forced upon him by internal and external pressures,
The Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) caucus in the Legislative Yuan has made an internal decision to freeze NT$1.8 billion (US$54.7 million) of the indigenous submarine project’s NT$2 billion budget. This means that up to 90 percent of the budget cannot be utilized. It would only be accessible if the legislature agrees to lift the freeze sometime in the future. However, for Taiwan to construct its own submarines, it must rely on foreign support for several key pieces of equipment and technology. These foreign supporters would also be forced to endure significant pressure, infiltration and influence from Beijing. In other words,