Two weeks ago, President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) and Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) Chairperson Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) debated the proposed economic cooperation framework agreement (ECFA) with China. Now that the dust has settled, two things seem clear. One is that the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) seems to hold most of the cards. Ma vowed to forge ahead with the deal regardless of the debate and, after his better than expected performance, he has no reason to reconsider.
The other is that the DPP wanted a public debate and got it. Tsai presented herself well and gained valuable exposure as a rising star on the political scene. However, she failed to deliver a decisive blow. With the deal due to be signed next month, Tsai is now reduced to calling for public protest, while supporters continue to push a referendum that is unlikely to be held.
The DPP seems to be running out of options — which does not mean the fight is over. ECFA negotiations continue and even after it is inked, changes are possible. DPP lawmakers have vowed to repeal the accord if they win a majority in 2012.
However, impassioned claims like this suggest it may be time to take stock — on both sides.
Ma, whose advisers seem to be giving him better guidance than before, should be pleased with his debate performance and the ECFA’s progress generally. Free-trade agreements are always hard to sell, especially when power relations are so unequal. Ma and the KMT have also been careful to avoid gloating and to continue reassuring voters that they will be protected, albeit by way of meaningless sound bites, as Tsai points out.
However, to advance his trade policy beyond his we-have-no-other-choice argument, Ma must do two things. First, he must add substance to his reassurances. This includes information about what is in the ECFA, balanced projections of gains and losses, assurances that backup plans and other trade pacts are in the works, programs for retraining and support in industries negatively affected and some indication that security concerns will be addressed.
Second, he must show a greater willingness to concede that Taiwanese have good reason to be worried. Dismissiveness and condescension have often been the KMT’s — and Ma’s — modus operandi. Ma would do well to recall that whatever an ECFA’s benefits, they will take time and results will be mixed. Even if the pact turns out well, it may not benefit a party that treats public fear as part of the cost of doing business.
As for the DPP, Tsai has had a lesson. Sensible questions and reasoned argument fared poorly against evasions and canned assurance. In her words, Ma won the debate with “political propaganda” and she lost it because she was not good at political talk.
Also, options still on the table must be carefully considered. The DPP must think about the consequences if voters approve the agreement. What then?
Public demonstrations raise awareness, but they are also dangerous. People get hurt and the DPP would be held responsible. Surely little is added to party esteem when legislative members resort to violence against bills they cannot block by legal means.
Those who promise repeal should remember that by 2012 the economy is likely to have improved. If ECFA is proven not to be the reason, the KMT will claim otherwise. It will also quote DPP politicians, including Tsai, who promise to cancel the pact, calling such promises a threat to newfound prosperity.
What the DPP needs most is a credible plan for engagement with China. Tsai’s offer of talks based on no political preconditions is nothing new. However, former vice president Annette Lu’s (呂秀蓮) warning last week against any such engagement suggests that Chinese demands are the least of Tsai’s worries. Whatever Tsai learned about politics in her recent encounter with Ma, it may serve her best in managing her party.
Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) caucus whip Fu Kun-chi (傅?萁) has caused havoc with his attempts to overturn the democratic and constitutional order in the legislature. If we look at this devolution from the context of a transition to democracy from authoritarianism in a culturally Chinese sense — that of zhonghua (中華) — then we are playing witness to a servile spirit from a millennia-old form of totalitarianism that is intent on damaging the nation’s hard-won democracy. This servile spirit is ingrained in Chinese culture. About a century ago, Chinese satirist and author Lu Xun (魯迅) saw through the servile nature of
In their New York Times bestseller How Democracies Die, Harvard political scientists Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt said that democracies today “may die at the hands not of generals but of elected leaders. Many government efforts to subvert democracy are ‘legal,’ in the sense that they are approved by the legislature or accepted by the courts. They may even be portrayed as efforts to improve democracy — making the judiciary more efficient, combating corruption, or cleaning up the electoral process.” Moreover, the two authors observe that those who denounce such legal threats to democracy are often “dismissed as exaggerating or
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