On April 11, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) began a series of public forums, the first on the aging population. The second, on the environment, was on Thursday, with plans for others ranging from globalization to international relations, including with China.
These meetings are meant to open a public dialogue to help the DPP map a 10-year policy platform. Chairperson Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) has given the project the highest priority, although she says it will not replace fundamental party values.
Tsai, who is up for re-election next month, believes that the DPP must prepare to govern Taiwan’s next generation. She has criticized politicians for being too concerned with short-term objectives and has vowed to make the DPP a party that is “insightful and forward-looking.”
The DPP is at an historic juncture. Soundly defeated in the 2008 presidential election, the DPP has made something of a comeback in recent months. Under Tsai’s leadership, the party made significant gains in legislative by-elections by capitalizing on the economic downturn and on a string of Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) political blunders since the party assumed power.
However, the DPP remains in a precarious position. Inspiring as they were, last year’s victories added little to the party’s legislative power. In addition, the gains that were made were due to declining KMT popularity rather than anything the DPP had done to gain support.
As Tsai is likely to be re-elected as party chair next month, two things are worth considering concerning how she will lead the DPP at this important time.
First is the relationship between Tsai’s 10-year plan and the party’s election strategy. The DPP has a great deal riding on polls in November and in 2012. Recent momentum must be sustained and if the party doesn’t win the presidency at the next election, it must make a serious challenge. Another poor showing could be fatal.
Yet Tsai has denied that the new long-term platform will be an issue in either of these elections.
It may be that she is playing down the plan to avoid alarming core supporters. Or she may hope to evade countermeasures by flying under the KMT’s radar. Either way, it is not the time for the DPP to hide its light under a bushel.
Beginning with its series of public forums — which are a welcome relief from the KMT’s dictatorial approach to policy — the 10-year plan is an excellent initiative that should be front and center in DPP election strategy over the next two years.
In addition to its democratic approach, the plan notably broadens the party’s platform, distinguishing it from the KMT and giving it the credibility it lacked as a viable political alternative. Nothing could be more damaging to the 2012 DPP campaign than to appear to have been merely obstructionist during its time in opposition.
The second thing to consider about Tsai’s next term as chair is how the new platform addresses relations with China. Taiwanese sovereignty has long been the DPP’s main reason for being, and given the trouble this caused the previous DPP government, it is clear that everything will depend on resolving this.
Recalling the DPP’s Taiwan Independence Clause (台獨黨綱) in 1991, Resolution on Taiwan’s Future (台灣前途決議文) in 1999, and the Normal Country Resolution (正常國家決議文) in 2007, it is clear the party is capable of amending its platform to keep pace with changes in geopolitics.
Yet this is really the No. 1 problem now facing the DPP. Any chance of mounting a serious challenge in 2012 will depend on winning support from political moderates and they remain skeptical of the party’s ability to manage relations across the strait.
Tsai must be pragmatic in reducing tensions with China. She must also be critical and creative in fashioning a policy that succeeds, while not merely capitulating to military and economic pressure.
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