The Control Yuan moved to impeach Prosecutor-General Chen Tsung-ming (陳聰明), hoping to secure rapid disciplinary action. Chen circumvented the issue by resigning not long after the impeachment motion was passed. This solved the problem for Minister of Justice Wang Ching-feng (王清峰) and President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九). Ma, who was facing criticism from supporters for not moving quickly enough on Chen, dealt with his resignation summarily. And with that, he drew a line under the whole sorry affair.
Nothing that Chen has been involved in since he took up his position has attracted so much attention as the corruption case brought against former president Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁).
Ironically enough, it was the attention that this case attracted that led to Chen Tsung-ming’s stepping down, a victim of association with a persona non grata.
Heading the prosecutorial system is sure to attract court attention. The director-general is expected to have legal expertise and a wealth of experience to draw on, but there are other indispensable aspects to the job: integrity, morals and an untarnished image. The Control Yuan’s decision to impeach Chen Tsung-ming made his position untenable, so his resignation was no surprise. Politicians of all stripes differed on whether they had the political authority to get involved in the impeachment case, but they did agree on one thing — there was much reluctance to commend Chen Tsung-ming on his performance.
That does not necessarily mean it was right to topple Chen Tsung-ming. It also leads to another question: What is to be done about the long-term malaise afflicting the prosecutorial system?
Problems are rife: leaking confidential information and thereby compromising procedural integrity during investigations; indiscriminate prosecution, especially if a court hands down an inconvenient non-guilty verdict in the first instance; pandering to the media when choosing whom to prosecute; and tailoring one’s conduct to the media, playing to its whims and courting favor by subscribing to a pro-blue agenda, without due regard to getting to the truth of the case. All these actions compromise the credibility of the system. Each one of them will have to be addressed if we are to reform the judicial system.
Ma came into office on the promise of such reform. He is almost halfway through his term and he has done nothing to that end. To date, the only evidence of his promised reform has been to install computer screens outside the court so people can have access to the interrogation transcripts. And even this has nothing to do with Ma.
Wang is never out of the news, talking about the state of the prosecutorial system and how she will make sure things get done soon. It’s a shame. This kind of talk, followed by an endless stream of reports, sounds hollower as time goes on.
If Wang doesn’t do anything positive soon, people are going to lose hope that reform will ever materialize.
The Control Yuan has succeeded in getting Chen Tsung-ming to step down. However, the problems inherent in the prosecutorial system will not disappear with him. If these are not addressed, it will be impossible to restore credibility in the system.
It is true, as Wang has said, that Chen Tsung-ming ‘s conduct damaged the system, but it will take more than just words to fix it. She is still at a loss with what to do about existing problems. I’m afraid this is not simply going to add to Ma’s problems, it might even be the end of him.
Of course, reform does not just stop at ousting Chen Tsung-ming. There is a lot more work to do if we are to repair the damage that has been done.
Lin Feng-jeng is executive director of the Judicial Reform Foundation.
TRANSLATED BY PAUL COOPER
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